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Abstract 
The dissertation is comprised of three essays, which study unintended effects of charter school 
programs. Chapter 1 evaluates the influence of charter schools on housing values. The dynamics 
between school quality and housing markets contribute to the isolation of disadvantaged students 
in low performing school districts. Charter schools reduce the link between residential location 
and school services, and hence potentially affect both property values and residential sorting. This 
chapter examines if charter schools influence the differences in housing prices between school 
districts and neighborhoods. I begin by developing a theoretical model identifying how charter 
schools influence school quality and how these changes potentially affect housing prices. Utilizing 
housing sale data for Upstate New York between 2000 and 2010, I estimate models comparing 
changes in housing price differences between school districts and neighborhoods. I find that 
charter schools do not influence the gap in housing prices between districts but affect the 
differences in housing values between high and low income neighborhoods in districts with charter 
schools.  
 
Chapter 2 analyzes the location of charter schools in New York, Florida, North Carolina, 
Michigan, and Ohio. I begin by describing the finance, accountability, and authorizer policies in 
each state. Then, I derive location and enrollment incentives created by these policies. Estimated 
negative binomial models reveal consistency between location patterns and finance provisions. In 
states where charter school payments vary with district location, charter schools are more likely to 
locate in districts with high expenditures holding cost and performance constant. However, in 
states where charter school payments do not vary with district location, charter school location is 
not influenced by district expenditures. Compensations for enrolling disadvantaged students create 
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location and enrollment incentives if they are sufficient enough to cover the costs of educating 
these students. 
 
Chapter 3 examines how charter schools influence school district efficiency. Charter school 
opponents and proponents have been arguing for a long time about the effect of charter schools on 
district efficiency with very opposing views on the subject. Utilizing data for all New York State 
school districts from 1998 to 2009, I find that charter schools increase school district efficiency 
holding cost factors and district performance constant. The magnitude of the effect differs 
depending on the number of students enrolled in charter schools. The effect ranges between a 1.1 
and 3.4 percent decrease in per pupil expenditures for enrollments between 50 and 5000 charter 
school students respectively. The effect is driven by efficiency gains in the provision of education 
for students in traditional public schools. The results are confirmed by several falsification tests.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Charter schools have been one of the most significant developments in U.S. education over the 
last twenty years (Bifulco and Bulkley 2014). Since the first charter school program was 
introduced in Minnesota in 1991, 42 states and the District of Columbia have adopted charter 
school legislation. According to the National Center for Education Statistics (2014), the 
percentage of all public schools that were public charter schools increased from 1.7 to 5.8 
percent between 1999/2000 to 2011/2012. In over 100 mostly urban school districts charter 
schools serve more than 10 percent or the public school population. At the same time, charter 
school enrollment increased from 0.3 million to 2.1 million students nationwide.  
 
Charter schools receive public funding but operate independently of their local school district. A 
contract with a public agency exempts the school from selected state and local rules. In return for 
funding and autonomy, the school must meet student performance standards specified in the law 
and its charter. The contract usually lasts for a set number of years and must be renewed to 
continue receiving public funding. To enroll into a charter school students have to apply for 
admission. Charter school students can cross attendance zone and in most states district borders 
making charter schools clearly a form of school choice. They do not charge tuition and 
oversubscribed charter schools are normally required to select students by lottery (Nelson et al. 
2000; Bifulco and Bulkley 2008).     
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Research on charter schools has been mainly interested in the effects of charter schools on 
academic achievement (Bifulco and Ladd 2006; Hoxby and Murarka 2007; Booker et al. 2007; 
CREDO 2009; Imberman 201; Angrist 2012 et al.; Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011) and segregation 
and isolation of particular student groups (Bifulco and Ladd 2007; Bifulco, Ladd, and Ross 2009; 
Zimmer et al. 2009; Booker, Zimmer, and Buddin 2005; Garcia 2008). Much less attention has 
been paid to the unintended effects of charter schools on public finance issues. Therefore, in the 
dissertation I address how charter schools influence housing prices, how charter schools financial 
provisions influence the location of charter schools, and how charter schools influence school 
district efficiency.   
 
Chapter 2 analyzes the impact of charter schools on housing values. More specifically, I evaluate 
whether or not the entry of charter schools lowers the difference in housing prices between 
adjacent high and low performing jurisdictions. I develop a theoretical framework to analyze the 
impact of charter schools on housing values. My theory describes ways in which charter schools 
might influence school quality and thereby the difference in housing prices between either school 
districts or neighborhoods. The first case describes a positive effect of charter schools on school 
quality. The charter school is perceived as a valuable schooling option or introduces competition 
among schools. However, the increase in school quality is not large enough to create an incentive 
for households to move between jurisdictions. The difference in housing prices can either go up 
or down depending on the relative changes in school quality between jurisdictions. The second 
case illustrates an increase in school quality that is large enough to create resorting between 
jurisdictions. In this case, housing price differences between jurisdictions will decrease. The 
third case describes how charter schools might decrease school quality. Cream skimming of 
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educationally advantaged students or a decrease in district resources can degrade school quality. 
Housing values in jurisdictions with lower school quality will drop leading to an increase in the 
housing price gap between high and low performing school districts.  
 
To analyze changes in housing price differences, I utilize housing sales for New York State 
between 2000 and 2010. My final sample consist of the city school districts Syracuse, Niagara 
Falls, Ithaca and their adjacent districts as well as a group of comparison districts. To analyze the 
change in housing price differences across districts, I estimate models comparing housing prices 
between districts with charter schools and their adjacent districts. Further, I compare changes in 
housing prices between neighborhoods with similar income in the district with charter schools 
and its adjacent districts. Also, I run regressions using a control group of districts similar to 
Syracuse, Niagara Falls, and Ithaca.  
 
I do not find statistically significant changes in housing price differences between school 
districts. However, I do find an effect of charter schools on housing price differences between 
neighborhoods. In Syracuse, charter schools raise the price of housing by almost 6 percent in 
neighborhoods having an income below the district’s median relative to similar neighborhoods in 
the adjacent school districts. In contrast, housing prices decrease by 5 percent in neighborhoods 
with an income above the median compared to similar neighborhoods in the adjacent school 
district. As a consequence, the difference in housing prices between poorer and richer 
neighborhoods in Syracuse is decreasing. The results suggests resorting between Syracuse’s 
richer and poorer neighborhoods. Probably households living in Syracuse’s richer 
neighborhoods, who get their child enrolled into one of the high performing charter schools, 
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move out of their neighborhood into somewhat poorer neighborhoods in Syracuse. As demand 
decreases in the richer neighborhoods, housing prices in the richer neighborhoods fall. As 
demand increases in poorer neighborhoods, housing prices in the poorer neighborhoods grow.   
 
After charter school entry, housing prices in Niagara Fall’s poorer neighborhoods decrease 
relative to neighborhoods with similar income levels located in the adjacent school districts. 
Likewise, after charter school entry, Ithaca’s poorer neighborhoods experience declining housing 
prices relative to similar neighborhoods in the adjacent school districts. In both districts housing 
prices in richer neighborhoods are not influenced by charter school entry. Consequently, in 
Niagara Falls and Ithaca, the difference in housing prices between richer and poorer 
neighborhoods increases after charter school opening. 
 
The empirical results suggest that the impact of charter schools on housing price gaps between 
neighborhoods is more complex and context specific than described in theoretical models on 
inter-district choice and voucher programs. More specifically, the effect of charter schools on 
housing values depend on how charter schools affect expected school quality in jurisdictions. 
Also, the empirical findings suggest that the effect of charter schools on housing values varies 
substantially between neighborhoods within the same district. Thus, to detect housing price 
changes it is necessary to analyze housing prices at the neighborhood level.   
 
Chapter 3 analyzes the influence of finance provisions on charter school location patterns by 
comparing different states. Supply decisions by charter school operators play an important role in 
determining which students have access to charter schools, which schools will be subject to 
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charter school competition, what effects charter schools will have on school and residential 
segregation, and ultimately on the distribution of the costs and benefits created by charter 
schools (Bifulco and Buerger 2014).  
 
The chapter provides an empirical test of whether charter school finance provisions influence 
charter school location and enrollment using a comparison between Michigan, Ohio, North 
Carolina, Florida, and New York. Applying theory and knowledge on finance provisions, I state 
hypothesis regarding the relationship between funding policies and charter concentration in five 
states. The first hypothesis states that in states linking charter school payments to district 
expenditures, charter schools will be more likely to locate in districts with greater expenditures 
holding performance and cost factors constant. This hypothesis was corroborated by the 
empirical analysis. The greater the variance in district expenditures the stronger was the 
relationship between charter school concentration and district expenditures.  
 
The second hypotheses stated that in states paying the same per pupil amount no matter where 
the charter school locates, charter schools will move into school districts with relatively low per 
pupil payments. While the coefficients of the negative binomial models suggest the hypothesized 
relationship, the results were close to zero and not statistically significant. Thus, the hypothesis 
cannot be corroborated.  
 
The third hypothesis predicted greater numbers of charter schools in districts with high 
concentrations of disadvantaged students and greater enrollment of these students in states 
paying additional money if the charter school enrolls disadvantaged students. The analyses were 
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able to corroborate this hypothesis for poor students. The results for special education and LEP 
students show that charter schools do not locate in areas with high concentrations of these 
students and enroll them less often compared to traditional schools in the same district. A 
potential explanations is that compensations are insufficient to outweigh the costs of educating 
these students. Another explanation is that charter schools have an incentive to enroll relatively 
high performing students to ensure compliance with the charter school contract and to secure 
sufficient demand for the allotted seats in the school.      
 
The evidence provided in this chapter that charter schools respond to financial incentives in their 
location and enrollment patterns suggests that policy makers can influence the supply of charter 
schools by raising or lowering per pupil payments. For instance, a way to potentially encourage 
charter schools to serve larger shares of disadvantaged students is to increase the per pupil 
payments for those categories of students.  
 
Second, the decision to either tie charter school payments to district spending or to pay a flat per 
pupil amount independent of location, has an important impact on charter school supply. Policies 
tying per pupil payments to district spending levels are likely to attract charter schools in high 
spending and inefficient districts. The opening of charter schools can increase competition 
between schools and hence lead to gains in the efficiency of providing education. As this study 
shows, these gains may be achieved at the expense of strong student stratification. More costly 
students stay in traditional schools while less costly students go to charter schools. This is more 
likely if finance policies do not include any or only small compensations for high cost students.  
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In states where finance policies show no variation in charter school payments with location, 
revenues have less influence on charter school supply. In these states charter school location may 
be more demand driven. This will be particularly true if finance policies include sufficient 
compensations for students not being served well by the existing traditional school system.  
 
Chapter 4 uses the cost function approach as theoretical framework and empirical estimation 
strategy. Theoretically, I work out how charter schools influence the costs and efficiency of 
providing education. Empirically, I focus on the effects of charter schools on school district 
efficiency. In the empirical models, I control for changes in input factors such as teacher salaries 
and student characteristics as well as changes in performance. Thus, inputs and performance 
constant the coefficient on the charter school enrollment variable is driven by changes in district 
efficiency associated with charter school enrollment.  
 
Utilizing data for all New York State school districts outside New York City from 1998/99 to 
2009/10, I find that charter school enrollment increases district efficiency. The magnitude of the 
effect differs depending on the number of students enrolled in charter schools. The effect ranges 
between a 1.1 and 3.4 percent decrease in expenditures for an enrollments between 50 and 5000 
charter school students. Efficiency gains are driven by the increased efficiency in providing 
education for students in traditional public schools. A charter school enrollment between 50 and 
5000 students reduces per pupil expenditures required to produce an increment in student 
performance by 1.5 and 4.3 percent respectively.  
 
8 
 
 
 
The estimation strategy comes with two caveats. First, the interpretation of the coefficient 
attached to charter school enrollment as an efficiency effect relies on effective control for all cost 
factors associated with charter schools. Despite controlling for poverty, limited English ability, 
and disability status in the school district, I fail to control for the ability of the students crossing 
district borders to reach the performance objective of the district to which they transferred to. 
The cost of bringing all students up to a given performance objective will change if large shares 
of either low or high ability students transfer into the district. Second, given multiple outputs and 
input sharing in the production of education, the reduction of inefficiencies in the production of 
test scores may have two different sources. The reduction could reflect decreases in spending for 
outputs other than test scores. The reduction also could reflect the use of more efficient 
technologies to educate students. I will deal with both of these problems more in future drafts of 
the chapter.  
 
In conclusion, the aim of this dissertation was to assess the unintended impact of charter school 
programs on housing prices, location decisions by charter operators, and school district 
efficiency in providing education. My conclusion is that charter school have unintended 
consequences in all three researched aspects. Thus, policy makers have to carefully scrutinized 
these unintended effects and incorporate them in their decisions on charter school policies.     
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2. The Impact of Charter Schools on Housing 
Values 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Starting with Oates (1969), an extensive body of literature has examined the link between school 
quality and residential location documenting that school quality is capitalized into housing values 
(Ross and Yinger 1999; Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger 2011). No matter if the studies focus on 
educational inputs such as spending per pupil or school outputs such as test scores, researchers 
have consistently found that households are willing to pay more for an incremental increase in 
education (Black 1999; Kane et al. 2006; Brasington and Haurin 2006). Further, studies found 
that heterogeneous preferences for school quality lead to residential sorting. Households with 
greater preferences for school quality and higher income sort into different neighborhoods than 
families with lower preferences for school quality and lower income (Bayer, Ferreira, and 
McMillan 2007; Yinger 2009). Ultimately, the dynamics between school quality and housing 
markets have strongly contributed to the isolation of disadvantaged students in low performing 
school districts (Barrow 2002). This is particularly true for urban areas where the poor are 
isolated in low performing city school districts and high degrees of segregation are prevalent 
between city and suburban school districts (Eberts and Gronberg 2005; Urquiola 2005; Bayoh, 
Irwin, and Haab 2006).   
 
School choice programs reduce the link between residential location and school services, and 
hence potentially affect both property values and residential sorting. Theoretical papers predict 
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large effects of voucher programs on housing markets, reducing income and housing value 
disparities across school districts (Nechyba 2000, 2003; Ferreyra 2007; Epple and Romano 
2003). Brunner, Cho, and Reback (2012) find that, in states that adopted inter-district choice 
programs, school districts with desirable nearby, out of district schooling options experience a 
relatively large increase in housing values, residential income, and population density. Hence, 
the authors corroborate the theoretical hypotheses substantiating that school choice programs are 
a potential instrument for overcoming the isolation of disadvantaged students and student 
segregation. 
  
This essay focuses on charter schools, a rapidly growing form of school choice, and their impact 
on housing price disparities between neighborhoods with different income. Charter schools are 
nonsectarian, publicly funded schools, operating under a contract with a public agency. The 
contract, or charter, exempts the school from selected state or local rules and regulations. In 
return for funding and autonomy, the school must meet student performance standards specified 
in the law and its charter. The contract usually lasts for a set number of years and must be 
renewed to continue receiving public funding. Typically, students are not enrolled unless parents 
apply for admission. Charter schools are open to anyone who applies and they do not charge 
tuition. Oversubscribed charter schools are normally required to select students by lottery 
(Nelson et al. 2000; Bifulco and Bulkley 2008).     
 
This chapter adds to the small literature on the impact of charter schools on housing values. 
More specifically, I evaluate whether or not the appearance of charter schools lowers the 
difference in housing prices between adjacent high and low performing jurisdictions. Prior 
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research by Imberman, Rourke and Naretta (2014) analyzes the impact of charter schools on 
housing values in Los Angeles County. The authors use the number of charters and the share of 
public enrollment in charters within various distances from a parcel as measurements of charter 
school penetration. Including census block fixed effects to account for endogenous charter 
locations and changes in the geographic distribution of sales, Imberman and colleagues do not 
find an impact of charter schools on housing values. Schwartz, Voicu, and Horn (2014) use 
housing sales in New York City to estimate the effect of choice school on housing values. The 
authors use the border approach popularized by Black (1999) and find that the opening of a 
choice school reduces the capitalization of test scores from zoned schools into housing values by 
approximately one third. They also find that the opening of the choice school is positively 
capitalized into housing values, suggesting that choice schools in New York City are viewed as 
neighborhood amenities.   
 
The chapter contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, I develop a theoretical 
framework to analyze the impact of charter schools on housing values. My theory describes three 
ideal cases of how charter schools influence school quality and thereafter the difference in 
housing prices between jurisdictions (either school districts or neighborhoods). The first case 
describes a positive effect of charter schools on school quality. The charter school is perceived as 
valuable schooling option or introduces competition among schools. However, the increase in 
school quality is not large enough to create an incentive for households to move between 
jurisdictions. The difference in housing prices can either go up or down depending on the relative 
changes in school quality between jurisdictions. The second case illustrates an increase in school 
quality that is large enough to create resorting between jurisdictions. In this case, housing price 
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differences between jurisdictions will decrease. The third case describes how charter school 
decrease school quality. Cream skimming of educationally advantaged students or a decrease in 
district resources can degrade school quality. Housing values in jurisdictions with lower school 
quality will drop leading to an increase in the housing price gap between high and low 
performing school districts.  
 
Second, this chapter is the first study on the impact of charter schools on housing values outside 
the two largest cities in the United States, New York and Los Angeles. To analyze changes in 
housing price differences, I utilize housing sales for New York State between 2000 and 2010. 
My final sample consist of the city school districts of Syracuse, Niagara Falls, Ithaca and of their 
adjacent districts as well as a group of comparison districts. Thus, this study sheds light into the 
impact of charter schools on housing prices for a set of school districts located in metropolitan 
areas with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants.  
 
To analyze the change in housing price differences across districts, I estimate models comparing 
housing prices between districts with charter schools and their adjacent districts. Further, I 
compare changes in housing prices between neighborhoods with similar income in the district 
with charter school and its adjacent districts. Also, I run regressions using a control group of 
districts similar to Syracuse, Niagara Falls, and Ithaca.  
 
I do not find statistically significant changes in housing price differences between school 
districts. However, I do find an effect of charter schools on housing price differences between 
neighborhoods. In Syracuse, charter schools raise the price of housing by almost 6 percent in 
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neighborhoods having an income below the district’s median relative to similar neighborhoods in 
the adjacent school districts. In contrast, housing prices decrease by 5 percent in neighborhoods 
with an income above the median compared to similar neighborhoods in the adjacent school 
district. As a consequence, the difference in housing prices between poorer and richer 
neighborhoods in Syracuse decreases. The results probably indicate resorting between 
Syracuse’s richer and poorer neighborhoods. Households living in Syracuse’s richer 
neighborhoods, who get their child enrolled into one of the high performing charter schools, 
move out of their neighborhood into somewhat poorer neighborhoods in Syracuse. As demand 
decreases in the richer neighborhoods, housing prices in the richer neighborhoods fall. As 
demand increases in poorer neighborhoods, housing prices in the poorer neighborhoods grow.   
 
After charter school entry, housing prices in Niagara Fall’s poorer neighborhoods decrease 
relative to neighborhoods with similar income levels located in the adjacent school districts. 
Likewise, after charter school entry, Ithaca’s poorer neighborhoods experience declining housing 
prices relative to similar neighborhoods in the adjacent school districts. In both districts housing 
prices in richer neighborhoods are not influenced by charter school entry. Consequently, in 
Niagara Falls and Ithaca, the difference in housing prices between richer and poorer 
neighborhoods increases after charter school opening. 
 
The empirical results suggest that the impact of charter schools on housing price gaps between 
jurisdictions is more complex and context specific than described in theoretical models on inter-
district choice and voucher programs. More specifically, the effect of charter schools on housing 
values depend on how charter schools affect expected school quality in jurisdictions. Also, the 
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empirical findings suggest that the effect of charter schools on housing values varies 
substantially between neighborhoods within the same district. Thus, to detect housing price 
changes it is necessary to analyze housing prices at the neighborhood level.   
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the charter school 
program in New York State. Section 3 states the theoretical framework and Section 4 applies the 
theoretical framework to New York State. Sections 5 and 6 explain estimation strategies and 
comparison groups respectively. Section 7 makes conclusions on the estimation strategies and 
comparison groups. Section 8 describes the data used for the analysis and provides Summary 
statistics. Section 9 presents the results and Section 10 states the conclusions.  
 
2.2 Charter School Program in New York State and Sample of School 
Districts 
 
The New York Charter School Law was established in 1998. According to the law, charter 
school students are allowed to attend charter schools outside their school district and attendance 
zone boundaries. However, if charter schools are oversubscribed, they have to select students by 
lottery. In this lottery process, preference is given to students residing in the school district, 
where the charter school is locating (NYS Charter School Law Subsection 2854 (2b)). Thus, 
oversubscribed schools may almost exclusively serve students from the district where they are 
located.  
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Charter schools receive per pupil payments from the districts in which their students reside, and 
these payments are the charter school’s primary source of funding. The amount a district pays 
per student is linked to the approved operating expenses of the district where the student resides. 
The charter application, approval, and evaluation process is closely regulated by the charter 
school authorizers1. The accountability standards set by authorizers can be considered relatively 
high compared to other states. Charter schools authorized by the Board of Regents have to 
perform higher than traditional schools in their district. School authorized by the New York State 
University are expected to have 75 percent of their students to score “proficient” or higher on 
state assessments. In a multistate comparison of charter school accountability laws and practices, 
the Center for Education Reform (CER) rated New York as a state that holds charter schools 
strictly accountable, pointing out that New York is one of the few states that have closed charter 
schools for performance reasons (CER 2007). The National Alliance of Public Charter Schools 
identifies New York as being amongst the few states using performance-based charter contracts, 
comprehensive school monitoring, and a systematic data collection processes (NAPCS 2012). 
Further, the charter school law of New York State requires districts to provide transportation to 
students enrolled in charter schools (NYS Charter School Law Subsection 2853 (4b)). 
 
In 2010, 177 charter schools were operating in New York State. The majority of charter schools 
are located in NYC. I focus on charter schools outside NYC as I do not have housing sale data 
available for NYC. Table 1 shows the 14 school districts outside NYC that have charter schools. 
The first column indicates the year the first charter school was established. The second column 
shows the number of charter schools in each school district and the third column the share of 
                                                          
1 Almost all charter schools are authorized by the State University of New York and the Board of Regents. Only two 
charter schools are authorized by a local school district.   
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students enrolled in charter schools. The highest counts of charter schools are in Albany, 
Buffalo, and Rochester. The share varies widely between 1 percent in Yonkers and 74 percent in 
Wainscott2. Further, there are several districts where the share is between 11 and 24 percent 
including Albany, Buffalo, Lackawanna, Roosevelt, and Kenmore-Tonawanda. 
 
The following columns present the performance of charter schools, regular public schools in the 
district, and the performance of adjacent districts. Performance is measured using state wide tests 
for grades 4 and 8 in English Language, as well as grades 4 and 8 in mathematics. After 
calculating the state average, I standardize the result with regard to the state mean. The resulting 
performance measurement is zero at the state mean and equals one (and negative one) at one 
standard deviation above (below) the mean. Charter schools outperform the average public 
school in the district where they are located except in the Niagara Falls school district. Most of 
the charter schools locate in school districts that perform below the state average. The exceptions 
are Ithaca and Kenmore Tonawanda where traditional public schools perform above the state 
average. The surrounding suburban districts perform in most cases better than the city school 
districts except in Ithaca, Kenmore-Tonawanda, and Troy, where the performance in the charter 
school district is greater than in its neighboring districts.  
 
To be included in the analysis, districts have to fulfill two criteria. First, there has to be a 
sufficient number of housing sales observed before and after charter school entry. In Albany, the 
first charter school opened in 1999. As I do not have housing sales prior 2000, I excluded Albany 
from the sample. In Buffalo, Rochester, Roosevelt, and Wainscott charter schools started 
                                                          
2 The Wainscott School District has only two schools including the charter school. The traditional public school has 
only elementary grades and had an enrollment of 21 students.  
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operating in 2000. With only 8 months of housing sales before charter school entry, I am unable 
to estimate the effect of charter schools on housing values in these school districts, and hence 
excluded them from my analysis. For some districts, particularly those located on Long Island, I 
have sales information only for parts of the district. These districts have to be excluded as well.  
 
Second, some school districts had a charter school moving into one of their adjacent school 
district at an earlier point in time. These charter schools may already affected housing values. 
Therefore, I excluded the school districts Kenmore-Tonawanda, Lackawanna, Troy, and 
Yonkers. Applying these two criteria leaves Syracuse, Niagara Falls, and Ithaca for the analysis.   
 
2.3 General Theoretical Framework  
  
The theoretical framework is based on the standard model of school quality capitalization as 
expressed in Ross and Yinger (1999), and Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger (2011). The standard 
model assumes that households maximize their utility over school quality, housing, and a 
composite good. Households make bids on housing based on school quality and local property 
tax rates. Households sort into different districts and attendance zones according to their income 
and preferences. The model assumes that households are mobile, and hence a key equilibrium 
condition is that all households in an income taste class achieve the same utility level. 
Households locate in a metropolitan area with many local governments financed by a property 
tax. All people who live in the same district are assumed to receive the same level of public 
services, and the only way to gain access to the public services in a district is to live there. 
Further, all households are considered homeowners.  
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A household’s budget constraint requires income to equal spending.   
 
𝑌 = 𝑍 + 𝑃𝐻 + 𝑡𝑉 = 𝑍 + 𝑃𝐻 + 𝑡
𝑃𝐻
𝑟
= 𝑍 + 𝑃𝐻 + 𝑡∗𝑃𝐻 = 𝑍 + 𝑃𝐻(1 + 𝑡∗) 
 
(1) 
 
where Y is the household’s income; Z is a composite good; H is units of housing services, which 
are sold at price P; t is the effective property tax rate3; V is the market value of a house and equal 
to PH/r, where r is the appropriate discount rate; and t* = t/r.  
 
The household’s problem is to determine how much to pay for H given the quality of local public 
services, S, and the effective tax rate, t. This problem can be specified by determining the 
maximum price a household will pay for housing associated with a given S, holding their utility 
constant. More technically, the household problem is defined by solving Equation (1) for P and 
maximizing the result with respect to H and Z subject to a utility constraint. Thus, a household 
maximizes  
 
𝑃 =  
𝑌 − 𝑍
𝐻(1 + 𝑡∗)
 
 
(2) 
subject to  
 
𝑈(𝑍, 𝐻, 𝑆) =  𝑈0(𝑌) 
 
(3) 
                                                          
3 The effective property tax rate equals the nominal tax rate times the assessed value divided by the market value. 
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where U0 is the utility achieved by households with income Y.  
 
Using the envelope theorem, the following equation can be derived 
 
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑆
=
𝑈𝑆/𝑈𝑍
𝐻(1 + 𝑡)
=
𝑀𝐵𝑆
𝐻(1 + 𝑡∗)
 
(4) 
   
In this equation, 𝜕P/𝜕S is the slope of the households bid function with respect to the quality of 
local schools. The slope indicates a household’s willingness to pay for an additional unit of 
school quality. According to the standard model, households sort into jurisdictions based upon 
the slope of their bid functions. Further, US/UZ is the marginal rate of substitution between S and 
the composite good and is also called the marginal benefit from S in dollar terms or MBS.  
 
Households sort according to their bid-functions for educational quality at two jurisdictional 
levels: school districts and attendance zones. To illustrate how school quality and residential 
location are linked for both types of jurisdictions consider the case depicted in Figure 1. There 
are two jurisdictions and two income-taste classes. Jurisdiction 1 has a low school quality and 
Jurisdiction 2 has a high school quality4. Further, there are two income taste classes A and B. 
Income taste class A has a high marginal willingness to pay for education. Income taste class B 
has a low marginal willingness to pay for education. Households in income taste class A have a 
steep bid function for school quality, and they win the bidding competition for housing in 
                                                          
4 “School quality is a complex and multidimensional concept” (Cullen and Jacob 2007: 6). Measures of school 
quality can be financial resources, the quality of the match between students and teachers, test scores, etc. In this 
study, I will use standardized test scores from the NYS report cards as they make comparisons between school 
districts possible. Further, report cards are well known to parents and potentially guide schooling decisions.             
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Jurisdiction 2. Households in income taste class B have a flatter bid function for school quality, 
and they win the bid in Jurisdiction 1. Over time, households will perfectly sort into both school 
jurisdictions resulting in income and housing prices disparities.  
 
Assume now that a charter school opens in Jurisdiction 1 (similar to Syracuse and Niagara Falls).  
The appearance of a charter school in Jurisdiction 1 can influence perceived school quality in 
four different ways. First, parents might value the option of sending their child to a low-cost 
educational alternative. When the existence of that possibility gives rise to a higher level of 
expected school quality than without it, the option has a value. This value is irrespective of 
whether the option is exercised or not. Option values are frequently encountered in financial 
markets, for example when the right to sell or buy in the future at a given price is bargained. The 
concept is also frequently associated with the valuation of environmental goods (Cameron and 
Englin 1997; Adamowitz et al. 1998) and transportation options (TCRP 2002), which may or 
may not be enjoyed in the future. If parents see charter schools as an option value because of 
their high performance, a particular school theme, or the racial composition of the school, school 
quality in Jurisdiction 1 and 2 will increase. This effect is likely to be larger in Jurisdiction 1 as 
the existing school quality is low and potential alternatives will add more value. 
 
Second, charter schools introduce competition to regular public schools. Charter school 
proponents argue that regular public schools operate in a monopolistic market and are 
overburdened by the institutions of democratic governance that leave them vulnerable to 
conflicting demands of multiple interest groups. Thus, they have weak incentives to improve 
school quality as perceived by parents or to use resources more efficiently (Brennan and 
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Buchanan 1980; Chubb and Moe 1990). Charter schools introduce competition to the public 
school system creating market incentives that induce regular public schools to become more 
efficient and increase their performance (Friedman 1955, 1962). Competitive mechanisms are 
likely to increase school quality in Jurisdiction 1. In Jurisdiction 2, school quality changes only if 
the charter school performs at the same or a higher level than the traditional schools in 
Jurisdiction 2. In that case, the charter schools is able to compete with traditional schools 
potentially influencing their quality. Generally, the effect of competition is likely to be larger in 
Jurisdiction 1 as school quality is relatively low and competitive mechanisms will create greater 
pressure to improve school quality.    
 
Third, charter schools can give rise to “cream skimming”. Cream skimming refers to the worry 
that charter schools will primarily serve the most advantaged students, leaving the disadvantaged 
to languish in underperforming schools. Cream skimming might arise for two main reasons. 
There is variation in availability of information about charter schools, and if information is costly 
to obtain, economically and educationally advantaged families are better able to exercise choice 
(Hastings and Weinstein 2008). Further, advantaged students are less costly to educate and 
charter schools might choose a location in the district where students with relatively high socio-
economic status live or take other steps to recruit relatively high performing students (Henig and 
McDonald 2002). Cream skimming is likely to result in high quality charter schools potentially 
leading to an increased option value. At the same time, traditional public schools will decrease in 
school quality. 
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Fourth, charter schools can potentially decrease district resources. Charter schools might have a 
negative impact on school districts resources in two ways. First, operating two systems of public 
schools under separate governance arrangements can create excess costs. Excess costs can be a 
result of increased personnel, facility, transportation, special education, health services, and 
maintenance costs.  Second, charter school financing policies can distribute resources away from 
districts if state aid payments to districts decrease and local charter school contributions increase 
(Bifulco and Reback 2012). Decreasing district resources are likely to have a negative impact on 
the quality of traditional public schools. Charter school quality is unlikely to be influenced by 
decreasing district resources.  
 
These mechanisms may appear simultaneously, and may offset or complement each other. For 
instance, it is possible that charter schools introduce “cream skimming” and at the same time 
competition to the regular district school. Whether overall school quality increases or decreases 
depends on the relative strength of these effects. The mechanisms can empirically lead to three 
different cases that I explain in the following sections. In the first case, school quality increases 
but the change is insufficient to generate resorting. In the second case, the increase in school 
quality leads to resorting. In the third case, school quality decreases.  
 
Case 1:  Increase in School Quality Insufficient to Generate Resorting 
In the first case, illustrated in Figure 2, growth in perceived school quality is not large enough to 
generate resorting. For Type B households the savings in housing generated by a move into 
District 1 would not be outweighed by the loss in amenities. Case 1 is more likely, if there is a 
large difference in school quality and other amenities between Jurisdiction 1 and 2 prior to the 
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charter school opening. Both income taste classes stay in their jurisdiction and compete with 
families of the same type for housing. However, as school quality has increased households are 
willing to pay a higher price for a unit of housing holding their utility constant. Population 
density and average income in both districts stay the same. Depending on the change in school 
quality for both jurisdictions housing prices will remain the same or go up. Thus, if the school 
quality in Jurisdiction 2 is greater than in Jurisdiction 1 prior to the appearance of the charter 
school and no resorting takes place, then  
 
∆N1 = 0,     ∆N2 = 0,     ∆P1 ≥ 0,     ∆P2 ≥ 0,     ∆ 1Y  = 0, and  ∆ 2Y = 0. 
 
The change in relative housing prices between Jurisdictions 1 and 2 is difficult to predict. 
However, even if the incremental increase in school quality is smaller in Jurisdiction 2 than in 
Jurisdiction 1, the effect on housing prices could be larger in Jurisdiction 2 as households have a 
greater willingness to pay for marginal increases in school quality.  
 
Case 2: Increase in School Quality Leading to Resorting 
In the second case, growth in perceived school quality is large enough to generate resorting. This 
case is illustrated in Figure 3. Increases in Jurisdiction 1’s school quality will create an incentive 
for Type B households living in Jurisdiction 2, to move into Jurisdiction 1 to take advantage of 
lower housing prices while sending their child to the charter school. Note that Type B 
households will only move into Jurisdiction 1 if the loss in amenities, they face by leaving 
Jurisdiction 2, is outweighed by savings in housing. Generally, resorting is more likely if 
Jurisdictions 1 and 2 are relatively close in the quality of education and other amenities before 
the appearance of the charter school. The resorting of households leads to an increase in 
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population density in Jurisdiction 1 and a decline in population density in Jurisdiction 2. As a 
result housing prices in Jurisdiction 1 will go up and housing prices in Jurisdiction 2 will go 
down. Since the households choosing to move into Jurisdiction 1 have a greater income than the 
households already living in Jurisdiction 1, the average income in Jurisdiction 1 will increase. As 
all households in Jurisdiction 2 belong to the same income taste class there will be no change in 
average income. Thus, if school quality is greater in Jurisdiction 2 than in Jurisdiction 1 prior to 
the appearance of the charter school and resorting takes place, then it follows that: 
 
     ∆N1 > 0,     ∆N2 < 0,     ∆P1 > 0,     ∆P2 < 0,     ∆ 1Y  > 0, and ∆ 2Y = 0. 
 
where N1 and N2 are population densities, and 1Y and 2Y are the average incomes in Jurisdiction 
1 and 2. The difference in housing prices between Jurisdiction 1 and 2 will be reduced as housing 
prices in Jurisdiction 1 increase and Jurisdiction 2 decrease. Also, the gap in income disparities is 
reduced as average income increases in Jurisdiction 1.  
 
Case 3: Decrease in School Quality 
In the third case, the charter school decreases overall school quality in Jurisdiction 1. This case is 
depicted in Figure 4. As school quality has decreased, Type B households will pay less for a unit 
of housing holding their utility constant. Type A households will not be attracted by the low 
performing schools in Jurisdiction 1. Thus, housing prices in Jurisdiction 2 will not change. 
Under this scenario, the same income taste classes continue living in Jurisdiction 1 and 
Jurisdiction 2. Also, population density and average income in both Jurisdictions stay the same. 
Depending on the decrease in school quality for Jurisdiction 1 housing prices will go down. 
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Thus, if the school quality in Jurisdiction 2 stays the same and school quality in Jurisdiction 1 
decreases, then 
 
     ∆N1 = 0,     ∆N2 = 0,     ∆P1 ≤ 0,     ∆P2 = 0,     ∆ 1Y  = 0, and ∆ 2Y = 0. 
 
The difference in housing prices between Jurisdiction 1 and 2 will increase as housing prices in 
Jurisdiction 1 decrease and Jurisdiction 2 stay the same. Population density and average income 
stay the same in both Jurisdictions. 
 
Differential Effect of Charter Schools on Housing Values with Distance  
The effects described in the above cases are likely to differ by households’ distance to the charter 
school. Epple and Romano (2003) describe how with increasing distance from the charter school 
transportation costs increase. Increasing transportation costs will decrease households’ option 
values of sending a child to a charter school. Thus, it is likely that the effect of charter schools on 
housing values is also declining with distance.  
 
2.4 Application of Theoretical Framework  
 
The theoretical framework can be applied to school districts and neighborhoods. I start with an 
application to housing prices changes between districts and then explain implications for housing 
price changes between neighborhoods. For each jurisdiction, I state how changes in housing 
price gaps are likely to occur.   
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The New York State charter school program and the location of the three school districts in the 
sample have two important implications for applying the above described theory. First, 
oversubscribed schools in New York have to give enrollment preference to students living in the 
school district the charter school is located. Thus, for oversubscribed schools, the option value of 
the charter school is very small for families living outside the district. Second, charter schools in 
Niagara Falls and particularly Syracuse have lower levels of performance relative to the 
traditional public schools in their adjacent districts (see Table 1). In these areas, it is unlikely that 
parents will send their children to a charter school which has lower levels of performance than 
the traditional public school the family can access.  
 
These assumptions are supported by the charter school enrollment figures in 20105. In Syracuse 
and Niagara Falls, 95 percent of the students enrolled in charter schools reside in the district 
where the charter school is located. In Ithaca, the share of students enrolled from outside the 
district is greater. Still about 60 percent of the students in the Ithaca charter school are from 
Ithaca. Consequently, the gap in housing prices between districts with charter schools and their 
adjacent districts is most likely driven by changes in housing prices in districts with charter 
school particularly in Syracuse and Niagara Falls.     
 
In sum, for the Syracuse and Niagara Falls metro areas, I expect changes in housing price 
differences between districts to be driven by housing price changes in districts with charter 
school. The gap in housing prices between districts will converge if housing prices in the district 
with charter school increase. The housing price gap will diverge if housing prices in the district 
                                                          
5 Enrollment is taken from the New York State report cards. 
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with charter school decrease. In Ithaca, the change in housing price differences is likely to be 
driven by housing price changes in Ithaca and its adjacent school districts. If housing prices 
decrease or decrease more in Ithaca than in its adjacent districts, housing prices will converge. If 
housing prices increase or increase more in Ithaca than in its adjacent school districts, housing 
prices will diverge.        
 
Changes in housing price differences between neighborhoods are expected to follow a different 
pattern. First, it is important to note that changes in housing price differences between 
neighborhoods can occur in two ways. On one hand, the difference in housing prices between 
neighborhoods located in the same districts can change. On the other hand, the difference in 
housing prices between neighborhoods in different districts can change. Second, resorting 
between neighborhoods is more likely, as gaps in amenities are smaller compared to gaps in 
amenities between districts. Third, neighborhoods within a school district are often very 
heterogeneous. Usually, the socio-economic status of residents and the quality of schooling 
available differ between neighborhoods. Thus, charter school may impact housing prices in 
varying neighborhoods differently.  
 
If households move between neighborhoods or bid up housing prices in some neighborhoods but 
not in others, the housing price difference between districts is probably influenced as well. 
However, the changing housing prices may not show up in an across district analysis for the 
following reasons. First, the effect of charter schools may strongly differ between neighborhoods 
even if the effect goes in the same direction. In an across district analysis, a heterogeneous 
charter school effect would lead to imprecisely measured results leaving the researcher in 
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uncertainty if there is an effect of charter schools on housing values. Second, the effects of 
charter school may be positive in some neighborhoods while being negative in other 
neighborhoods. In an across district analysis these effect would cancel each other out leading the 
researcher believe that there is no effect of charter schools on housing values.  
 
Altogether, I expect the gap in housing prices between neighborhoods to converge if households 
resort between neighborhoods. In this case, housing prices in the neighborhood with formerly 
low school quality increase and housing prices in the neighborhood with formerly high school 
quality decrease. Further, housing prices between neighborhoods will converge if housing price 
changes in the neighborhood with formerly low school quality are greater than in the 
neighborhood with formerly high school quality. I anticipate housing prices to diverge if school 
quality decreases in the neighborhood with low school quality leading to lower housing values 
while housing prices in the neighborhood with formerly high school quality stay the same. Also, 
charter schools may lead to an increase in housing prices in formerly low and high performing 
neighborhoods but more so in the neighborhood with high school quality. This case is likely as 
households in the neighborhood with high school quality have a steeper bid function and housing 
prices are likely to react more to an incremental increase in school quality. 
 
2.5 Empirical Methods: Estimation Strategy 
 
The section on empirical methods consist of three parts. The first part explains the estimation 
strategies used in the chapter. The second part describes in more detail the comparison groups 
utilized in the empirical methods. The third part compares advantages and disadvantages of the 
empirical strategies used.    
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Estimation Strategy 1 
The baseline specification is based on a difference in difference framework. I estimate the shift 
in neighborhood housing price trends comparing housing values before and after the charter 
school entry in the district where the charter school enters to the shift in housing values in its 
adjacent districts. I use census tract fixed effects to control for time invariant neighborhood 
characteristics. I also include quarter by year fixed effects to control for seasonality and specific 
year characteristics. The baseline estimating equation is written as follows:     
 
log 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑞𝑦 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞𝑦 + 𝛽2 (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞𝑦 × 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑) +  𝜑𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑞𝑦 + 𝛿𝑛 +  𝜃𝑛𝑇𝑦 + 𝜇𝑞𝑦
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑞𝑦 
(5) 
 
where P is the price of a house i, in neighborhood n, in district d, during a quarter of the year q, 
and year y. Postqy indicates the time after charter school entry
6. Insided indicates the district with 
the charter school. The vector X stands for housing characteristics including the overall condition 
of the house, the availability of a fireplace, the construction grade, the availability of central air 
conditioning, the number of bathrooms, the number of bedrooms, the living area, the living area 
squared, the age of the house, and the age of the house squared. The term δn stands for 
neighborhood fixed effects at the census tract level. The term θnTy indicates the slope of the 
neighborhood specific trend and µqy indicates month by year fixed effects. The last term εindqy is a 
randomly distributed error term.    
 
                                                          
6 I set the start of the post period equal to the opening of the first charter school in the area. 
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The coefficient of interest in the above equation is β2. The coefficient compares housing price 
trends in districts with charter schools to housing price trends in their adjacent districts before 
and after charter school entry. The coefficient measures the average treatment effect of charter 
schools on housing values in the district in which they are located under the provision that the 
adjacent districts act as an appropriate counterfactual for the change in housing prices in absence 
of the charter school. I expect the coefficient to be positive, if charter schools raise housing 
prices in the district they locate. I expect a negative sign, if charter schools decrease housing 
prices in the district they locate.   
 
There are three potentially useful modifications of the baseline model. In the first modification, I 
will reduce the sample to housing sales taking place half a mile away from the district border. By 
reducing the sample to housing sales close to the district border, I can effectively control for 
amenities relevant to residents on either side of the border.  
 
In the second modification, I control for distance between charter school and parcel. As stated in 
the theoretical section, with distance grow transportation costs. Increased transportation costs are 
likely to decrease the option value of the charter school. Thus, the effect of charter schools on 
housing values probably decreases with distance.  
 
To control for distance in the baseline specification, I measure the distance between each house 
sold and the charter school. I add a distance term to Equation 5. Further, I interact distance with 
Post and Inside. The coefficient I am after is attached to the triple interaction between distance 
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and Post X Inside. The coefficient tells me how the effect of the charter school is changing if the 
distance to the charter school increases by one mile.  
 
Third, theoretical models on the relationship of school quality and housing values have stressed 
the importance of household income on the willingness to pay for education (Nguyen-Hoang and 
Yinger 2011; Epple and Romano 2003; Epple, Romer, and Sieg 2001). These models emphasize 
that high-income households are willing to pay more for increases in their child’s educational 
achievement and hence are willing to pay more for increases in the quality of their child’s 
school. Therefore, a charter school may be highly valued by families living in a high income 
neighborhood. On the other hand, households living in high income neighborhoods are likely to 
have already access to relatively high performing public or private schools. Thus, charter schools 
may not add additional value for them. Households living in low income neighborhoods are 
likely to have only access to low performing schools, and a potential alternative will be highly 
valued. However, poor households are unlikely to be able to pay relatively large amounts of 
money for increases in the quality of their child’s school.  
 
As the effect of charter schools on housing values is likely to differ between neighborhoods with 
varying income, I estimate the baseline specification separately for neighborhoods with different 
income. In the first of these models, I reduce the sample to housing sales in neighborhoods with 
an income below the median in the district with charter school. In the second model, I reduce the 
sample to housing sales in neighborhoods above the median in the district with charter school. In 
both models, I include only neighborhoods in the charter school district that have a similar 
income compared the neighborhoods in the adjacent districts and vice versa. With limiting the 
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sample to similar neighborhoods in the district with charter school and its adjacent districts, I 
avoid bias resulting from comparisons that are not supported on either side of the border. 
 
Estimation Strategy 2 
The next empirical specification is based on a triple difference framework. I estimate the shift in 
neighborhood housing price trends comparing housing values before and after charter school 
entry, between the metropolitan areas in the sample and their matched metropolitan areas, and 
between the focal districts in these areas with their adjacent districts. Similar to the previous 
equation, I include a several fixed effects to control for time-invariant neighborhood 
characteristics, neighborhood housing price trends, seasonality, and year effects. The empirical 
model can be expressed as follows:    
 
log 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑞𝑦 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞𝑦 + 𝛽2 (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞𝑦 × 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑) + 𝛽3(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞𝑦 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑑)    
+  𝛽4(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑞𝑦 × 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 × 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑑) +  𝜑𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑞𝑦 + 𝛿𝑛 + 𝜃𝑛𝑇𝑦 + 𝜇𝑞𝑦
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑞𝑦 
(6) 
 
In this model, Insided indicates the district with charter and its direct comparison district in a 
matched metropolitan area. Treatd is a dummy variable being one in the district with charter 
school and its adjacent districts. The dummy equals zero for all districts in the control group. 
 
The coefficient of interest is β4. The coefficient compares metropolitan areas with each other, 
compares the district with charter school and its direct comparison district with their adjacent 
school districts, and compares the time before and after charter school entry. The coefficient will 
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be positive if charter schools impact properties more positively (or less negatively) in districts 
with charter schools compared to its adjacent districts and a set of similar school districts in 
another metropolitan area. Therefore, a positive coefficient can indicate two effects. If the charter 
school moved into a district with lower housing values than its adjacent district, the housing 
price gap will decrease. If the charter moved into a district with greater housing prices than its 
adjacent districts, the housing price gap will increase. The coefficient will be negative if the 
impact of charter school entry is more negative (or less positive) in the district with the charter 
school compared to its adjacent districts and a set of school districts in another metropolitan area. 
Thus, a negative coefficient can imply two effects. If the charter school moved into a district 
with lower housing values than its adjacent districts, the housing price gap will increase. If the 
charter school moved into a district with greater housing prices than its adjacent districts, the 
housing price gap will decrease.  
 
It is important to note that the empirical strategy stated above does not rely on similarity in 
district characteristics. If districts with charter schools and without charter schools are not 
becoming more or less dissimilar prior charter school opening, the estimated effect should 
identify the causal impact of charter schools on housing values. More specifically, identification 
of the causal effect requires that housing prices follow parallel trends conditional on the 
observable covariates in the absence of any intervention. If that is the case, any difference in 
housing prices in the period after charter school entry can be attributed to charter schools. 
Importantly, this assumption cannot be explicitly tested as we do not observe the true 
counterfactual. In the next section, I will analyze the parallel trend assumption using graphical 
evidence.  
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2.6 Empirical Methods: Comparison Groups 
 
The goal of the empirical strategy is to estimate changes in housing price differences between 
districts with and without charter schools. For causal inference, however, it is not sufficient to 
compare housing prices in school districts before and after charter school opening. An 
appropriate comparison group is required to estimate what would have happened to housing 
prices in the absence of the charter school. To help estimate the counterfactual, I select different 
control groups. How I select control groups is explained in more detail below.  
 
Comparison Group 1: Adjacent School Districts 
The first control group consists of all housing sales in the adjacent school districts. I define 
adjacent districts as all districts that border the district with the charter school. This is illustrated 
in Figure 5, which shows Syracuse and its adjacent districts. The Syracuse City School District is 
located in the center and the two charter schools are highlighted. Adjacent school districts are all 
districts touching the border of the Syracuse City School District. The focus of my analyses is 
changes in housing price gaps between school districts after charter school entry. Thus, the 
adjacent school districts are a natural comparison group. Further, as the adjacent school districts 
are in the same metropolitan area, they are likely to be affected by the same housing market 
shocks as the district with charter school.  
 
As stated earlier, for my empirical strategy it is important that housing price trends between 
districts with charter school and their adjacent districts are not becoming more or less dissimilar 
prior charter school opening. As this so called parallel trends assumption cannot be explicitly 
tested, I graphically analyze housing price trends prior charter school opening.  
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To analyze if districts with charter schools have similar trend compared to their adjacent 
districts, I regress the log of housing prices on a full set of quarter by year fixed effects for the 
time period prior to charter school entry. Then, I plot the monthly average residual for the charter 
school district and the adjacent school districts. The time fixed effects in the regression control 
for potential shocks over time. The residuals show how monthly housing sales in districts with 
charter schools and in their adjacent districts differ from the respective trends. In Figures 6 to 8, I 
plot the monthly residuals with a local linear fit7 to make the trend line more visible.    
 
Figure 6 shows housing price trends for Syracuse. Panel 1 compares trends between all housing 
sales in Syracuse and its adjacent districts. The trends are parallel. At the end of the observed 
time period the trends start to slightly diverge probably because of an anticipation effect of the 
charter school on housing values. Panel 2 reduces the sample to sales half a mile away from the 
district border. As expected, the trends are closer to each other. Further, the trends are relatively 
parallel and do not show a potential anticipation effect for the time period prior charter school 
entry.  
 
Figure 7 shows housing price trends for Niagara Falls and its adjacent school districts. Using all 
housing sales, the trends are parallel (see Panel 1). Limiting the sample to housing sales close to 
the district border, trends are still parallel but the distance between them is less (see Panel 2).  
 
                                                          
7 I use Stata’s lpoly command to produce the local line fit line. The command performs a kernel-weighted local 
polynomial regression of the residual and time in months. Displayed is a graph of the smoothed values with 
confidence bands  
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Figure 8 shows housing price trends for Ithaca and its adjacent school districts. Using all housing 
sales, the trends are less parallel compared to Syracuse and Niagara Falls (see Panel 1). It is 
difficult to say why these differences in trends occur. A potential explanation is that the more 
rural districts surrounding Ithaca have somewhat different housing markets compared to Ithaca. 
Also, the housing markets in the adjacent school districts could be less homogenous than in the 
other two districts. Reducing the sample to sales at the district border, trends seem to be even 
less parallel. The space between both graphs varies considerably.    
 
Comparison Group 2: Similar Metropolitan Areas 
The second comparisons group consist of districts located in metropolitan areas other than 
Syracuse, Niagara Falls, and Ithaca. Searching for metropolitan areas that match the districts in 
the sample and their adjacent districts, I face the following dilemma. I have plenty of information 
on school district characteristics but only a small number of metropolitan areas in New York 
State. To overcome this dilemma, I use a judgmental approach with the following formal 
procedure. All three districts in the study sample with charter schools are city school districts, 
thus I start with a list of all city school districts in New York State. Next, I limited the sample to 
districts that, like Syracuse, Niagara Falls, and Ithaca, are located in western or central New 
York. Finally, I select the districts and their adjacent districts that are the closest match to 
Syracuse, Niagara Falls, Ithaca, and their adjacent districts on variables drawn from school 
district tabulations of the 2000 U.S. Census. Specifically, I find the closest match, on mean 
performance, enrollment, share of black students, and share of students in poverty. The four 
variables are good determinants of factors influencing housing prices making them a good 
approximation for differences in housing price trends between districts. The results of this 
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matching process are presented in Table 2. A graphical comparison between housing price trends 
is shown in Panels 3 and 4 in Figures 6 to 8.  
 
Compared to other school districts in western and central New York, Syracuse stands out as a 
school district having a relatively high enrollment, low performance, high rates of poverty, and a 
large share of black students. Syracuse is surrounded by school districts having a much lower 
enrollment, higher levels of student performance, a lower share of students in poverty, and a 
lower share of black students as depicted in Table 2. These figures suggest that there is a high 
degree of socio-economic segregation between Syracuse and its adjacent districts. The unique 
characteristics of the area will strongly influence the difference in housing prices between 
Syracuse and its adjacent districts making it difficult to find comparison districts. However, I can 
exploit the variation in the timing of charter school entrance between districts and can compare 
Syracuse with Niagara Falls. Niagara Falls is the closest match for Syracuse among districts that 
did not contain charter schools earlier than Syracuse (see Table 2). Its enrollment and share of 
black students is somewhat smaller than Syracuse, but in all other categories Niagara Falls and 
its adjacent districts show great similarities with Syracuse and its neighboring districts. The first 
charter school moved into Syracuse in 2002, while Niagara Falls had its first charter school in 
2006. Thus, I can use Niagara Falls as the control district for Syracuse during the pre-2006 
period. Therefore, the pre-period for Syracuse are the 2 years before charter school entry. The 
post period are the years following the charter school entrance up to the point when Niagara Falls 
had its charter school8.  
 
                                                          
8 As families might anticipate the opening of the charter school in Niagara Falls, I exclude the 6 months before 
charter school opening in Niagara Falls from the analysis. 
38 
 
 
 
Figure 9 shows the pre trends for Syracuse and Niagara Falls. The first panel shows housing 
price trends for Niagara Falls and its adjacent school districts. The trends are parallel. Panel 2 
compares the difference in housing price trends between Syracuse and its adjacent school 
districts with the difference in housing price trends between Niagara Falls and its adjacent school 
districts. The residuals in Panel 2 are calculated in the following way. In a first step, I subtract 
the residuals in Syracuse from the residuals in its adjacent districts. I do the same for Niagara 
Falls. Then I plot the difference separately for both metro areas. The trend lines are again based 
on a local linear fit. The trends are parallel in the beginning of the time period but converge at 
the end. The result suggests that Syracuse’s adjacent school districts are a better comparisons 
group.  
 
In the next step, I have to find comparison districts for Niagara Falls. The Niagara Falls school 
district is characterized by schools that perform about one standard deviation below the state 
average, have an enrollment that is smaller than in the big upstate cities but substantially larger 
than in rural school districts, and a relatively high share of students in poverty (see Table 2). 
Niagara Fall’s adjacent districts perform better and have a smaller enrollment. Their shares of 
black and poor students are less than the state average. School districts that serve as a good 
comparison are Binghamton and Dunkirk. They are somewhat smaller than Niagara Falls but 
have performance below the state mean and enrollment of black and poor students above the 
state mean. Their adjacent districts are suburban and comparable to Niagara’s adjacent districts.  
 
Figure 10 shows the pre trends for Niagara Falls and Binghamton and Dunkirk. As previously 
shown, trends between Niagara Falls and its adjacent school districts are parallel (see Figure 7). 
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Trends in Binghamton, Dunkirk, and their adjacent districts are the same in the beginning of the 
observed time period. Then, the trend in Dunkirk and Binghamton drops a bit. Again, I plot the 
differences in residuals between Niagara Falls and its adjacent districts and Binghamton and 
Dunkirk and their adjacent districts. The trends are parallel for most of the observed time period. 
However, similar to the Syracuse case, trends converge at the end of the observed time period. 
Thus, the adjacent school districts seem to be a better comparisons group for Niagara Falls.   
 
Ithaca is located in a small metropolitan area and is strongly influenced by its higher education 
industry. Ithaca enrolls fewer students than the other districts in the sample and has much higher 
student performance compared to its adjacent school districts. The share of black and poor 
students is much lower compared to other districts with a charter school. The surrounding 
districts are rural, have lower student achievement than Ithaca, smaller enrollment, a similar 
share of black students, but fewer students in poverty (see Table 2). Saratoga Springs and 
Oneonta are districts that share these characteristics. They have institutions of higher education 
in the district and they are surrounded by rural districts. Their performance is above the state 
mean and their enrollment is relatively small. The share of black students in Saratoga Springs is 
less than in Ithaca and the share of poor students is higher in Oneonta. Saratoga Springs and 
Oneonta have adjacent school districts with lower performance and smaller enrollment. These 
characteristics make Saratoga Springs and Oneonta good comparison districts for Ithaca.  
 
Figure 11 shows pre trends for Ithaca as well as for Saratoga Springs and Oneonta. As already 
mentioned, trends between Ithaca and its adjacent school districts are less parallel compared to 
Syracuse, Niagara Falls and their adjacent school districts. Oneonta and Saratoga show similar 
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trends except five years prior charter school entry. Again, I plot the difference in residuals 
between Ithaca and its adjacent districts and Ithaca’s direct comparison districts and their 
adjacent districts. Trends converge and diverge at different points in time periods and do not 
seem to be parallel for most of the observed time. Ithaca’s adjacent school districts seem to be a 
better comparisons group than Saratoga Springs and Oneonta.  
 
2.7 Empirical Methods: Concluding Remarks 
 
While both specifications estimate the change in housing price gaps between school districts, the 
underlying assumptions and identification strategies are different. Equation 5 assumes that 
housing price trends between districts with charter schools and their adjacent districts are parallel 
prior charter school opening. Equation 6 assumes that the trend of housing price difference 
between districts in the metropolitan area with charter school are similar to trends in housing 
price differences between districts in a matched control area. As the graphical analysis of pre 
trends showed, the parallel trends assumption is meet best by districts adjacent to the district with 
charter school. Thus, Equation 5 is the preferred specification.   
 
Equation 5 estimates the effect of charter schools on the housing price gap between districts by 
using a difference in difference estimator. Using this strategy, I can effectively control for 
common shocks to housing prices in the metropolitan area. Equation 6 uses a triple difference 
strategy. Using this strategy, I can effectively control for housing price shocks in the 
metropolitan area and for common shock between city school districts and their adjacent 
districts. While the triple difference has the advantage of a more robust analysis, the housing 
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price trends prior charter school opening were less parallel. Thus, generally, I will give more 
weight to the results of Equation 5.  
 
2.8 Data  
 
The data for these analyses are drawn from several sources. Property sales information and 
housing characteristics were obtained from the New York Office of Real Property Services 
(ORPS). The database includes information on property location, class, sales date, and sales 
price. Information from the sales database was merged with detailed parcel-level data from the 
New York State Real Property System (RPS) database. The Real Property System collects 
information from local assessors on a number of parcel characteristics such as construction grade 
of the house (which refers to the quality of the material and workmanship used to construct the 
house and is graded from A to E), size (for living space measured in square feet, number of 
bathrooms, number of bedrooms, etc.), and special features (for example full basement, central 
air conditioninging, fireplace, etc.). In most cases, housing characteristics were only available for 
the first time a house was sold. Thus, the data does not provide information on parcel traits that 
varies over time. Combining both datasets, I constructed a pooled cross-sectional dataset that 
spans from January 2, 2000 to August 6, 20109. It is important to note that neither of the 
combined datasets includes information on housing sales in NYC, and hence I have to exclude 
NYC from my analysis. Information on charter school entry and location was drawn from the 
New York Charter School Institute web page hosted by the State University of New York10.  
                                                          
9 The New York Office of Real Property Services puts a flag on all housing sales that are not arm’s length. I do not 
include these sales in my data set as they are unlikely to reflect the market price of a parcel. 
10 Housing sales and charter schools were geo coded and placed into the census tracts and districts using ArcGis.    
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Tables 3 to 6 show Summary statistics for housing sales in Syracuse, Niagara Falls, and Ithaca. 
In each table Columns 1 and 2 compare the housing characteristics in the district with charter 
schools to housing characteristics in the adjacent school districts. In Columns 3 and 4, I compare 
the housing characteristics for the same district but for houses located ½ mile away from the 
district border. Finally, Columns 5 and 6 contrast housing characteristics for the direct 
comparison of the charter school district and its adjacent school districts.     
 
Table 3 compares housing characteristics for Syracuse. Columns 1 and 2 show that houses in 
Syracuse cost $37,598 less than in the adjacent districts (about 27 percent). Further, houses in 
Syracuse are of somewhat inferior quality, are less likely to have air conditioning, and are on 
average 32 years older compared to houses in the adjacent school districts. Therefore, housing 
characteristics in Syracuse and its adjacent school district mirror to some extent the socio-
economic segregation between the school districts. Comparing houses characteristics for sales ½ 
mile away from the district border, the gap in housing prices is somewhat greater averaging 
$38,504 (a difference of about 26 percent). The housing quality in Syracuse is still inferior to its 
neighbors. Also, the share of houses with central air conditioning is higher in the adjacent school 
districts and the age gap is less compared to the previous sample.  
 
Contrasting houses in Niagara Falls and its adjacent school districts, houses in Niagara Falls 
have lower sales prices and are of lower quality than in the adjacent school districts. The 
difference in housing prices is on average $83,734 (about percent 51 percent). Houses in Niagara 
Falls are more likely to have central air conditioning and they are older.  
43 
 
 
 
Comparing Syracuse and its adjacent school districts with Niagara Falls and its adjacent school 
districts, it is apparent that the housing price gap between Niagara Falls and its adjacent districts 
is somewhat greater. Further, the gap in housing size is greater while the gap in housing age is 
smaller between Niagara Falls and its adjacent districts. All other housing characteristics look 
similar. 
 
Table 4 presents summary statistics for Niagara Falls. As already described earlier, houses in 
Niagara Falls are of less value and of somewhat less quality compared to houses in the adjacent 
school district. Using the reduced sample around the district border for Niagara Falls, the gap in 
housing prices is much smaller averaging $20,782 (about 18 percent). Houses in Niagara Falls 
are of somewhat better quality, more likely to have air central air conditioning, and to be older. 
 
Dunkirk and Binghamton have less valuable and lower quality houses than their adjacent 
districts. The difference in housing prices is $41,484 (about 32 percent). Further, houses in the 
Dunkirk and Binghamton are less likely to have central air conditioning. Comparing the 
differences in housing stock between Niagara Falls and its adjacent districts with Dunkirk and 
Binghamton and their adjacent school districts the following points are evident. The housing 
price difference between Niagara Falls and its adjacent districts is greater. Also, the differences 
in housing size and age are greater in Niagara Falls. All other housing characteristics look 
relatively similar. 
 
Table 5 presents summary statistics for Ithaca. Columns 1 and 2 compare housing characteristics 
in Ithaca and its surrounding districts. It is notable that housing prices and the quality of housing 
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in Ithaca are greater than in its adjacent school districts. The difference in housing prices is 
$62,003 (about 43 percent). Also, houses in Ithaca are more likely to have central air 
conditioning. The reduced sample shows for Ithaca a decline in the housing price difference. The 
difference in housing prices is reduced to $29,492 (about 13 percent). Overall, the gap in housing 
quality, share of houses with air conditioning, and age is reduced.  
 
In Oneonta and Saratoga, housing prices and housing quality are greater than in their adjacent 
school districts. The difference is $54,223 (about 21 percent). Further, houses are more likely to 
have central air conditioning. Comparing the differences in housing characteristics between 
Ithaca and its adjacent districts with differences between Oneonta and Saratoga and its adjacent 
districts, it is evident that there is a greater difference in the housing prices and quality between 
Ithaca and its adjacent districts. All other housing characteristics look relatively similar. 
  
2.9 Results 
  
The results are presented separately for Syracuse, Niagara Falls, and Ithaca in Tables 6 to 8 
respectively. Models 1 and 2 estimate Equation 5 using the adjacent school districts as control 
group. In Model 2, the sample is reduced to housing sales ½ mile away from the district border. 
The main focus in the first two models is the coefficient on the interaction between post and 
inside. The effect captures the change in housing prices differences between school districts with 
charter schools and their adjacent districts after charter school entry.  
 
Model 3 estimates Equation 6 using the matched metropolitan areas. The main effect is captured 
by the triple interaction between post, inside, and treatment. The coefficient compares the change 
45 
 
 
 
in housing price differences between the districts with charter school and its comparison district 
and between the control districts and their adjacent school districts after charter school entry.  
 
Models 4 to 6 estimate Equation 5 but differentiate by distance and neighborhood income. Model 
4 interacts the coefficient of interest with distance in miles. In Model 5, the sample consist only 
of sales in neighborhoods having a neighborhood income below the median in the district with 
charter school. Model 6 presents the same model for housing sales taking place in neighborhoods 
with an income above the median. In Models 5 and 6, I include only neighborhoods in the 
charter school district that have a similar income compared the neighborhoods in the adjacent 
districts and vice versa. With limiting the sample to similar neighborhoods on each side of the 
border, I avoid bias resulting from comparisons that are not supported on either side of the 
border. 
 
Results Syracuse 
Table 6 presents the results for Syracuse. In Models 1 and 2, the coefficients on the interaction 
between post and inside are negative and imply an increase in the housing price gap between 
Syracuse and its adjacent school districts. However, the estimated coefficient are imprecisely 
estimated and not statistically significant. Model 3 shows no effect of the charter school 
indicating that the difference in housing prices between Syracuse and its adjacent district relative 
to the difference in housing prices between Niagara Falls and its adjacent districts is not 
changing after charter school entry. Model 4 shows a main effect being close to zero and 
statistically insignificant. The coefficient on the triple interaction including distance suggests that 
with increasing distance, the effect of the charter school is reduced. Being a mile further away 
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reduces the impact of the charter school in housing prices by 1.4 percent. As the coefficient is 
imprecisely estimated, this cannot said with certainty.  
 
Model 5 shows a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction between post 
and inside. Housing prices in Syracuse’s poor neighborhoods increase by about 6 percent after 
charter school entry compared to similar neighborhoods in the adjacent school districts. Model 6 
shows a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction between post and 
inside. Housing prices in Syracuse’s richer neighborhoods decreased by 5 percent after charter 
school entry compared to similar neighborhoods located in the adjacent school districts.  
 
The results for Models 5 and 6 probably indicate resorting between Syracuse’s richer and poorer 
neighborhoods. Households living in Syracuse’s richer neighborhoods, who get their child 
enrolled into one of the high performing charter schools, move out of their neighborhood into 
somewhat poorer neighborhoods in Syracuse. As demand decreases in the richer neighborhoods, 
housing prices fall. As demand increases in poorer neighborhoods, housing prices grow. Thus, 
the result for neighborhoods in Syracuse is similar to Case 2 in the theoretical section.  
 
Results Niagara Falls 
Table 7 shows the results for Niagara Falls. In Model 1, the coefficient on the interaction 
between post and inside is close to zero implying no change in the housing price gap between 
Niagara Falls and its neighboring districts. Reducing the sample to housing sales close to the 
district border the coefficient becomes positive indicating a decrease the housing price gap. The 
coefficients in both models are not statistically significant. In Model 3, the coefficient on the 
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triple interaction is close to zero. The coefficient indicates that the difference in housing prices 
between Niagara Falls and its adjacent districts is not changing differently compared to districts 
in the matched metro area. In Model 4, the main effect is close to zero and not statistically 
significant. The coefficient on the triple interaction is positive indicating a greater impact on 
housing values for parcels that are further away from the charter school. However, the coefficient 
is imprecisely estimated and not statistically significant.  
 
Model 5 shows a statistically significant negative coefficient on the interaction between post and 
inside. Housing prices in Niagara Falls poor neighborhood decreased by 2.9 percent compared to 
similar neighborhoods in the adjacent school districts. Model 6 shows a positive but not 
statistically significant coefficient on the interaction between post and inside. The results indicate 
an increasing gap between housing prices in Niagara Falls neighborhoods. Housing prices in 
poorer neighborhoods decrease while they remain unchanged in richer neighborhoods. The result 
is potentially explained by declining school quality in Niagara Fall’s poorer neighborhoods. As 
the charter school is low performing compared to other schools in the district, a reduction in 
school quality is unlikely based on cream skimming. It is more likely that resources or services 
declined in schools located in low income neighborhoods. As school quality decreases, 
households have to be compensated by lower housing prices. The situation in Niagara Falls is 
best explained by theoretical case number three.  
 
Results Ithaca 
Table 8 presents the results for Ithaca. In Model 1, the coefficient on the interaction between post 
and inside is negative and indicates a decline in the housing prices gap between Ithaca and its 
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neighboring districts. Reducing the sample to housing sales at the district border, the coefficient 
becomes positive. Both coefficients are imprecisely estimated and they are not statistically 
significant. In Model 3, the coefficient on the triple interaction is close to zero. The coefficient 
indicates that the difference in housing prices between Ithaca and its adjacent districts is not 
changing differently compared to districts in the matched metro area. Differentiating the effect 
by distance, the main effect in Model 4 is close to zero. The coefficient on the triple interaction is 
close to zero suggesting no relationship between distances and housing price changes. Both 
coefficients are not statistically significant.  
 
Model 5 shows a negative and statistically significant negative coefficient on the interaction 
between post and inside. Housing prices in Ithaca’s poor neighborhood decrease by 1.9 percent 
compared to similar neighborhoods in the adjacent school districts. Model 6 shows a positive but 
not statistically significant coefficient on the interaction between post and inside. The results 
indicate an increasing gap between housing prices in Ithaca’s neighborhoods. Housing prices in 
poorer neighborhoods decrease while they stay the same in richer neighborhoods. Similar to 
Niagara Falls, the result is potentially explained by declining school quality in the poorer 
neighborhoods in Ithaca. As performance measurement in the charter school’s 2012 and 2013 
report cards reveal, the Ithaca charter school is lower performing compared to its traditional 
counterparts. Thus, a reduction in school quality is unlikely to be based on cream skimming.   
 
It is more likely that resources or services declined in schools located in low income 
neighborhoods. As school quality decreases, households have to be compensated by lower 
housing prices. The situation in Niagara Falls is best explained by theoretical case number three. 
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More likely is that resources or services declined in schools located in low income 
neighborhoods. As school quality decreases, households have to be compensated by lower 
housing prices. Similar to Niagara Falls, the situation in Ithaca is best explained by theoretical 
case number three.  
 
In conclusion, there are no statistically significant results on the coefficients of interest for 
Models 1 to 4. Most of the results are imprecisely measured and do not allow any further 
conclusions about and whether the gap in housing prices changes. The models 5 and 6 show 
statistically significant coefficients indicating changes in housing prices for neighborhoods 
within Syracuse, Niagara Falls, and Ithaca. The heterogeneity of the charter school effect 
amongst neighborhoods with different income is most likely the reason why models focusing on 
overall effects at the district level show either imprecise or no results. In Syracuse, households 
living in neighborhoods with higher median income move into neighborhoods with lower median 
income located in Syracuse. The difference in housing prices between neighborhoods in 
Syracuse is decreasing. In Niagara Falls and Ithaca low income neighborhoods experience 
declining housing prices. As housing prices in higher income neighborhoods do not change, the 
gap in housing prices between neighborhoods is increasing.   
 
2.10 Conclusions  
 
Theoretical models of bidding and sorting suggest that charter schools can have a significant 
effect on housing markets and residential sorting. In this chapter, I provide an direct empirical 
test of whether those predicted effects occur. My theory describes three cases how charter 
schools influence school quality and housing prices. The first case describes a positive effect of 
50 
 
 
 
charter schools on school quality. However, the increase in school quality is not large enough to 
generate resorting. The difference in housing prices between high and low performing 
jurisdictions can either go up or down depending on the relative changes in school quality 
between jurisdictions.  The second case illustrates an increase in school quality that is large 
enough to create resorting. In this case, housing price differences between high and low 
performing jurisdictions decrease. The third case describes how charter school decrease school 
quality leading to a decline in housing prices in the lower performing jurisdiction. In this case, 
the gap in housing prices between districts increases.  
 
Empirically, I do not find statistically significant changes in housing price differences between 
school districts. However, I do find an effect of charter schools on housing price differences 
between neighborhoods. In Syracuse, charter school raise the price of housing by almost 6 
percent in neighborhoods having an income below the district’s median relative to similar 
neighborhoods in the adjacent school districts. In contrast, housing prices decrease by 5 percent 
in neighborhoods with an income above the median compared to similar neighborhoods in the 
adjacent school district. As a consequence, the difference in housing prices between poorer and 
richer neighborhoods in Syracuse is decreasing. The results probably indicate resorting between 
Syracuse’s richer and poorer neighborhoods. Households living in Syracuse’s richer 
neighborhoods, who get their child enrolled into one of the high performing charter schools, 
move out of their neighborhood into somewhat poorer neighborhoods in Syracuse. As demand 
decreases in the richer neighborhoods, housing prices fall. As demand increases in poorer 
neighborhoods, housing prices grow.   
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Syracuse is exemplary for the effect of high performing charter schools on housing values in 
districts with much lower performing traditional public schools. The charter schools are an 
amenity that is valued by some families who willing to move out of their neighborhood into a 
poorer neighborhood.    
 
In Niagara Falls poorer neighborhoods, housing prices decrease relative to neighborhoods with 
similar income levels located in the adjacent school districts. Likewise, Ithaca’s poorer 
neighborhoods experience declining housing prices relative to similar neighborhoods in the 
adjacent school districts after charter school entry. In both districts housing prices in richer 
neighborhoods are not influenced by charter school entry. Consequently, in Niagara Falls and 
Ithaca, the difference in housing prices between richer and poorer neighborhoods increased after 
charter school opening. 
 
Niagara Falls and Ithaca are exemplary for the effect of charter schools on housing values that 
performing lower than the traditional public schools in the district. The charter schools takes 
students and money away from traditional schools. Their low performance is likely to be 
acknowledge by residents and seen as a disamenity.     
 
The empirical results suggest that the impact of charter schools on housing price gaps between 
jurisdictions is more complex and context specific compared to inter-district choice and voucher 
programs. More specifically, the effect of charter schools on housing values depend on how 
charter schools impact expected school quality in jurisdictions. Also, the empirical findings 
suggest that the effect of charter schools on housing values varies tremendously between 
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neighborhoods within the same district. Thus, to detect housing price changes it is necessary to 
analyze housing prices at the neighborhood level.   
 
Additional research has to be conducted to explore the relationship between charter schools and 
housing prices further. Particularly, my analysis is limited by the availability of housing sales 
before 2000 and only focuses on areas with small charter school enrollment. Using different 
samples may lead to somewhat different results. Further, I did not have attendance zones for 
school districts to explore within district changes on housing prices further. Future research 
could address these deficiencies to create a better understanding how charter school influence 
housing prices.  
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Figure 1: Perfect Sorting without Charter Schools 
 
 
 
Figure 2: School Quality Increase Without Resorting 
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Figure 3: School Quality Increase With Resorting 
 
 
 
Figure 4: School Quality Decrease 
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Figure 5: Syracuse City School School District and Its Adjacent School Districts 
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 Figure 6: Sale Price Residuals by Month for Syracuse 
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Figure 7: Sale Price Residuals by Month for Niagara Falls 
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Figure 8: Sale Price Residuals by Month for Ithaca 
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Figure 9: Sale Price Residuals by Date for Syracuse and Metro Comparison 
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Figure 10: Sale Price Residuals by Date for Niagara Falls and Metro Comparison 
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Figure 11:  Sale Price Residuals by Date for Ithaca and Metro Comparison 
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Table 1: Performance of Charter Schools and Districts in 2010 
District First Charter 
Established 
Number 
of Charter 
Schools 
Share of 
District 
Enrollment 
Sufficient 
Pre Period 
Housing 
Sales 
Available 
Charter 
School in 
Adjacent 
District  
Average 
Performance 
Charter 
Schools  
Average 
Performance 
District 
Schools 
Average 
Performance 
Surrounding 
Districts 
Included 
in Final 
Sample 
Albany  1999 12 24% No Yes No -0.18 -0.97 0.63 No 
Buffalo  2000 15 19% No Yes No -0.44 -1.58 0.18 No 
Rochester  2000 6 4% No Yes No N/A -0.90 0.74 No 
Roosevelt 2000 1 8% No Yes No N/A 0.15 -0.53 No 
Wainscott 2000 1 74% No Yes No -0.25 -1.17 -1.14 No 
Riverhead 2001 1 2% Yes No No -0.59 -0.22 0.34 No 
Kenmore-
Tonawanda 2001 1 2% Yes Yes Yes 0.91 -0.07 0.60 No 
Troy  2001 2 11% Yes Yes Yes -0.84 -1.71 0.48 No 
Lackawanna 2002 1 19% Yes Yes Yes -0.60 -0.84 0.30 No 
Syracuse  2002 2 5% Yes Yes No -0.89 -2.20 0.22 Yes 
Yonkers  2005 1 1% Yes Yes Yes N/A 0.42 0.14 No 
Niagara Falls 2006 1 5% Yes Yes No -0.49 -1.29 -0.17 Yes 
Hempstead 2009 2 7% Yes No No -0.19 N/A 0.56 No 
Ithaca  2009 1 2% Yes Yes No 1.13 -1.04 0.83 Yes 
Source: Number of charter schools and year of establishment are taken from the SUNY Charter School Institute web page (http://www.newyorkcharters.org). 
Enrollment figures are taken from the Common Core of Data 2010 Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey. Performance measures are taken from 
the 2010 New York State report cards   
Performance is computed by averaging the standard scores for grade 4 ELA, grade 4 math, grade 8 ELA and grade 8 math for each school in New York State. 
Then, the measurement is converted into standard scores with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.  
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Table 2: Charter Districts and Matched Control Districts 
     District   Adjacent Districts Averages 
  
 
  
Mean 
Performance 
Enrollment Black 
Population 
in % 
Population 
in Poverty 
in % 
  Mean 
Performance 
Enrollment Black 
Population 
in % 
Population 
in Poverty 
in % 
 Measurement                   
   state mean 0.00 3082.23 4.09 8.38   0.14 3487.26 4.21 8.47 
   state standard deviation 1.00 4198.70 9.29 5.22   0.46 3261.23 5.75 3.65 
                       
 District                    
   ITHACA  1.02 7620.00 7.33 7.61   -0.03 1501.25 2.17 7.88 
                       
   Control: Saratoga Springs  0.58 7915.00 1.48 5.68   0.06 2107.50 1.02 7.30 
   Control: Oneonta  0.65 2705.00 7.33 14.99   -0.22 691.67 0.31 11.72 
                       
   NIAGARA FALLS -0.96 11075.00 28.65 19.64   0.24 4162.86 1.13 4.40 
                       
   Control: Binghamton -0.23 8135.00 14.47 18.34   0.41 3020.00 2.57 7.86 
   Control: Dunkirk  -1.36 2610.00 5.07 24.70   0.14 1657.50 1.11 9.72 
                       
   SYRACUSE  -2.17 28575.00 40.45 22.54   0.25 4193.33 2.49 5.97 
                       
   Control: Niagara Falls -0.96 11075.00 28.65 19.64   0.24 4162.86 1.13 4.40 
                       
 All variables are used for the school year 1999  
                      
 Performance computed by converting mean score of each district in the state into a standard scores with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one 
using statewide test specific means and standard deviations, and then averaging the standard scores for  grade 4 ELA, grade 4 math, grade 8 ELA and 
grade 8 math. 
 Any additional measure from the district tabulations of the 2000 U.S. Census 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics Syracuse 
 
  
All housing 
sales Syracuse
All housing 
sales adjacent 
districts
1 Mile 
around the 
border 
Syracuse
1 Mile 
around the 
border 
adjacent 
school 
districts
All housing 
sales Niagara 
Falls
All housing 
sales adjacent 
districts
Number of  sales 5,053 13,470 2,943.00 1,481.00 2,314.00 5,464.00
Sales price in $ 100,362 137,959 105530.6 144035 80,677.15 164,411.50
(52,368) (73,248) (44,553) (78,981) (39,099) (78,217)
Share condition fair or poor 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02
(0.19) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.18) (0.14)
Share condition good or excellent 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.09
(0.20) (0.29) (0.18) (0.27) (0.23) (0.28)
Share no fire place 0.50 0.53 0.45 0.43 0.69 0.38
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) C(0.49) (0.46) (0.49)
Share construction grade A or B 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.16
(0.22) (0.24) (0.19) (0.29) (0.24) (0.37)
Share construction grade D or E 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.00 0.01
(0.36) (0.34) (0.33) (0.32) (0.02) (0.08)
Share central air condition 0.15 0.27 0.19 0.34 0.37 0.24
(0.36) (0.44) 0.39) (0.47) (0.48) (0.43)
Average number of full baths 1.23 1.40 1.23 1.46 1.25 1.51
(0.51) (0.58) (0.51) (0.62) (0.48) (0.60)
Average number of bedrooms 3.10 3.11 3.03 3.06 3.08 3.20
(0.73) (0.70) (0.65) (0.72) (0.76) (0.72)
Average number square feet living area 1533.96 1580.09 1,501.17 1,633.74 1,367.62 1,766.08
(531.02) (582.57) (471.83) (660.78) (440.47) (619.31)
Average age 66.84 34.74 64.59 48.50 61.61 36.06
(15.66) (20.91) (15.38) (20.37) (16.02) (20.97)
Syracuse Niagara FallsSyracuse
Notes: Prices were deflated to January 2000 dollars using the "CPI Inflation Calculator" from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics Niagara Falls 
 
  
All housing 
sales Niagara 
Falls
All housing 
sales adjacent 
districts
1 Mile 
around the 
border 
Niagara Falls
1 Mile 
around the 
border 
adjacent 
school 
districts
All housing 
sales Dunkirk 
and 
Binghamton
All housing 
sales adjacent 
districts
Number of  sales 2,314 5,464 790.00 212.00 966.00 15,966.00
Sales price in $ 80,677 164,412 97441.94 118223.5 89,351.64 130,835.90
(39,099) (78,217) (41,239) (100,389) (52,203) (80,980)
Share condition fair or poor 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.07
(0.18) (0.14) (0.11) (0.17) (0.33) (0.26)
Share condition good or excellent 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.07
(0.23) (0.28) (0.30) (0.10) (0.26) (0.26)
Share no fire place 0.69 0.38 0.63 0.58 0.70 0.54
(0.46) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.46) (0.50)
Share construction grade A or B 0.06 0.16 0.11 0.24 0.06 0.10
(0.24) (0.37) (0.31) (0.43) (0.23) (0.30)
Share construction grade D or E 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.06
(0.02) (0.08) (0) (0) (0.28) (0.23)
Share central air condition 0.37 0.24 0.43 0.12 0.07 0.21
(0.48) (0.43) (0.50) (0.33) (0.25) (0.41)
Average number of full baths 1.25 1.51 1.26 1.33 1.24 1.40
(0.48) (0.60) (0.49) (0.54) (0.48) (0.58)
Average number of bedrooms 3.08 3.20 3.04 2.92 3.11 3.11
(0.76) (0.72) (0.62) (0.72) (0.87) 0.7629268
Average number square feet living area 1367.62 1766.08 1,350.82 1,451.51 1,509.62 1,607.15
(440.47) (619.36) (411.61) (609.22) (476.92) (594.69)
Average age 61.61 36.06 53.87 46.05 67.29 47.70
(16.02) (20.97) (17.36) (19.61) (16.72) (22.37)
Niagara Falls Dunkirk and BinghamtonNiagara Falls
Notes: Prices were deflated to January 2000 dollars using the "CPI Inflation Calculator" from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Table 5: Summary Statistics Ithaca 
 
  
All housing 
sales Ithaca
All housing 
sales adjacent 
districts
1 Mile around 
the border 
Syracuse
1 Mile around 
the border 
adjacent 
school 
districts
All housing 
sales Oneanta 
and Saratoga
All housing 
sales adjacent 
districts
Number of  sales 3,777 3,112 539.00 228.00 6,435.00 20,833.00
Sales price in $ 207,012 145,009 227882.8 198390.4 257,702.90 203,479.60
(122,708) (108,677) (122,426) (112,922) (173,751) (135,591)
Share condition fair or poor 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.04
(0.16) (0.25) (0.13) (0.11) (0.21) (0.20)
Share condition good or excellent 0.43 0.28 0.43 0.49 0.12 0.18
(0.50) (0.45) (0.50) (0.50) (0.32) (0.38)
Share no fire place 0.48 0.71 0.40 0.51 0.48 0.56
(0.50) (0.46) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Share construction grade A or B 0.15 0.08 0.13 0.20 0.18 0.11
(0.36) (0.28) (0.34) (0.40) (0.39) (0.31)
Share construction grade D or E 0.11 0.17 0.10 0.20 0.05 0.08
(0.32) (0.38) (0.30) (0.40) (0.22) (0.26)
Share central air condition 0.16 0.05 0.19 0.13 0.43 0.26
(0.36) (0.22) (0.39) (0.34) (0.50) (0.44)
Average number of full baths 1.67 1.51 1.88 1.74 1.63 1.56
(0.71) (0.63) (0.67) (0.68) (0.67) (0.64)
Average number of bedrooms 3.16 3.10 3.42 3.29 3.19 3.10
(0.86) (0.78) (0.80) (0.78) 0.8216371 0.8013503
Average number square feet living area 1681.48 1654.07 1,897.15 1,807.02 1,800.00 1,662.80
(659.52) (607.48) (650.88) (640.79) (693.98) (627.25)
Average age 48.05 44.47 36.51 36.16 35.45 37.88
(26.07) (26.73) (20.35) (24.90) (27.77) (27.46)
Oneanta and SaratogaIthaca
Notes: Prices were deflated to January 2000 dollars using the "CPI Inflation Calculator" from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Ithaca
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Table 6: Analysis for Syracuse 
 
 
  
Syracuse and 
Adjacent Districts
Syracuse and 
Adjacent 
Districts - 1/2 
Mile
Syracuse and 
Control Districts 
- inl. Adjacent 
Districts
Syracuse and 
Adjacent Districts - 
with Distance 
Interaction 
Syracuse and 
Adjacent Districts 
- Income below 
Median 
Syracuse and 
Adjacent Districts - 
Income above 
Median 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 0.0544** 0.0892* 0.0114 0.0637* -0.0757 0.0748***
(0.0222) (0.0457) (0.0204) (0.0337) (0.0550) (0.0228)
Distance -0.0113
(0.0111)
Post  X  Inside -0.0243 -0.0351 -0.0336 0.00998 0.0597** -0.0503**
(0.0171) (0.0231) (0.0256) (0.0364) (0.0274) (0.0231)
Post  X  Treatment 0.0466***
(0.0146)
Post  X  Distance -0.00109
(0.00355)
Inside  X  Distance 0.0530
(0.0712)
Post  X  Inside  X  Distance -0.0139
(0.00871)
Post  X  Inside  X  Treatment 0.00829
(0.0307)
Neighborhood Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Neighborhood Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter/Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 18,517 4,423 23,379 18,517 3,451 4,429
R
2
0.605 0.571 0.606 0.606 0.440 0.629
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,  * p<0.1
Notes : Regressions are estimated with OLS. The post period starts on September 1st of the school year the first charter school opens. 
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Table 7: Analysis for Niagara Falls 
 
 
  
Niagara Falls and 
Adjacent 
Districts
Niagara Falls 
and Adjacent 
Districts - 1/2 
Mile
Niagara Falls 
and Control 
Districts - inl. 
Adjacent 
Districts
Niagara Falls and 
Adjacent Districts 
- with Distance 
Interaction 
Niagara Falls and 
Adjacent Districts 
- Income below 
Median 
Niagara Falls and 
Adjacent Districts - 
Income above 
Median 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 0.126** 0.133** 0.151*** 0.121* 0.033*** 0.118**
(0.0460) (0.0555) (0.0469) (0.0665) (0.0054) (0.0469)
Distance 0.00359
(0.00966)
Post  X  Inside 0.00987 0.0325 0.0784 -0.0109 -0.0291*** 0.0139
(0.0211) (0.0391) (0.0568) (0.0776) (0.0016) (0.0105)
Post  X  Treatment -0.0401*
(0.0232)
Post  X  Distance 0.000684
(0.00518)
Inside  X  Distance -0.190**
(0.0749)
Post  X  Inside  X  Distance 0.0282
(0.0194)
Post  X  Inside  X  Treatment -0.0511
(0.0614)
Neighborhood Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Neighborhood Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter/Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 7,772 1,001 15,953 5,507 1,294 1,792
R
2
0.618 0.688 0.565 0.642 0.548 0.644
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,  * p<0.1
Notes:  Regressions are estimated with OLS. The post period starts on September 1st of the school year the first charter school opens. 
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Table 8: Analysis for Ithaca 
 
 
  
Ithaca and 
Adjacent 
Districts
Ithaca and 
Adjacent 
Districts - 1/2 
Mile
Ithaca and 
Control 
Districts - inl. 
Adjacent 
Districts
Ithaca and 
Adjacent Districts 
-  with Distance 
Interaction 
Ithaca and Adjacent 
Districts - Income 
below Median 
Ithaca and Adjacent 
Districts - Income 
above Median 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 0.0344 0.0328 -0.0311 0.747** 0.0211*** 0.0164
(0.0664) (0.122) (0.0345) (0.334) (0.0041) (0.0802)
Distance -0.0153**
(0.00628)
Post  X  Inside -0.0504 0.0421 -0.0245 -0.01297 -0.0191*** 0.0199
(0.0417) (0.0854) (0.0229) (0.0292) (0.0033) (0.0408)
Post  X  Treatment 0.0476*
(0.0286)
Post  X  Distance -0.00534**
(0.00231)
Inside  X  Distance -0.00601
(0.0124)
Post  X  Inside  X  Distance 0.00560
(0.0138)
Post  X  Inside  X  Treatment 0.0468
(0.0453)
Neighborhood Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Neighborhood Trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter/Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 6,876 767 20,782 4,763 1,351 4,686
R
2
0.627 0.715 0.627 0.587 0.709 0.594
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,  * p<0.1
Notes:  Regressions are estimated with OLS. The post period starts on September 1st of the school year the first charter school opens. 
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3. The Influence of Finance Policies on Charter 
School Locations in New York, Florida, North 
Carolina, Michigan, and Ohio 
 
3. 1 Introduction 
 
The nature and effects of state charter school programs depend partly on the location decisions 
made by potential charter school operators. These supply decisions influence the composition of 
charter schools, their effects on the enrollments and finances of traditional public schools, and 
the type of competition charter schools will create. Despite their importance, supply decisions 
have been largely neglected in the study of charter schools (Bifulco and Buerger 2012).  
 
Among the understudied questions of charter school location is how finance provisions influence 
charter school locational decisions. Although state policies regarding charter school finance 
policies vary widely, charter schools in all states share the following characteristics. First, 
enrollment is not guaranteed. Second, charter school funding is determined by the number of 
students. Third, charter schools have to fulfill performance goals. Therefore, all charter school 
operators must be concerned with: (1) reaching achievement standards, (2) attracting enough 
students to fill their allotted number of seats, and (3) keeping costs sufficiently low to maintain 
financial viability. These three factors are likely to influence the locational decision of charter 
school operators. States can affect these factors by their funding policies (Bifulco 2014).   
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This chapter examines the influence of finance provisions on charter school location patterns by 
comparing different states. Using data for Michigan, Ohio, North Carolina, Florida, and New 
York, the results show that locational and particularly enrollment patterns are consistent with the 
incentives created by financial policies. In states tying charter school payments to school districts 
expenditures, charter schools are more likely to locate in districts having greater expenditures. In 
states paying flat per pupil amounts independent of charter location, charter schools are more 
likely to move into low spending school districts. The analysis also shows that additional 
payments for enrolling disadvantaged students encourages charter schools to locate in high 
poverty areas and to enroll more disadvantaged students, but only if payments are large enough 
to outweigh the cost of educating those students.   
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the analysis sample and Sections 3, 4, 
and 5 describes the finance, accountability, and authorizer policies for each state in the study 
sample. Section 6 discusses the location and enrollment incentives created by the different 
policies in each state. Using policies and theoretical considerations, Section 7 states the studies 
hypotheses. Section 8 describes the empirical methods used to test the hypotheses. Section 9 
presents the results, and finally Section 10 makes conclusions.   
 
3.2 Sample   
 
 
Table 9 shows the decision making process determining the study’s sample. Column two and 
three show the number of charter schools and the share of charter school students in states with 
charter school programs. I first select states having large charter school programs regarding the 
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number of schools and charter school enrollment (see also Bifulco 2014 for similar criteria). 
Next, I keep states where payments are determined by charter school laws rather than through 
negotiation between authorizer and charter school operator. In a final step, I select only states 
where the data for my empirical models is available. More particularly, I need performance 
information prior the start of the charter school program. Thus, the final sample consists of 
Michigan, Ohio, North Carolina, Florida, and New York.  
 
3.3 Charter School Finance, Accountability, and Authorizing Policies  
 
I expect charter schools to make location decisions that increase the likelihood of reaching 
performance goals, attracting enough students, and staying financially viable. How likely it is for 
a charter school operator to reach these three goals is influenced by each states’ finance, 
accountability, and authorizing policies. By making it easier to reach the three goals in some 
locations than in others, charter school policies create location and enrollment incentives. To 
understand how these incentives emerge, I describe the finance, accountability, and authorizing 
policies for each state separately in the next sections.  
 
3.3.1 Charter School Finance Systems in New York, Florida, North Carolina, 
Michigan, and Ohio 
 
 
Allotments to charter schools consist of two parts: base payments and additional payments for 
students with certain characteristics (henceforth compensations). Base payments are determined 
by the legislature in each state in the study sample. For each charter school, the total amount is 
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calculated by multiplying the base payment by the number of full time students in the school. In 
New York, Florida, and North Carolina base payments vary with the location of the charter 
school. In Michigan11 and Ohio payments are the same no matter where the school is located. 
Compensations are additional payments for high cost students. Charter schools can receive 
compensations for students with disabilities, living in poverty, and having limited English 
proficiency (LEP). The additional payments are calculated either by weighting these groups of 
students differently in the calculation of base payments or by directly adding a specific per pupil 
amount of money to the base payment. In all the states in the study sample, charter schools 
receive additional payments for students with disabilities. Only in Michigan and Ohio do charter 
schools receive compensation for enrolling poor students. In all states in the study sample but 
New York, charter schools receive additional payments for enrolling LEP students.    
 
Table 10 lists base payments and compensations for each state in the sample. All figures are 
displayed for 2007, as this is the most recent year in the sample detailed information for all states 
can be determined. I describe first, how base payments are determined in each state.   
 
Base Payments 
In New York, charter schools receive payments for each enrolled student from the district where 
the student resides. Per pupil payments are determined by the approved operating expenses of the 
district from two years earlier divided by a weighted pupil count (also from two years earlier) 
multiplied by an adjustment factor12. Approved operating expenses are total district expenditures 
excluding expenditures for capital outlay and debt service for school buildings; transportation; 
                                                          
11 In Michigan there is a small variation of $300.    
12 The adjustment factors is supposed to correct for inflation.   
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lunch programs; tuition payments; and some other miscellaneous expenditures. The adjustment is 
based on the statewide change in approved operating expenses from three years prior to one year 
prior (Bifulco and Buerger 2012). In 2007, the approved operating expenditures per pupil that 
charter school could have received varied between $6,081 and $17,915 with a mean of $9,987 
and a standard deviation of $2,497.  
 
In Florida, the per pupil payments to charter schools are calculated by dividing the operating 
funds of the district in which the charter school is located by the number of weighted full-time 
equivalent students in the school district. The result is multiplied by weighted full-time students 
in the charter school. Operating funds include gross state and local funds, discretionary lottery 
funds, and funds from the school district’s current operating discretionary millage levy (Florida 
Statutes Title XLVIII Chapter 1002.33 (17)). In 2007, the per pupil payments for weighted 
students counts ranged from $6,776 to $10,745 with a mean of $7,913 and a standard deviation 
of $802.  
 
In North Carolina, the state pays charter schools the average per pupil revenues of the district in 
which the charter school is located excluding funding for students with special needs or limited 
English proficiency (G.S. § 115C-238.29H a 1). If charter schools enroll students with special 
needs or LEP, they receive additional funds from the state. These revenues are explained in the 
next section. Further, charter schools obtain per pupil payments from the school district in which 
a student resides. The amount of these payments have to equal the per pupil local expenditure 
(G.S. 115C-238.29H). Calculations for these amounts are done by the school district. The 
Department of Public Instruction neither oversees nor intervenes with the calculation and 
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payment of local appropriations (Charter School Financial Guide 2010). In 2007, the payments 
charter schools could have received varied between $3,943 and $8,864 depending on the district 
the charter school locates and excluding payments for students with disabilities or limited 
English proficiency. The distribution had a mean of $5,047 and a standard variation of $770.  
 
In Michigan, the charter school finance system is strongly influenced by Proposal A, a 
constitutional amendment approved by Michigan voters in 1994. Proposal A decoupled the local 
property tax from the financing of local education agencies and established the state’s sales tax 
as primary source of education funding. Under Proposal A, the Legislature annually calculates a 
per-pupil funding allowance for each school district. The amount of the allowance is related to 
district spending prior to Proposal A. Districts having spent more prior the proposal receive a 
greater allowance. All districts receive at least the minimum allowance from the state. Charter 
schools receive either the minimum allowance or a charter school allowance (Summers 2013). In 
2007, the minimum allowance was $7,085 and the charter school allowance was $7,385. Charter 
schools located in districts receiving an allowance less than $7,385 obtained the minimum 
allowance.  Charter schools located in districts receiving an allowance greater than $7,385 
obtained the charter school allowance. Therefore, the maximum difference between districts in 
charter school payment was $300 (Olson and LaFaive 2007).  
 
In Ohio, all charter schools receive the per pupil base cost amount from the state regardless of 
location. The per pupil base cost formula is determined statewide by the General Assembly 
according to the cost of the three input factors: base classroom teacher compensation, other 
personnel support, and non-personnel support. The General Assembly decides on the base 
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classroom teacher compensation by defining a teacher to student ratio and a base classroom 
teacher compensation for the whole state that is necessary for the state‐defined basic education. 
Per pupil payments for personnel and non-personnel support are calculated using an adjustment 
factor determined by the legislature and revenues in the previous year. In 2007, the per pupil 
base cost formula was $5,403 (Legislative Service Commission 2008).  
 
Base Payment Adjustments 
Base payments to charter schools are often adjusted for district or student characteristics. 
Adjustments are done by either weighting students differently or by adding specific dollar 
amounts for certain types of students. I present the weights for each state in Table 10. To 
compare additional payments resulting from these weights, I multiply state’s average unweighted 
base payment by the specific student weight. If specific dollar amounts are added, I show the 
payments in 2007.  
 
In two states charter school revenues are adjusted for district characteristics. In Florida, charter 
schools receive additional funding if they locate in districts with small enrollments. Payments are 
based on a sparsity index. The index is computed by dividing the full time equivalent enrollment 
of the district by the number of permanent senior high school centers (not to exceed three). In 
2007, potential payments to charter schools ranged between $2 and $533 per pupil. Further, 
Florida law also requires that payments to charter schools are adjusted for the cost of living in 
the district. Adjustments are done using an annually computed District Cost Differential (DCD), 
The DCD is calculated by adding each district’s Florida Price Level Index for the most recent 
three years and dividing the sum by three. The result is multiplied by 0.800, divided by 100, and 
77 
 
 
 
0.200 is added to the product. In 2007, the weights ranged between 0.9221 and 1.0271. Using the 
average unadjusted payments to charter schools of $7,913, the adjustment would results in 
deductions or payments between -$616 and $214.  
 
In Ohio, charter schools receive additional funding if they locate in school districts that are 
below the 80th percentile in the state’s income and property wealth distribution. The amount of 
the so called parity aid is determined by the state’s legislature. In 2007, parity aid ranged 
between $9 and $594 per pupil depending on district’s position in the wealth distribution of the 
state.  
 
States also adjust their payments to charter schools according to student characteristics. In 
addition to location-specific incentives, these adjustments create incentives to enroll (or exclude) 
specific students. All states use weights that increasing payments to charter schools for enrolling 
students with disabilities. In Michigan and North Carolina, these weights do not distinguish 
between different forms of disabilities with flat weights of 0.286 and 0.125 respectively. In Ohio, 
Florida, and New York weights vary with the severity of the disability. Weights range in Ohio 
between 0.28 and 4.73, in Florida between 0.035 and 5.201, and in New York between 0.9 and 
1.65. Therefore, weights for students with severe disabilities are greatest in Ohio and Florida 
while they are smallest in North Carolina and Michigan. The weight for students with less severe 
disabilities is greatest in New York and smallest in Florida. Comparing actual payments, Ohio 
and Florida have the highest payments for students with severe disabilities while Florida has by 
far the smallest payment for students with less severe disabilities. New York has a relatively high 
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per pupil payment for students with severe disabilities while North Carolina and Florida have 
relatively low payments.      
 
Adjustments for enrolling students living in poverty are made in Michigan and Ohio. In 
Michigan, charter schools receive additional payments for students qualifying for free breakfast, 
milk or lunch under federal law. In 2007, the federal eligibility threshold for a one person 
household was a monthly gross income of $850 per month. The weight for poor students was 
0.115 leading to an additional payment of $832. In Ohio, charter schools receive additional 
payments for students whose parents participate in the Ohio Works First program. The program 
provides time-limited cash assistance to families with a gross monthly income of less than $773. 
Only charter schools located in districts having more poor students than the average school 
district in the state receive additional payments for enrolling poor students. In 2007, the per pupil 
payment varied depending on the degree of poverty in the district. The in the poorest school 
district was $1,208.   
 
In all states but New York, base payments are adjusted for enrolling LEP students. The weight in 
Florida is 0.275 leading to an additional payment of $2,176. In North Carolina, charter schools 
receive a compensation of $683 for enrolling an LEP student. In Michigan, LEP students receive 
the same weight as poor students if they are not already counted as a poor student. If they are 
already counted as a poor student they do not receive an additional weight. Also, the legislature 
appropriates annually money for LEP students. In 2007, appropriations were $2,800,000 and 
41,842 LEP students were counted in the state. Hence, the state paid an additional $67 for every 
LEP student enrolled in a charter school. In Ohio, the weight varies with the number of LEP 
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students living in the district where the charter school is located. If there are more LEP students 
than in the average school district, charter schools receive additional payments for LEP students. 
The weights vary between 0.125 and 0.25 leading to additional payments between $675 and 
$1,350 respectively. Therefore, weights and payments for LEP students are greatest in Florida 
followed by Ohio and Michigan. Payments are smallest in North Carolina.  
 
Florida is the only state adjusting payments to charter schools according to grade enrollment. 
The weight for enrolling students in classes K to 3 is 0.035 and for enrolling students in classes 9 
to 12 is 0.088. Additional payments are $277 and $360 respectively.   
 
3.3.2 Accountability 
 
 
Charter schools programs are based on the idea of performance-based accountability (Bulkley 
2001). The strength of a performance-based accountability system depends on both the rigor of 
the performance goals and how these goals are enforced (Bulkley 1999, Hill et al. 2001). Charter 
schools have to fulfill the same NCLB goals as do other schools in their state (US Department of 
Education 2001). If standards are relatively high compared to other states, it will be more 
challenging for charter schools to reach the performance goals. NCES has compared each state's 
standard for proficient performance in reading and mathematics in grades 4 and 8 by placing the 
state standards onto a common scale defined by NAEP scores. Table 11 compares the percentage 
of students that are proficient according to the state and the NAEP standard for each state in the 
study sample for 2007. Differences between NAEP and state standards tend to be smaller in New 
York and Florida, indicating relatively demanding standards. North Carolina has less demanding 
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reading standards than New York and Florida, but similar standards in mathematics. Michigan 
and Ohio tend to have less demanding standards than New York and Florida in both math and 
reading.    
   
The instruments charter school authorizers use to enforce performance standards start with the 
application process and end with the renewal of the charter school contract. Performance based 
contracts between authorizer and operator, and the systematic data collection and monitoring of 
the school are important factors as well (Bulkley 2001). The National Alliance for Public Charter 
Schools (NAPCS) has developed a model charter school law including the accountability 
mechanisms a “flawless” charter school law should have. Further, NAPCS has transparently 
compared the availability of these mechanisms with charter school laws nationwide. I use the 
NAPCS model charter school law to compare the availability of accountability mechanisms 
between the five states in my sample.  
 
Table 12 depicts the four NAPCS accountability criteria. The first criterion analyzes 
accountability mechanisms during the application process. The criterion highlights the inclusion 
of comprehensive academic, operational, governance, and performance requirements in the 
application. The second criterion examines whether or not charter school laws require 
performance based contracts created as separate post-application documents between authorizers 
and public charter schools, and whether or not these contracts detail academic performance 
expectations, operational performance expectations, and school and authorizer rights and duties. 
The third criterion captures the processes that allow authorizers to monitor and collect data on 
the compliance with the performance contract. Finally, the last criterion analyzes the renewal 
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process with a focus on school closure and dissolution procedures. NAPCS assigns points from 0 
to 4 for each of these criteria with 0 indicating that accountability instruments are not in place 
and 4 representing that all instruments of the model law are part of the charter school law.  
 
Table 12 shows the scores assigned to the five states and the state average according to the 
NAPCS ranking. Florida and New York are rated as having more extensive accountability 
provisions, while Michigan, Ohio, and particularly, North Carolina are rated as having weaker 
accountability provisions. Therefore, New York and Florida have both more rigorous 
performance standards and more extensive charter school accountability provisions than 
Michigan, Ohio, and North Carolina.  
 
3.3.3 Authorizers 
 
 
Authorizers decide on charter applications, and hence potentially influence the location of 
charter schools. I scrutinize each state’s charter school law for preferences towards applicants 
intending to serve certain types of students or to locate in a specific area.  Also, I investigated 
authorizers’ mission statements for priorities towards certain locations or student groups.  
 
In New York, charter schools can be authorized by the local school districts, the State Board of 
Regents (Regents), or the trustees of the State University of New York (SUNY). New York 
charter School Law states that authorizers are “encouraged to give preference to applications that 
demonstrate the capability to provide comprehensive learning experiences to students identified 
by the applicants as at risk of academic failure” (Charter School Law S 2852 (2)). Consequently, 
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the mission statements of Regents and SUNY state a preference towards applicants intending to 
serve students that are at a greater risk of not meeting the State’s academic standards.  
 
In North Carolina, the charter school law allows local school boards, the University of North 
Carolina, and the state board of education to serve as authorizers. Charter schools approved by 
local school boards and the University of North Carolina must also be approved by the State 
Board of Education. As the State Board of Education has the final decision on a charter school 
application, the board acts ha the last decision on authorizing a charter school. North Carolina 
Charter School Law states that in reviewing charter school applications the “State Board is 
encouraged to give preference to applications that demonstrate the capability to provide 
comprehensive learning experiences to students identified by the applicants as at risk of 
academic failure” (§ 115C-238.29 D (a)).  
 
In Florida, local school boards, state universities (for lab schools13 only) and community college 
district boards of trustees (for charter technical career centers only) can serve as authorizers. In 
practice, however, 99 percent of the charter schools are authorized by local school boards and 1 
percent by higher education institutions (NACSA 2012). Neither the Florida Charter School Law 
nor the Florida Charter School Application Evaluation Instrument, used by authorizers to assess 
charter school applications, state preferences towards applicants serving a particular student 
population or locating in specific neighborhoods. The Florida Association of Charter School 
                                                          
13 Laboratory or developmental research schools are affiliated with the college of education within the state 
university of closest geographic proximity. Lab schools serve as a vehicle for the conduct of research, 
demonstration, and evaluation regarding management, teaching, and learning (Florida Statutes Title XLVIII, 
Chapter 1002). 
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Authorizers (FACSA) does not state a preference in providing education to certain student 
groups either.  
 
In Michigan, boards for local districts, intermediate school districts14, community colleges, and 
public universities can authorize charter schools, with jurisdictional restrictions for all but tribal 
community colleges and public universities. The most active authorizers are local school boards 
and higher education organizations. While local school boards authorize smaller numbers of 
charter schools15, higher education organizations often oversee large numbers of charter 
schools16. The charter school law gives priority to authorizing schools replacing charter schools 
that have been closed for low performance and that intend to operate the same grade levels as the 
closed school (Sec 380.503 (2)). Amongst the authorizers overseeing large numbers of charter 
schools, only the Bay Mills Community College has in its mission to ensure a quality education 
for urban, minority, and poor children.   
 
In Ohio, the law allows a wide variety of entities to serve as authorizers if they are approved by 
the state board of education. Active authorizers are the state’s education department, local school 
districts, higher education institutions, and not-for-profit organizations. Higher education 
institutions and not-for-profit organizations oversee larger numbers of charter schools than local 
school boards. Neither the charter school law nor the mission statements of the largest charter 
school authorizer mention a preference towards a location or student group. 
                                                          
14 Intermediate school districts are organized at the county or multi-county level and provide services for school 
districts including services for special education students and vocational education. Additionally they collect data for 
the state department of education. 
15 The Detroit School District is the largest local authorizer with overseeing 18 schools in 2010.    
16 In 2010, the Bay Mills Community College oversaw 43 charter schools, Grand Valley State University 42, and 
Central Michigan University 59 charter schools. 
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3.4 Location Incentives and Disincentives   
 
 
Reasons for establishing a charter school can vary tremendously between charter school 
operators. However, given the terms under which charter school are financed and authorized, 
charter school operators have to meet three key objectives. First, they have to reach student 
achievement standards specified in their charter agreements. Second, operators have to attract 
enough students to fill their allotted seats. Finally, charter schools have to keep costs low enough 
to maintain financial viability (Bifulco and Buerger 2012). Following Bifulco and Buerger 
(2012), I expect that charter operators will make supply decisions that increase the likelihood of 
meeting these objectives. Given this assumption, Bifulco and Buerger (2012) identify several 
locational incentives that charter school financing and accountability provisions create for 
charter school operators. In this section, I recap those incentives, and identify few additional 
incentives created by aspects of charter financing policies not discussed by Bifulco and Buerger 
(2012).   
 
Location Incentives Based on Variation in Charter School Base Payment 
In states where charter school payments depend on district expenditures, districts with a high 
expenditure-to-cost ratio are an attractive location for charter school operators. A large number 
of low cost students and high expenditures will make it relatively easy for the charter operator to 
fulfill the achievement goals in the charter school contract. However, a high spending to cost 
ratio is also likely to allow the district to operate traditional public school that are appealing to 
students and parents. Thus, attracting enough students to stay financially viable might be 
difficult. Districts with high spending-to-cost ratios, which use their resources inefficiently, are 
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more likely to be an attractive location for charter schools. Therefore, in states where charter 
school base payments vary with school location, I expect larger concentrations of charter schools 
in inefficient districts with high spending-to-cost ratios (Bifulco and Buerger 2012).    
 
In states where charter school payments do not vary with the location of charter schools, I would 
expect a different picture. In these states, including Michigan and Ohio, charter school payments 
can be more or less than expenditures in the surrounding district. Charter schools are more likely 
to move into districts with relatively low per pupil expenditures. In these districts, charter 
schools have more funding than traditional public schools enabling them to provide attractive 
programs to students and parents. Thus, in states that have no variation in charter school 
payments, I expect to see a larger concentration of charter schools in districts with low per pupil 
payments, holding districts costs and performance levels constant.   
 
Bifulco and Buerger (2012) analyze charter school location patterns in New York a state having 
a high variation in per pupil district payments linked to differences in district expenditures. 
Controlling for the cost of providing education and mean student performance, they find that 
districts with higher per pupil operating expenditures have greater concentrations of charter 
schools. Holding district spending and cost of education constant, districts with lower mean 
student performance have more charter schools, which suggests that charter schools are more 
likely to move into relatively inefficient school districts.  
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Location Incentives Based on Cost Factors 
A substantial literature in education finance maintains that education costs depend on district and 
student characteristics (Downes and Pogue 1994; Reschovsky and Imazeki 1998; Duncombe and 
Yinger 2000, 2005). District characteristics influencing education costs include teacher wages 
and facility costs. Holding other factors constant, charter schools have an incentive to locate in 
districts with low teacher wages and rents to decrease their operational costs (Bifulco and 
Buerger 2012).  
 
Student characteristics influencing costs are mainly students’ learning and language abilities. 
Supplemental payments for different grade levels, poor, LEP, and disabled student can offset 
disincentives created by high costs. By serving high shares of students in groups that generate 
additional payments, charter schools can generate higher per pupil revenues than surrounding 
schools. Whether or not charter schools have financial incentive to serve high cost students 
depends on the relationship between costs and supplemental payments. Holding everything else 
equal, in states where supplemental payments equal or exceed costs, charter schools will enroll 
relatively large amounts of high cost students. In states were costs are greater than additional 
revenues, charter schools will not have incentive to enroll high cost students. Ultimately, how 
costly high need students are, will depend on the performance standards in the charter school 
contract and if an effective set of policy instruments is in place to enforce these standards. Costs 
will be greater in states having higher performance goals and more effective instruments and 
lower in states with lower performance standards and less effective instruments costs (Bifulco 
and Buerger 2012).  
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Lacireno-Paquet et al. (2002) present evidence from Washington, D.C. that suggests that this 
type of financial incentive can influence charter school enrollments.  Specifically, they find that 
charter schools are less likely than regular public schools to serve students whose language or 
special education needs make them more costly to educate. Interestingly, only charter schools 
that they classified as market-oriented, rather than mission-oriented, showed this tendency, 
suggesting that this type of financial incentive influences the supply decisions of some types of 
charter school providers more than others.  
 
Location Incentives Based on Performance of Students and Schools  
Attracting high achieving students increases the likelihood of reaching required achievement 
standards. The more demanding the student achievement standards, the stronger the incentive to 
attract high achieving students. Also, schools that offer high achieving peers are attractive to 
parents both because such peers might have positive spill-over effects and because parents might 
use the achievement level of students as a proxy indicator of  instructional quality. Of course, 
high achieving students often have other attractive schooling options either because they live in 
areas with high quality public schools or have access to private or magnet schools. Thus, a 
charter school which chooses a location attractive to high achieving students may face more 
competition and have a harder time filling seats, which might weaken the strength of this 
incentive (Bifulco and Buerger 2012).   
 
Parents whose children attend low performing schools are more likely to be dissatisfied with 
their current schooling options and to find a charter school attractive. Thus, locating in low 
performing school districts makes it more likely that a charter school can fill its allotted seats. 
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However, many of the students attracted to the charter school might be high need or low 
achieving students. Enrolling these students will make it more difficult to reach the student 
achievement standards without sufficient additional payments. If charter schools have a cost 
effective model to educate high need students, low performing school districts will be an 
attractive charter school location (Bifulco and Buerger 2012).  
 
Also, charter schools locating in low performing districts can try to attract students from more 
advantaged backgrounds. For instance students whose parents are college educated may be more 
likely to use school choice programs compared to students of parents with less education. There 
is consistent empirical evidence that parental preferences are very heterogeneous and that low-
income parents place lower values on academic characteristics when choosing schools 
(Schneider and Buckley 2002; Hastings, Kane, and Staiger 2006; Jacob and Lefgren 2007). 
Further, Hastings and Weinstein (2008) show that if information is costly to obtain, 
economically and educationally advantaged families are better able to exercise choice. Using a 
nationally representative data set, Butler et al. (2013) find students of parents having a somewhat 
greater socio-economic status than their peers having a higher likelihood enrolling into a charter 
schools. Thus, charter school operators in low performing school districts may be able to attract 
higher performing students out of low performing schools (Bifulco and Buerger 2012).    
 
Evidence that these considerations may influence charter school locations is provided by a study 
in Washington, D.C. Henig and MacDonald (2002) found that charter schools were more likely 
to locate in census tracts with high proportions of African-American and Hispanic residents than 
in predominantly white census tracts. However, among census tracts with concentrations of 
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nonwhite residents, charter schools tended to locate in those with middle income and high home 
ownership rates. This location pattern suggests a strategy of targeting the more advantaged 
students within groups of traditionally disadvantaged students. Corroborating these findings, 
Bifulco and Buerger (2012) find that New York charter schools are more likely to locate in 
districts with concentrations of college educated adults as well as high levels of diversity in 
educational attainment.  
 
Location in Diverse Districts  
The preceding discussion suggests that a strategy targeting advantaged students who would 
otherwise attend schools with concentrations of disadvantaged students might be attractive to 
charter school operators. Such a strategy, if successful, would make reaching achievement 
standards, attracting a sufficient number of students, and keeping per pupil costs low each more 
likely. Thus, many charter school operators might look to locate near schools with diverse 
populations of students that include significant concentrations of both educationally 
disadvantaged groups and more advantaged, higher achieving student groups (Bifulco and 
Buerger 2014). 
 
Glomm, Harris, and Lo (2005) make a more general argument of this kind. They argue that a 
diverse population is likely to have a dispersed distribution of parental preferences for different 
types of educational programs. As a result, schools or districts that serve diverse populations will 
have a difficult time satisfying the preferences of all of their parents, creating a demand for 
charter schools that can differentiate their offerings from the local school or district. They also 
90 
 
 
 
present evidence, consistent with their argument, that charter schools in Michigan are more 
likely to locate where populations are diverse in terms of race and adult education levels. 
 
Another important factor is how in a diverse school district students sort into schools. It is 
possible that the schools reflect the diversity of the district residents. However, it is also very 
likely that students already sort into schools. If students are to sort into schools according to the 
preferences, I do not expect a high demand for students in these districts. However, families 
compete for entry into a neighborhood and may do not get to match their preferences towards 
education with the neighborhood they end up living. Thus, I expect charter schools to move into 
school districts with greater variation in residents and at the same time great disparities in 
schools’ performance and student characteristics.      
 
Location Incentives Based on Authorizer Preferences 
As described earlier, authorizers in New York, North Carolina, and Michigan have preferences to 
approve applications for charter schools locating in areas with high shares of students at risk of 
academic failure. Charter operators applying for opening a charter school at a location preferred 
by the authorizer will have greater chances of getting their charter application approved. Charter 
schools will only locate in these areas if they have a cost effective model to educate high need 
students, or if they can enroll high performing students from these areas.  
 
Although charter school authorizers are widely accepted as a crucial institution for the success of 
charter school programs, policymakers and researchers have largely overlooked them (Finnigan 
2004). Using information from interviews and focus groups Finnigan et al. (2004) provide some 
91 
 
 
 
evidence that state authorizers are much more likely than local authorizers to consider in their 
sponsoring decisions the improvement of the public school systems, creating competition, and 
fulfillment of the state law. Thus, it is possible that charter school authorizers, particularly at the 
state level, actively encourage operators to move into certain areas. However, at this point it is 
unclear how strong this effect is.  
 
3.5 Hypotheses 
 
 
Taking into account base payments as well as accountability and authorizing policies in each 
state, I offer the following hypotheses.  
 
H1. Holding performance and cost factors constant, I expect a positive relationship 
between district expenditures and the number of charter schools in states where charter 
school payments vary with district spending.  
 
The incentive to move into a high spending school district will be greater if there is a greater 
variance in district expenditures.  
 
H2. In states where charter school payments do not vary with district expenditures, 
holding performance and cost factors constant, I expect a negative relationship between 
expenditures and the number of charter schools in a district.  
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In states where charter school payments are unrelated to district spending, charter schools will 
have a competitive advantage in districts where per pupil spending in traditional public schools is 
low.   
 
Taken into account the weights and additional payments for disadvantaged students, I can offer 
the following hypotheses.  
 
H3. In states compensating charter schools for the enrollment of disadvantaged students, 
I expect a positive relationship between charter concentration (charter enrollment) and 
the share of disadvantaged students in a district (school). 
 
The relationship between the number of charter schools and the share of disadvantaged students 
in a school district is altered by the amount of additional payments, authorizer preferences, and 
the strength of the accountability system in the state. Additional payments have to be perceived 
as sufficient by charter school operators to create an incentive. Authorizer preferences can 
enforce incentives created by additional payments. High accountability standards with rigid 
enforcement increase the costs for charter schools to educate disadvantaged students and mitigate 
incentives created by additional payments.  
 
3.6 Empirical Methods 
 
 
To test the above stated hypotheses, I conduct two sets of analysis. The first analysis examines 
the distribution of charter schools across districts and the second analysis examines the 
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enrollment in charter schools. Focusing on the districts where charter schools are located allows 
me to examine the effect of financial considerations that vary at the district level such as per 
pupil payments. Looking at enrollment allows me to investigate the alignment of actual student 
shares with compensation schemes for high cost students.  
 
Location Across Districts  
The goal of this study is to determine how finance and accountability policies in different states 
influence locational decisions of charter schools. The empirical estimation follows the approach 
used by Downes and Greenstein (1996), Glomm, Harris, and Lo (2005), and Bifulco and Buerger 
(2012) to examine school location and estimate the following regression model in each of the 
five states:  
 
Chi = f(Ei, Pi, Ci, Di, Ni, εi) (1) 
  
 
where Chi is the number of charter schools in district i, Ei is per pupil spending in the district, Pi 
is a measure of student performance in the district, Ci are indicators of educational costs in the 
district including teacher wages and student need indicators, Di are measures of the diversity of 
the population in the district, Ni is a control for the number of school age children, Rit are rental 
costs, and εi is a random error term.  
 
Two main issues arise in estimating and interpreting the proposed regression. First, the count of 
charter schools only occurs in non-negative integer values and several districts will not 
experience a charter school moving in at all. In this case, researchers typically estimate either a 
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Poisson or a negative binomial model. I used two tests to determine the correct model for the 
count of charter schools in each state. First, I calculated the over-dispersion parameter alpha 
using a log likelihood test. Alpha is the variance of the multiplicative random effect. If the value 
of alpha is close to zero, the distribution has a variance that is close to the mean. In this case, a 
Poisson model is preferred over a negative binomial model. If alpha is significantly different 
from zero, a negative binomial model is preferred. The value of alpha is significantly different 
form zero in all states suggesting that a negative binomial is a better fit for my models17.   
   
Second, I follow Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and conducted the following analysis. In a first 
step, I estimated the fitted frequencies for different numbers of charter schools using a Poisson 
and negative binomial model. Then, I compared the actual to the fitted frequencies of the two 
models. Frequencies for the actual and fitted counts are quite similar in New York, Michigan, 
and Ohio in both models. In North Carolina and Florida, the Poisson regression substantially 
underpredicts the proportion of zero charter schools and overestimates the proportion of having 
one or two charter schools. This pattern in the lack of fit is associated with the neglect of 
overdispersion in the data. In count data, overdispersion arises when for the variance for a count 
exceeds its mean. This is particularly true in North Carolina and Florida18. The negative binomial 
model predicts the count of charter schools much better, and hence I use this model for my 
estimation.  
 
                                                          
17 The alpha values are all statistically significant at the .01 level. The values are: New York 297.45; Florida 504.4; 
North Carolina 266.39; Michigan 569.08; and Ohio 928.09.  
18 The mean and variances are: New York 0.07 and 0.06; North Carolina 0.8 and 190.2; Florida 6.7 and 222.36; 
Michigan 0.33 and 7.89; and Ohio 0.48 and 11.62. 
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A second issue concerns potentially endogenous relationships. Each of the independent variables 
I propose to examine is potentially influenced by the presence of charter schools. To address this 
issue, I regress the number of charter schools in 2009-10 on measures of the independent 
variables before charter school entry. For instance, all measurements based on census tabulations 
will be from 1990. None of the five states had a charter school program in 1990. Further, 
performance measurements will be from standardized tests at least one year before the charter 
school program was established. Using district characteristics before charter school opened 
should minimize potential simultaneity problems. 
 
The data to estimate Equation 1 comes from several sources. The charter school counts come 
from charter school lists administered by each state and available at the state’s education 
department web page. The operating expenditures in a district were calculated using the 
Common Core of Data School District Finance Survey (CCD). The per pupil expenditure in each 
district is calculated by dividing the current operating expenditure19 for elementary and 
secondary education instructional programs by the number of students enrolled in the district. 
Current operating expenditures reflect in states with varying charter school payments revenues 
for charter schools. In states with flat payments they reflect how much the traditional schools 
spend charter schools are competing with. Performance measurements are computed by 
converting mean scores of each district in the state into standardized scores with a mean of zero 
and standard deviation of one using statewide test specific means and standard deviations, and 
                                                          
19 The current operating expenditures are defined as the sum of the current expenditures for instruction, the current 
expenditures for support services, and the current expenditures for other services (including food services and 
enterprise operations). I exclude capital expenditures as they fluctuate strongly according to building projects in the 
districts. Further, I exclude debt as these costs do not reflect operating expenditures of a given year.     
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then averaging the standard scores for grade 4 English, grade 4 mathematics, grade 8 English and 
grade 8 mathematics. 
 
Measurements of student characteristics, mean years of education, the diversity measurements 
for education and race, rent for residential property and enrollment figures were computed using 
data from district tabulations of the 1990 U.S. Census. The measures of educational and racial 
diversity are versions of a Herfindahl index. The Herfindahl index for parental education is 
constructed using 4 different years of education categories20. The Herfindahl index for race is 
constructed using 5 racial categories21. Values for the Herfindahl indices range from 0 to 100 
with greater numbers indicating more diversity.  
 
Finally, the measure of teacher wages in each of the state’s metropolitan areas is the Labor 
Market Comparable Wage index produced by the National Center for Education Statistics. This 
measure is determined by wages paid for comparable occupations in the local labor market and 
thus reflects the underlying costs of teachers rather than district decisions about teacher salaries.  
 
Enrollment in Charter Schools 
Choosing a location is only one of several supply decisions that charter school operators make. 
They also make decisions about what programs to offer, and how to advertise and recruit 
students. Together with the educational preferences of parents and students, these supply 
decisions may influence who attends charter schools. Once charter school operators have chosen 
a location where there is healthy demand, charter schools may have an incentive to choose 
                                                          
20 The categories are less than high school degree, high school degree, some college, and college degree.  
21 The categories are white, black, Indian, Asian, and Hispanic. 
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programs and recruitment strategies that attract higher achieving students or students who require 
fewer resources to reach student achievement standards. I do not observe the decisions charter 
schools make about programming, recruiting and advertising in this study. However, I can 
compare the enrollments of charter schools to the surrounding traditional public schools to see if 
their programs and recruitment strategies attract certain types of students. Further, I can evaluate 
if charter school enrollment patterns are consistent with the incentives set by each state’s finance 
policies (Bifulco and Buerger 2012).  
 
Using report card information from 2010 in each of the five states, I compare the compositions 
of charter schools to the schools in the district where they are located. Charter school students 
are able to cross district school borders, however, in most states enrollment preferences are given 
to the students residing in the district where the charter school is located22. I use a regression 
framework for comparing enrollment in charter and traditional schools in the same district. The 
dependent variables measure the share of students with disabilities, being poor, and having 
limited English proficiency. The independent variable is a charter school dummy. In such a 
regression, the intercept simply states the share of at risk students in traditional schools. The 
coefficient on the charter school dummy shows how charter schools deviate from traditional 
schools in their enrollment and if the disparity is statistically significant. To make comparisons 
only within districts, I add district fixed effects to the regression. To control for potential 
                                                          
22 The charter school law in New York states that in case of oversubscription “enrollment preference shall be 
provided to pupils […] residing in the school district in which the charter school is located” (Charter School Law S 
2854. 2 (b)). In Florida, charter schools can give preference to students residing “within a reasonable distance of the 
charter school” (Title XLVIII 1002.33 10 (d)) and can give preference to students that live in the municipality the 
charter school is located (Title XLVIII 1002.33 10 (b)). “A resident of a municipality that operates a charter school-
in-a-municipality pursuant to paragraph (15) (c). In Ohio, charter schools can restrict enrollment to students in the 
district they are located in (2013 Ohio Charter Law Guidebook). In case of oversubscription, Ohio charter schools 
have to give preference to students residing in the district the school is located (2013 Ohio Charter Law Guidebook).  
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heteroskedasticity, I weight each regression by school enrollment. More formally, I estimate the 
following equation: 
 
𝑋𝑠𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝑢𝑠𝑖 
 
 
where Xsi stands for characteristics of students enrolled in school s, in district i. The 
characteristics include the share of students in poverty, LEP students, and students with. Charter 
is an indicator that turns on for charter schools. The term δi stands for districts fixed effects.  
 
3.7 Empirical Results 
 
 
First I discuss the results for the analysis of charter location across districts and then the 
enrollment analysis.  
 
Location Across Districts 
Table 13 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the district level analysis. In New 
York, Michigan, and Ohio charter schools move into relatively low performing school districts 
with relatively high concentrations of poor students. In contrast, in North Carolina and Florida, 
charter schools move into relatively high performing school districts and have a relatively low 
concentration of poor students. In all states except New York charter schools move into districts 
with relatively high teacher wages and rents, which is probably explained by the fact that charter 
schools are locating in urban areas that tend to have higher wages and rent prices. Districts where 
charter schools locate have greater educational diversity but do not differ greatly from other 
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districts in the level of adult education. In terms of racial diversity, charter schools move into 
more racially diverse districts in New York, Ohio, and Michigan. Charter schools locate in less 
diverse districts in Florida and North Carolina. In all states charter schools move into districts 
with greater enrollment and with greater operating expenditures per pupil.  
 
The patterns of charter school location detailed in Table 13 does not allow me to say much about 
the incentives created by finance policies. Finance, accountability, and authorizer policies create 
countervailing incentives and it would be useful to know which of the variables listed in Table 
13 are independently associated with the number of charter school, after controlling for other 
variables. Further, Table 13 ignores the considerable amount of variation in the number of 
charter schools across districts with charter schools. To help assess whether the theoretically 
described incentives influence which districts have the highest concentration of charter schools, I 
show the results of the regression analysis in Table 14.  
 
New York, Florida, and North Carolina are states where charter school payments vary with 
operating expenditures in the district. New York has the greatest variation followed by Florida 
and North Carolina. For these states, I predicted positive coefficients and greater magnitudes in 
states with greater variation in expenditures. The predications are confirmed by the coefficients 
in Table 14. For all three states, the coefficients are positive. The effect of operating expenditures 
on the concentration of charter schools in the district is greatest in New York followed by 
Florida, and North Carolina. In New York, a one percent increase in the per pupil expenditures is 
associated with a 6 percent increase in charter schools. Thus, if a district would increase per 
pupil spending by 16 percent, the number of charter schools in the district would double. In 
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Florida, a one percent change in operating expenditures leads a 2.4 percent increase in charter 
schools. If a district would increase operation expenditures per pupil by 41 percent the number of 
charter schools would double. In North Carolina a one percent increase in operating expenditures 
is associated with a 1.7 percent increase in charter schools. To double the amount of charter 
schools a district would have to spend 58 percent more per pupil.  
 
In Michigan and Ohio payments to charter schools do not vary with district expenditures. I 
predicted a negative coefficient on the variable measuring the operating expenditures. The 
coefficients in Table 14 show negative coefficients for Michigan and Ohio. In Michigan, a one 
percent increase in operating expenditures leads to a decrease in charter schools by 0.3 percent. 
In Ohio, a one percent increasing in operating expenditures leads to a decrease in charter school 
concentration of 0.1 percent. Both coefficients show relatively small effects that are not 
statistically significant. The initial hypothesis cannot be corroborated; however, the relationship 
between operating expenditures and charter school concentration is negative as predicted. 
 
For variables measuring student characteristics such as the share of students with disabilities, 
being poor, and having limited English proficiency, I predicted greater concentrations of charter 
schools in states paying compensations for these students. The coefficients on the variable 
measuring the share of students with disabilities are close to zero and statistically insignificant in 
all states but New York. In New York, the coefficient on the share of students with disabilities is 
statistically significant and negative. A one standard deviation increase in the number of disabled 
students decreases the number of charter schools by 50 percent. The weights for students with 
disabilities are neither high nor low compared to the other states in the sample. However, charter 
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schools in New York State seem to avoid places with high concentrations of students with 
disabilities. Thus, the finding is not consistent with the predictions in the theoretical section of 
the chapter. 
 
The coefficients on the variables measuring the share of poor students in the districts are close to 
zero and statistically insignificant in all states but Ohio. In Ohio, a one standard deviation change 
in the share of poor students increases the number of charter schools in the district by 85 percent. 
Out of all states, Ohio has the highest additional payments for poor students. Thus, the result 
confirms the hypotheses stated in the theoretical section of the chapter.  
 
The coefficients on the variable measuring the share of students with limited English proficiency 
are close to zero and statistically insignificant in Florida and Ohio. The coefficients are 
imprecisely measured in New York and North Carolina. In Michigan, the coefficient is positive 
and statistically significant indicating that charter schools are more often located in districts with 
higher shares of LEP students. The coefficient implies that a one standard deviation increase in 
the share of LEP students leads to a 24 percent increase in charter schools. Michigan is not a 
state with high compensations for LEP students. Thus, the initial hypothesis is not corroborated.  
 
The analysis of the relationship between student characteristics and charter school concentration 
did not show a consistent pattern. The results corroborated the theoretical predictions regarding 
the relationship between the share of poor students and the concentration of charter schools. The 
results did not corroborate the theoretical predications for the relationship between the share of 
students with disabilities and limited English proficiency and the concentration of charter schools 
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in the school district. There are two potential explanations for the inconsistency between 
empirical results and theoretical predictions. First, if there are large variations in the student 
population within districts, the across district analysis cannot pick up differences between 
districts. This could be particularly true for Florida and North Carolina where districts are very 
large and match county borders. Second, the incentives created by compensations may be offset 
by the higher cost of educating these students. In this case, compensations are not high enough to 
create a location incentive. The enrollment analysis will help to understand which of these two 
explanations is likely to be true.  
 
Further, I predicated a negative relationship between costs factors including teacher wages and 
building rents and the number of charter schools in the district. However, only in New York does 
an increase in the teacher wage index leads to a decrease in charter schools. In all other states, 
the coefficients on the teacher wage variable are close to zero and not statistically significant. A 
potential explanation why the results in these four states deviate from the theoretical predictions 
could be that charter schools pay salaries below the conventional wages for similar occupation in 
the area. According to the National Center for Education Statistics, the gap in salaries between 
traditional and charter schools teacher was $8,900 in 2012 (NCES 2013). Thus, charter schools 
might be able to avoid high costs by paying their teachers lower salaries.  
 
I proxy for commercial rent with the rent for residential properties as researchers have shown the 
strong correlation between both real estate sectors and their similarities in rent patterns (Gyourko 
2009; Rosen 1979; Roback 1982). The coefficients in all states are close to zero and not 
statistically significant. The result indicates that rent differences between school districts do not 
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have an impact on how charter school operators choose their location. One potential explanation 
is that other factors such as per pupil payments are more important factors when charter school 
operators look for potential locations.  
 
The predictions on the relationship between district performance and the concentration of charter 
schools in the district were ambiguous. On one hand, charter schools could be drawn to move 
into high performing districts making it easier to fulfill performance goals. On the other hand, 
charter schools could be inclined to move into low performing district where the demand for 
alternative educational programs is high. I find a statistically significant result only for New 
York, where charter schools locate more often in school district with low performance. In the 
other states, there is no statistically significant relationship between performance and charter 
concentration. The result is possibly explained by the countervailing incentives performance 
creates for charter school operators.  
 
I predicted that charter schools are more likely to move into districts with both concentrations of 
college educated parents but also considerable diversity in educational levels among parents. The 
coefficients on the variable measuring the mean years of education are not statistically 
significant in any of the states. In New York and North Carolina the coefficients on the variable 
measuring the educational diversity in the district are statistically significant. The coefficient in 
New York implies that a one standard deviation increase in diversity is associated with a 116 
percent increase in the number of charter schools. In North Carolina the coefficient is much 
smaller suggesting that a one standard deviation increase in diversity is associated with a 21 
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percent increase in charter schools. Therefore, I can only partially corroborate the initially stated 
hypotheses.  
 
Controlling for educational diversity, the amount of racial diversity in a district does not have 
statistically relationship with the concentration of charter schools for all states except Ohio. The 
coefficient in Ohio implies that a one standard deviation increase in racial diversity is associated 
with a 60 percent increase in charter schools.  
 
In all states charter schools are more likely to move into school districts with high enrollment 
numbers. Similar to the operating expenditures, the coefficient on the enrollment variables can 
be interpreted as an elasticity. The effects in all states are relatively small suggesting that to 
double the number of charter schools the enrollment would have to increase by 100 percent.  
 
In Table 15, I pool all states and rerun Equation 1 including dummy variables for each state and 
interacting these dummies with the log of operating expenditures. The coefficients on the 
interactions are statistically significant for New York, Florida and North Carolina. The 
magnitude of the effect is somewhat smaller for New York and larger for North Carolina 
compared to the results in Table 14. The reason for these differences are the relative numbers of 
charter schools in each state. New York has a relative small number of charter school compared 
to Florida and North Carolina. Thus, the concentration of charter schools is also greater in these 
states. The coefficients on the interactions for Michigan and Ohio are not statistically significant. 
Overall, the results of the pooled regression confirms the results of Table 14.      
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In conclusion, the across district comparisons shows the following results. The first hypothesis 
predicted a positive relationship between expenditures and the concentration of charter schools in 
states with varying charter payments. The analysis corroborated the hypothesis showing a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between expenditures and the number of charter 
schools in a school district. The relationship was stronger in states having a greater variation in 
charter payments. The second hypothesis states a negative relationship between district 
expenditures and charter concentration for states with no variation in charter payments. The 
hypothesis was partially confirmed as the coefficients showed the expected sign but were not 
statistically significant. The third hypothesis predicted a positive relationship between the share 
of disadvantaged students and the concentration of charter schools for states paying 
compensations. The analysis did not show a consistent pattern for all groups of disadvantaged 
students. For poor students the regressions showed a positive and statistically significant result in 
Ohio. Ohio is the state that pays the largest compensation for poor students of all states in the 
sample. Thus, the hypothesis was confirmed. For students with disabilities and with limited 
English proficiency the regression did not show the predicted effects. The inconsistency between 
theoretical predictions and empirical results may be explained by within district variation in 
these variables or compensations insufficient to create location incentives.  
 
Enrollment in Charter Schools 
Table 16 presents for each state the share of students with disabilities, living in poverty, and 
having limited English proficiency. I calculated the measurements using school level report cards 
for each state. The first notable result is that students in Florida are more likely to be poor, and 
limited in their English proficiency. Students in Ohio are much less likely to be poor and have 
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limited English skills. In general, the variance between states is greatest in the number of 
students receiving free lunch and relatively small for students with limited English proficiency.  
 
Table 16 does not allow a direct comparison between charter and traditional schools in the same 
district. In the next step, therefore, I regress each measure of disadvantaged students on a charter 
school dummy and district fixed effects. I am weighting each regression by school enrollment to 
avoid potential heteroscedasticity. Also, I cluster at the district level to control for potential 
shocks in the enrollment of disadvantaged students. To increase the comparability across states, I 
standardized each measure of disadvantaged students with regard to the state’s mean. Table 17 
presents the coefficients on the charter school dummy with their corresponding standard error.     
 
I predicted that in states paying compensations to charter schools for enrolling disadvantaged 
students, enrollments of disadvantages students will be higher than in states not paying 
compensations. This is exactly what the coefficients on the charter dummy show for the 
regressions using the share of poor students in a school as dependent variable. In Michigan and 
Ohio the coefficients are positive and statistically significant suggesting that charter schools 
enroll more poor students than the traditional public schools in the same district. Payments for 
poor students are much higher in Ohio compared to Michigan. Consistently, the coefficient is 
greater in Ohio than in Michigan. The coefficient for Ohio implies that charter schools enroll 0.4 
of a standard deviation more poor students than the traditional public schools located in the same 
district. In Michigan, charter schools enroll 0.27 of a standard deviation more poor students than 
traditional schools in their district. In Florida and North Carolina the coefficients are negative 
and statistically significant. The coefficients show that charter schools enroll 0.5 and 1.43 
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standard deviations fewer poor students than the traditional schools in their district. In New 
York, the coefficient is positive but imprecisely estimated. New York does not pay any 
additional funding for enrolling poor students.  
 
The regressions using the share of students with disabilities or the share of students with limited 
English proficiency as dependent variables, show negative and statistically significant 
coefficients on the charter school dummy. The results suggest that charter schools enroll smaller 
numbers of these students than traditional schools in the same school district. For students with 
disabilities, the difference between charter and traditional schools is greatest in Ohio. Charter 
schools enroll 0.34 standard deviations fewer special education students compared to traditional 
public schools. For LEP students, the difference is greatest in Florida, where charter schools 
enroll over one standard deviation fewer LEP students than traditional public schools. 
 
There are two potential explanations for the discrepancy between theoretical predications and 
empirical results. First, compensations for these students are not large enough to create an 
enrollment incentive. In fact, Duncombe and Yinger (2005) estimate that the additional costs of 
educating an LEP or special education student are much higher than for a poor student. 
Estimating cost functions for New York State school districts, they find that students coming 
from poor families are 111 percent and LEP students are 215 percent more costly to educate 
compared to regular students. Further, they estimate the costs of educating special education 
students to be 264 percent more costly compared to regular students.  
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Second, charter school operators may try to avoid disadvantaged students to ensure the school is 
high performing. Even though charter schools cannot selectively admit students, they can choose 
their mission and establish unique curricula making it less likely for disadvantaged students to 
apply (Renzulli and Evans 2005). If the school admits larger shares of less disadvantaged 
students it is easier to fulfill performance goals in the charter contract and hence avoid the risk of 
being closed or not renewed. Also, high performing charter schools are more likely to attract 
students, making it easier to fill the allotted seats in the school.  
 
In conclusion, the enrollment analysis shows the following results. The third hypothesis 
predicted greater enrollments of disadvantaged students in states paying compensations. The 
hypothesis was confirmed for the enrollment of poor students. The hypothesis was not confirmed 
for the enrollment of special education and LEP students. The results are most likely explained 
by two factors. First, compensations for disadvantaged students are likely to not outweigh the 
cost of educating them. Second, charter schools prefer high performing students to ensure a 
proper licensing and demand for the school.   
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
 
Supply decisions by charter school operators play an important role in determining which 
students have access to charter schools, which schools will be subject to charter school 
competition, what effects charter schools will have on school and residential segregation, and 
ultimately on the distribution of the costs and benefits created by charter schools.  
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This chapter provides the first empirical test of whether charter school finance provisions 
influence charter school location and enrollment using a comparison between different states. 
Applying theory and knowledge on finance provisions, I state hypothesis regarding the 
relationship between funding policies and charter concentration in five states. The first 
hypothesis states that in states linking charter school payments to district expenditures, charter 
schools will be more likely to locate in districts with greater expenditures holding performance 
and cost factors constant. This hypothesis was corroborated by the empirical analysis. The 
greater the variance in district expenditures the stronger was the relationship between charter 
school concentration and district expenditures.  
 
The second hypotheses stated that in states paying the same per pupil amount no matter where 
the charter school locates, charter school will move into school district with relatively low per 
pupil payments. While the coefficients of the negative binomial models where indicating the 
hypothesized relationship, the results were close to zero and not statistically significant. Thus, 
the hypothesis cannot be corroborated.  
 
The third hypothesis predicted greater numbers of charter schools in districts with high 
concentrations of disadvantaged students and greater enrollment of these students in states 
paying compensations. The across district and enrollment analysis were able to corroborate these 
hypotheses for poor students. The results for special education and LEP students show that 
charter schools do not locate in areas with high concentrations of these students and enroll them 
less often compared to traditional schools in the same district. A potential explanations is that 
compensations are insufficient to outweigh the costs of educating these students. Another 
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explanation is that charter schools have an incentive to enroll relatively high performing students 
to ensure compliance with the charter school contract and to secure sufficient demand for the 
allotted seats in the school.      
 
The evidence provided in this chapter that charter schools respond to financial incentives in their 
location and enrollment patterns has important policy implications. First, it suggests that policy 
makers can influence the supply of charter schools by raising or lowering per pupil payments. 
For instance, a way to potentially encourage charter schools to serve larger shares of 
disadvantaged students is to increase the per pupil payments for those categories of students.  
 
Second, the decision to either tie charter school payments to district spending or to pay a flat per 
pupil amount independent of location, has an important impact on supply decision by charter 
operators. Policies tying per pupil payments to district spending levels are likely to attract charter 
schools in high spending and inefficient districts. The opening of charter schools can increase 
competition between schools and hence lead to gains in the efficiency of providing education. As 
this study shows, these gains may be achieved at the expense of strong student stratification. 
More costly students stay in traditional schools while less costly students go to charter schools. 
This is more likely if finance policies do not include any or only small compensations for high 
cost students.  
 
Policies paying flat amounts most likely will see less influence of district expenditures on charter 
location. In these states charter school location may be more demand driven. This will be 
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particularly true if finance policies include sufficient compensations for students not being 
served well by the existing traditional school system.  
 
Third, charter school accountability seems to play an important role in charter location and 
enrollment. States with low accountability standards and relatively high compensations are likely 
to see concentrations of charter schools in areas with disadvantaged students and greater 
enrollments of these students in charter schools. Good examples are Michigan and Ohio where 
states pay compensations for poor students and accountability systems are not as demanding as 
in other states. Therefore, high accountability standards probably have to be accompanied by 
greater compensations for disadvantaged students. Otherwise, charter schools are likely to be 
discouraged from locating in areas with high shares of these students or to enroll them. 
  
Finally, the authorizer preferences stated in charter schools laws do not seem to have a great 
influence on charter school locations in the five states analyzed. In states having preferences 
towards charter applications intending to serve certain types of students or to locate in specific 
area, the analysis did not show a larger concentration of charter schools in areas with high 
concentrations of students emphasized in the law. There are two reasons why this could be the 
case. First, authorizers might not follow the priorities set in the law and may emphasize other 
criteria in authorizing and renewing charter schools. Second, as earlier discussed, charter school 
operators may be avoiding areas with high concentrations of disadvantaged students for cost 
reasons. The analysis in this chapter suggests that location priorities are likely to have to be 
backed up by greater compensations for enrolling disadvantaged students.     
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Table 9: Decisions Process for Sample 
State 
Number of charter 
schools1 
Share of charter 
schools students23 
Predetermined 
Payments24 
Data Availability25 
Alabama No program No program - - 
Alaska 25 3.95% - - 
Arizona 504 10.57% predetermined payments no 
Arkansas 38 1.80% - - 
California 813 5.14% predetermined payments no 
Colorado 158 8.03% predetermined payments no 
Connecticut 18 0.92% - - 
Delaware 18 7.35% - - 
Florida 412 5.23% predetermined payments yes 
Georgia 63 2.25% - - 
Hawaii 31 4.37% - - 
Idaho 36 5.26% - - 
Illinois 39 1.71% - - 
Indiana 53 1.77% - - 
Iowa 9 0.12% - - 
Kansas 35 1.00% - - 
Kentucky No program No program - - 
Louisiana 77 4.56% - - 
Maine No program No program - - 
Maryland 42 1.41% - - 
Massachusetts 62 2.86% - - 
Michigan 294 6.84% predetermined payments yes 
Minnesota 181 4.23% predetermined payments no 
Mississippi 1 0.08% - - 
Missouri 48 2.01% - - 
Montana No program No program - - 
Nebraska No program No program - - 
Nevada 35 2.67% - - 
New Hampshire 15 0.41% - - 
New Jersey 70 1.66% - - 
New Mexico 72 3.94% - - 
New York 140 1.62% predetermined payments yes 
North Carolina 96 2.64% predetermined payments yes 
North Dakota No program No program - - 
Ohio 323 5.16% predetermined payments yes 
Oklahoma 18 0.96% - - 
Oregon 102 3.31% negotiations - 
Pennsylvania 134 4.49% predetermined payments no 
Rhode Island 12 2.25% - - 
South Carolina 39 1.80% - - 
South Dakota No program No program - - 
Tennessee 20 0.45% - - 
Texas 536 3.06% predetermined payments no 
Utah 72 5.83% - - 
Vermont No program No program - - 
Virginia 3 0.01% - - 
Washington No program No program - - 
                                                          
23 Calculations based on the 2010 Common Core of Data assembled by the National Center of Education Statistics. 
24 Own research based on state charter school laws and budget information.  
25 Inquiries were made to the state education departments regarding data necessary for the analysis.  
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West Virginia No program No program - - 
Wisconsin 206 4.14% negotiations - 
Wyoming 3 0.31% - - 
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Table 10: Charter School Finance Systems in Michigan, Ohio, North Carolina, Florida, and New York 
 New York Florida North Carolina Michigan Ohio 
Base Payments      
  Payments (in 2007) $6,081 to $17,915 with a 
mean of $9,987 and a 
standard deviation of $2,497  
$6,776 to $10,745 with a 
mean of $7,913 and a 
standard deviation of $802 
 
$3,943 to $8,864 with a mean 
of $5,047 and a standard 
variation of $770 
 
$7,085 or $7,385 with a mean 
of $7,159 and standard 
deviation of $129 
$5,403 
Adjustments for district 
characteristics 
     
  Adjustment for low wealth  
  districts 
no adjustments no adjustments no adjustments no adjustments Payments: $9 - $594 
depending on district wealth 
and determined by the 
legislature 
 
  Small districts/Sparcity no adjustments 
 
Payments: $2 to $533 
depending on district 
enrollment; determined by the 
legislature  
 
no adjustments no adjustments no adjustments 
  Cost of living  no adjustments  
 
 
Weights: between 0.9221 to 
1.0271  
 
Deductions/Payments:  -$616 
to $214  
no adjustments no adjustments no adjustments 
Adjustments for student 
characteristics 
     
  Disabilities Weight: 1.65 for students 
with severe disabilities and 
0.9 for students with less 
severe disabilities 
 
 
 
 
Payments: $14,182 for 
students with severe 
disabilities and $7,735 for 
students with less severe 
disabilities26   
 
 
Weights for less severe 
disabilities: grades K to 3 = 
0.035; grades 9 to 12 = 0.088  
 
Weights for severe 
disabilities: 3.734 and 5.201 
 
 
Payments for less severe 
disabilities: $277 and $696  
 
Payments for severe 
disabilities: $21,634 and 
$33,242 
 
Weight: 0.125 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Payment:  $631 
  
 
 
 
Weight: 0.286 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Payment: $2,069 
 
 
 
Weight: 0.28 – 4.73 based on 
the severity of the disability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Payments: $1,513 – $20,153  
 
 
 
 
  Poverty no adjustments  
 
 
no adjustments no adjustments  
 
 
Weight: 0.115  
 
Payment: $832     
 
 
                                                          
26 Calculation is based on the maximum amount of expenditures that can be multiplied with the weights. The amount was $8,500 in 2007 (NYS Education Commissioner 2007).   
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Payment: $1,208 determined 
by the legislature 
  
  Limited English Proficiency no adjustments  
 
 
Weight: 0.275  
 
 
 
Payment: $2,176  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Payment:  $683 determined 
by the legislature 
Weight (if student is not 
already counted as poor): 
0.115  
 
Payment (if student is not 
already counted as poor): 
$832     
 
 
 
 
Payment: $67 determined by 
the legislature  
 
Weights: 0.125 – 0.25 
depending on the # of LEP 
students in the district 
 
Payments: $675 – $1,350  
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Table 11: Strength of Accountability Systems in Five States According to NAPCS Model Charter School Law  
 
Strength Charter School Law 
  
Charter Application, 
Review, and 
Decision-making 
Processes 
Performance-Based 
Charter Contracts 
Required 
Comprehensive Charter 
School Monitoring and 
Data Collection 
Processes 
Clear Processes for 
Renewal, 
Nonrenewal, and 
Revocation 
Decisions 
Average  
Score 
New York 2 3 3 3 2.75 
Florida 2 2 2 2 2.00 
North Carolina 1 2 1 1 1.25 
Michigan 1 2 2 2 1.75 
Ohio 1 1 3 2 1.75 
NAPCS Average 1.725 1.525 2.025 2.075 1.84 
 
 
 
Table 12: Comparison of State and NAEP Proficiency Levels for Five States 
 
Comparison State and NAEP Proficiency Levels  
  
Reading Grade 4 
Proficiency 
Difference between 
State and NAEP 
Standards 
Reading Grade 8 
Proficiency 
Difference between 
State and NAEP 
Standards 
Mathematics Grade 4 
Proficiency 
Difference between 
State and NAEP 
Standards 
Mathematics Grade 
8 Proficiency 
Difference between 
State and NAEP 
Standards 
Average 
Difference 
New York -32 -25 -37 -29 -30.75 
Florida -41 -19 -26 -32 -29.5 
North Carolina -56 -60 -27 -31 -43.5 
Michigan -46 -44 -40 -42 -43 
Ohio -44 -44 -30 -37 -38.75 
NCES Average  -41.90 -39.71 -32.79 -30.66 -36.26 
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Table 13: Description of Variables for the Analysis of Charter School Location Across Districts in 5 States:  
  New York   Florida   North Carolina   Michigan    Ohio 
  
With  
Charter 
Without 
Charter   
With  
Charter 
Without 
Charter   
With  
Charter 
Without 
Charter   
With  
Charter 
Without 
Charter   
With  
Charter 
Without 
Charter 
Number of Districts 14 466   38 23   47 63   96 278   38 544 
Number of Charter 
Schools 3.54 0   10.63 0   2.06 0   2.73 0   6.68 0 
  
(4.43) 
 
(0) 
   
(18.43) 
 
(0) 
   
(2.35) 
 
(0) 
   
(7.93) 
 
(0) 
   
(12.1) 
 
(0) 
 
Current Operating 
Expenditures 9,589.36 9,173.31   4,515.56 4,393.64   4,458.13 4,364.13   4,662.48 3,906.67   5,499.65 4,654.92 
  
(1,320.51) 
 
 
(2,288.58) 
 
   
(404.8) 
 
 
(387.83) 
 
   
(546.45) 
 
 
(356.72) 
 
   
(952.77) 
 
 
(827.03) 
 
   
(780.8) 
 
 
(1,084.58) 
 
 
Mean Student 
Performance -1.09 0.19   0.17 -0.37   0.2 -0.18   -0.28 0   -1.38 0.09 
  
(1.28) 
 
(0.94) 
   
(0.97) 
 
(1.06) 
   
(0.94) 
 
(1.05) 
   
(1.15) 
 
(0.83) 
   
(1.52) 
 
(0.88) 
 
Teacher Wage 
Index 103.88 106.02   82.84 75.3   87.14 83.55   96.07 91.73   91.98 87.97 
  
(10.39) 
 
(12.58) 
   
(6.47) 
 
(6.91) 
   
(7.33) 
 
(6.28) 
   
(6.65) 
 
(6.86) 
   
(5.2) 
 
(6.31) 
 
Child Poverty Rate 14.62 6.64   19.26 26.04   16.88 20.6   15.16 12.75   21.21 13.49 
  
(6.95) 
 
(4.46) 
   
(6.25) 
 
(7.35) 
   
(7.2) 
 
(8.47) 
   
(12.34) 
 
(8.52) 
   
(13.56) 
 
(9.21) 
 
Mean Years of 
Education  13.18 13.67   12.4 11.76   12.32 11.91   12.77 12.73   12.54 12.53 
  
(0.99) 
 
(0.87) 
   
(0.56) 
 
(0.45) 
   
(0.69) 
 
(0.46) 
   
(0.8) 
 
(0.72) 
   
(0.8) 
 
(0.86) 
 
Educational 
Diversity 90 86.66   95.74 92.57   95.23 94.24   90.67 89.44   92.11 87.47 
  
(2.65) 
 
(3.52) 
   
(2.39) 
 
(2.88) 
   
(4.4) 
 
(2.86) 
   
(7.33) 
 
(5.05) 
   
(6.95) 
 
(7.45) 
 
Racial Diversity 53.22 23.29   41.55 43.04   41.97 42.84   21.67 10.71   35.41 7.58 
  
(20.74) 
 
(20.02) 
   
(13.02) 
 
(15.03) 
   
(18.62) 
 
(21.9) 
   
(20.7) 
 
(12.02) 
   
(22.38) 
 
(10.19) 
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Enrollment 15,960.38 3,410.47   42,937.95 4,719.91   13,572.38 5,657.6   8,748.55 2,408.69   15,663.42 2,374.24 
  
(18,711.25) 
 
(3,091.61) 
   
(60,548.71) 
 
(4,367.73) 
   
(15,889.62) 
 
(4,355.33) 
   
(20,813.85) 
 
(19,27.88) 
   
(20,057.64) 
 
(18,56.13) 
 
Disability Rate 7.4 8.74   22.02 27.75   20.52 23.89   17.66 17.29   20.06 17.27 
  
(1.97) 
 
(3.49) 
   
(5.76) 
 
(5.73) 
   
(5.02) 
 
(4.79) 
   
(6.36) 
 
(5.19) 
   
(6.55) 
 
(5.63) 
 
Rate English not 
First Language 0.85 0.9   10.11 7.3   4.33 4.33   5.81 4.06   4.61 4.33 
  
(0.09) 
 
(0.08) 
   
(9.72) 
 
(8.49) 
   
(1.96) 
 
(1.58) 
   
(4.73) 
 
(3.07) 
   
(2.77) 
 
(6.11) 
 
Median Rent 524.46 538.28   445.84 311.13   348.6 310.94   444.96 403.18   395.45 375.02 
  
(184.04) 
 
(197.64) 
   
(92.2) 
 
(70.1) 
   
(64.15) 
 
(51.14) 
   
(76.7) 
 
(81.36) 
   
(80.49) 
 
(83.7) 
 
                              
1. Average Operating Expenditures calculated using the Common Core of Data Fiscal Files from 1999. 
2. Computed by converting the mean score for each district in the state into a standardized score with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one using statewide test 
specifics means and standard deviations, and then averaging the score for grade levels 4 and 8 in subjects Math and English, Language, and Art. Tests are taken from state 
accountability systems prior to the charter school program.   
3. Teacher comparable wage index for consolidated metropolitan statistical areas obtained from National Center for Education Statistics downloaded from: 
http://nces.ed.gov/edfin/adjustments.asp 
4. Measure from district tabulations of the 1990 U.S. Census.  
5. Herfindal index constructed using four different years of education categories. Values range between 1 and 100 with greater values indicating more diversity.  
6. Herfindahl index constructed using five different categories of race. Values range between 1 and 100 with greater values indicating more diversity.  
                              
All measures in parentheses are standard deviations                   
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Table 14: Charter School Location Across School Districts in 5 States using Negative Binomial 
 
Variation of Per Pupil Expenditures 
by Charter Location 
Large  
  
Small No No 
            
Count Charter Schools 
New York Florida 
North 
 Carolina 
Michigan  Ohio 
            
Log of Avg Operating Expenditures 6.154*** 2.439** 1.722* -0.314 -0.108 
  (1.584) (1.206) (1.021) (0.712) (1.075) 
      
Mean Student Performance -1.674** -0.147 0.159 -0.134 -0.236 
  (0.770) (0.120) (0.174) (0.176) (0.158) 
      
Teacher Wage Index -0.137*** -0.00352 0.0268 0.0156 0.0138 
  (0.0438) (0.0236) (0.0221) (0.0181) (0.0436) 
      
Child Poverty Rate 0.00154 -0.0188 -0.0116 0.0167 6.262** 
  (0.115) (0.0505) (0.0368) (0.0215) (2.916) 
      
Mean Years of Education  0.741 0.0671 0.505 0.00881 0.0407 
  (0.688) (0.431) (0.365) (0.230) (0.400) 
      
Educational Diversity 0.436** 0.0482 0.0470* 0.00524 0.0433 
  (0.173) (0.0688) (0.0282) (0.0104) (0.0546) 
      
Racial Diversity 0.00228 0.0117 0.00790 0.00451 0.0270*** 
  (0.0244) (0.0152) (0.00893) (0.00672) (0.00727) 
      
Log of Enrollment 0.963** 1.007*** 0.707*** 0.998*** 1.199*** 
  (0.460) (0.179) (0.156) (0.0909) (0.283) 
      
Disability Rate -0.252** 0.000354 -0.00932 0.00726 0.0356 
  (0.109) (0.0523) (0.0516) (0.0396) (0.0882) 
      
Rate English not First Language 4.184 -0.00283 -0.100 0.0499*** 0.000404 
  (5.383) (0.0144) (0.0895) (0.0121) (0.0421) 
      
Median Rent -0.000602 
-
0.000473 -0.00157 0.00168 0.00508 
  (0.00352) (0.00272) (0.00306) (0.00196) (0.00458) 
      
Constant -104.4*** 
-
34.43*** 
-
33.19*** -9.656 -20.67 
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  (25.75) (12.02) (8.154) (6.221) (12.57) 
            
Log-likelihood Value -47.488 -112.959 -104.146 -267.721 -134.186 
R-squared 0.853 0.973 0.902 0.981 0.788 
Observations 480 61 110 374 582 
            
            
R-squared is computed as the square of the correlation between the dependent variable and the 
predicted value of the dependent variable.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,  * p<0.1     
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Table 15: Pooled Negative Binomial for 5 States 
  
Count of Charter 
Schools  
    
Operating Expenditures  X  Dummy New York 2.812*** 
  (0.915) 
Operating Expenditures  X  Dummy Florida 2.944*** 
  (0.838) 
Operating Expenditures  X  Dummy North Carolina 3.125*** 
  (0.842) 
Operating Expenditures  X  Dummy Michigan  0.904 
  (0.749) 
Operating Expenditures  X  Dummy Ohio 0.245 
  (0.583) 
Dummy New York -1.273 
  (11.54) 
Dummy Florida 1.907 
  (10.16) 
Dummy North Carolina 25.10*** 
  (7.868) 
Dummy Michigan  19.39** 
  (8.939) 
Mean Student Performance -0.308*** 
  (0.0981) 
Teacher Wage Index -0.00170 
  (0.0120) 
Child Poverty Rate 0.178*** 
  (0.0446) 
Mean Years of Education  0.0884 
  (0.164) 
Educational Diversity -0.0195* 
  (0.0100) 
Racial Diversity -0.00571 
  (0.00446) 
Log of Enrollment 1.217*** 
  (0.0765) 
Disability Rate 0.0142 
  (0.0173) 
Rate English not First Language 0.00880 
  (0.0165) 
Median Rent -0.000452 
  (0.00109) 
Constant -39.32*** 
  (6.914) 
122 
 
 
 
    
Log-likelihood Value -799.163 
R-squared 0.805 
Observations 1,603 
    
    
R-squared is computed as the square of the correlation between the dependent variable and the 
predicted value of the dependent variable.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses ** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,  * p<0.1   
  
 
 
Table 16: Summary Statistics for All Schools in a State 
  
New 
York Florida 
North 
Carolina Michigan  Ohio 
            
% With Disabilities 15.12  N/A 15.43 18.59 15.68 
   (12.38) N/A (15.64) (20.84) (10.63) 
% Students Free Lunch 43.05 63.41 51.41 50.99 48.86 
  (29.75) (24.11) (19.51) (24.68) (27.11) 
% Limited English Proficiency 7.26 29.33 6.53 8.06 1.92 
  (11.8) (37.18) (8.73) (12.66) (6.97) 
            
All figures are computed from 2010 report cards for individual schools. The table is 
showing means and in parentheses standard deviations for all schools in the state. 
 
 
  
Table 17: Enrollment Differences between Charter School and Traditional Schools 
  New York Florida 
 North  
Carolina 
Michigan  Ohio 
             
% With Disabilities 
-
0.135***  N/A 
 
-0.141*** -0.271*** -0.337*** 
  (0.0112)  N/A  (0.0409) (0.0243) (0.115) 
% Students Free Lunch 0.220 -0.508***  -1.426*** 0.271*** 0.404*** 
  (0.145) (0.0527)  (0.174) (0.0576) (0.108) 
% Limited English 
Proficiency -0.502*** -1.072*** 
 
-0.744*** -0.130* -0.367*** 
  (0.118) (0.186)  (0.0810) (0.0747) (0.127) 
             
All coefficients are from regressing the normalized share of students on a charter school dummy and district 
fixed effects. All regressions are weighted by school enrollment and clustered at the district level.     
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4. The Effect of Charter Schools on District 
Efficiency: The Case of New York State 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Charter schools are a rapidly growing form of schools choice in the United States. According to 
the National Center for Education Statistics (2014), the percentage of all public schools that were 
public charter schools increased from 1.7 to 5.8 percent between 1999/2000 to 2011/2012. At the 
same time, charter school enrollment increased from 0.3 million to 2.1 million students. Since 
the beginning of charter school programs, concerns have been raised that charter schools would 
reduce resources from traditional schools (Moodey’s 2013; Molnar 1996; Arsen, Plank, and 
Sykes 1999). Given the financial constraints many school districts face after the “Great 
Recession” (Hull 2010) and the growing number of charter schools, the question of how charter 
schools influence school district efficiency, costs, and expenditures is more salient than ever.   
       
Despite the growing interest there is almost no research on the topic. Arsen and Ni (2012) utilize 
fixed effect models to analyze the impact of charter school enrollments on school district 
budgets. They find that higher levels of charter school enrollments are associated with declining 
fund balances, and more rapidly declining revenues than expenditures in districts losing students 
to charter schools. Bifulco and Reback (2014) evaluate the influence of charter schools on 
district revenues and expenditures for the city school districts of Albany and Buffalo in New 
York State. Using information from school district budgets, they authors find that charter schools 
had negative fiscal impact on the two school districts. Gronberg, Jansen, and Taylor (2012) use a 
stochastic cost frontier approach to analyze the cost efficiency of charter schools relative to 
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traditional public schools, and explore the extent to which those differences are attributable to 
differences in hiring and compensation practices, or to differences in the length of time a campus 
has been operating. Their main finding suggest that charter schools are able to produce 
educational outcomes at lower cost than traditional public schools.  
 
In this chapter, I use the cost function approach as theoretical framework and empirical 
estimation strategy. Theoretically, I work out how charter schools influence the costs and 
efficiency of providing education. Empirically, I focus on the effects of charter schools on school 
district efficiency. In the empirical models, I control for changes in input factors such as teacher 
salaries and student characteristics as well as changes in performance. Thus, holding inputs and 
performance constant the coefficient on the charter school enrollment variable is driven by 
changes in district efficiency associated with charter school enrollment.  
 
Utilizing data for all New York State school districts outside New York City from 1998/99 to 
2009/10, I find that charter school enrollment increases overall district efficiency. The magnitude 
of the effect differs depending on the number of students enrolled in charter schools. The effect 
ranges between a 1.1 and 3.4 percent decrease in per pupil expenditures for enrollments between 
50 and 5000 charter school students respectively. Efficiency gains are driven by the increased 
efficiency in providing education for students in traditional public schools. A charter school 
enrollment between 50 and 5000 students reduces per pupil expenditures needed to achieve a 
given level of performance by 1.5 and 4.3 percent respectively.  
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To confirm the results, I conduct a series of falsification tests and analyze the heterogeneity of 
the charter school effect. In a first falsification test, I test for differences in trends between 
districts with and without charter school enrollment prior charter school opening. Then, I test for 
events at the county level being correlated with both: charter school enrollment and declining per 
pupil expenditures. Finally, I use local expenditure for fire services to test for events at the 
district level being correlated with charter school enrollment and declining per pupil 
expenditures. All falsification tests confirm the initial findings.  
 
I analyze the heterogeneity of the charter school effect using different subsamples of school 
districts based on location and need/resources capacity. Further, I differentiate the charter school 
effect by grades offered and evaluate the timing of the charter school effect. The charter school 
effect is driven by districts having low and high needs for resources and by charter enrollments 
in grades K to 6. Further, the charter school effect is most evident 4 to 6 years after the first 
charter school enrollment in the districts.   
 
The estimation strategy comes with two caveats. First, the interpretation of the coefficient 
attached to charter school enrollment as efficiency effect relies on effective control for all cost 
factors associated with charter schools. Despite controlling for poverty, limited English ability, 
and disability status in the school district, I fail to control for the ability of the students crossing 
district borders to reach the performance objective of the district they transferred to. The cost of 
bringing all students up to a given performance objective will change if large shares of either low 
or high ability students transfer into the district. Second, given multiple outputs and input sharing 
in the production of education, the reduction of inefficiencies in the production of test scores 
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may have two different sources. The reduction could reflect decreases in spending for outputs 
other than test scores. The reduction also could reflect the use of more efficient technologies to 
educate students.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the charter school 
program in New York State. Section 3 states the theoretical framework and Section 4 applies the 
framework.  Sections 5 explains data and measurements used in the empirical models. Section 6 
states the empirical strategy. Section 7 presents the results and Sections 8 and 9 provide 
falsification and robustness checks. Section 10 makes conclusions.  
 
4.2 New York State Charter School Program 
 
The New York Charter School Law was established in 1998. Charter schools receive per pupil 
payments from the districts in which their students reside, and these payments are the charter 
school’s primary source of funding. Charter school enrollments in New York are not restricted 
by any residency requirements. If charter schools are oversubscribed, they have to select students 
by lottery. In this lottery process, preference is given to students residing in the school district, 
where the charter school is located (NYS Charter School Law Subsection 2854 (2b)). Although 
the majority of charter schools students live in the district where the charter school is located, 
most charter schools serve at least some students from other districts as well (Bifulco and 
Buerger 2013).  
 
The payments for a charter school student come from the district where the student lives and are 
based on per pupil spending in that district.  The amount a district pays per student is equal to the 
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approved operating expenses per pupil in the district27. In 2009, the approved operating 
expenditures varied between $6,258 and $29,456 with a mean of $12,001 and a standard 
deviation of $3,480. Charter schools receive additional funding for students with disabilities. The 
additional payments are 1.65 for students with severe disabilities28 and 0.9 for students with less 
severe disabilities. Charter schools do not receive additional funding for students with limited 
English proficiency or being poor. Further, the district where a charter school is located is also 
required to provide textbooks and software, transportation, health and special education 
evaluation services to charter schools.   
 
The amount that a district spends on capital outlays and debt service for school buildings is not 
included in the calculation of approved operating expenses that determine charter school 
payments in New York. Also, charter schools are not eligible to apply for the largest building aid 
program offered by the state.  In the years until 2014, the New York City Department of 
Education provided space for a large number of charter schools for nominal rental fees, and 
absorbs utility and janitorial service costs for those schools (NYC-IBO 2010). A new state law 
that passed in April 2014 gives New York City two options to meet the demands of the growing 
charter school sector. The city either hands over free space in public or private buildings or gives 
money to the school to find their own space (Hernandez and Craig 2014). Districts outside New 
                                                          
27 Per pupil payments are determined by the approved operating expenses of the district from two years earlier 
divided by a weighted pupil count (also from two years earlier) multiplied by an adjustment factor.  Approved 
operating expenses are total district expenditures excluding expenditures for capital outlay and debt service for 
school buildings; transportation; lunch programs; tuition payments; and some other miscellaneous expenditures.  In 
the weighted pupil count, aidable summer session pupils, pupils with special education needs, non-disabled 
secondary pupils, and students in particular disability categories receive additional weights.  The adjustment is based 
on the statewide change in approved operating expenses from three years prior to one year prior. 
28 Students with severe disabilities students have limited cognitive abilities combined with behavioral and/or 
physical limitations and who require highly specialized education, social, psychological and medical services in 
order to maximize their full potential for self-fulfillment and meaningful participation in society (Sections 100.5, 
100.6, 100.9 and 200.5 of the Regulations of the Commissioner of Education). 
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York City, however, have not been as generous in providing space for charter schools. The state 
has also used federal funds to provided start-up and facilities grants for charter schools (Bifulco 
and Buerger 2013).   
 
The charter application, approval, and evaluation process is closely regulated by the charter 
school authorizers. The accountability standards set by authorizers are be considered relatively 
high compared to other states. Charter schools authorized by the Board of Regents have to 
perform higher than traditional schools in their district. School authorized by the New York State 
University are expected to have 75 percent of their students to score “proficient” or higher on 
state assessments. In a multistate comparison of charter school accountability laws and practices, 
the Center for Education Reform (CER) rated New York as a state that holds charter schools 
strictly accountable, pointing out that New York is one of the few states that have closed charter 
schools for performance reasons (CER 2007). The National Alliance of Public Charter Schools 
identifies New York as being among the few states using performance-based charter contracts, 
comprehensive school monitoring, and a systematic data collection processes (NAPCS 2012). 
Further, the charter school law of New York State requires districts to provide transportation to 
students enrolled in charter schools (NYS Charter School Law Subsection 2853 (4b)). 
 
In 2009, the last year in this studies sample, 121 charter schools were enrolling students in New 
York State29. The majority of charter schools are located in NYC. I focus on charter schools 
outside NYC as I do not have the data to estimate cost functions including NYC. Table 18 shows 
the 12 school districts outside NYC having charter schools opening until 2008-09. The first 
                                                          
29 The count is based on the Basic Educational Data System (BEDS) run by the New York State Education 
Department.  
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column indicates the year the first charter school was established in the district. The first charter 
school outside NYC was opened in Albany in 1999-00. The second column shows the total 
number of charter schools in each district in 2008-09. The highest counts of charter schools are 
in Albany, Buffalo, and Rochester.  
 
The next two columns state the districts’ location. Most districts having charter schools are 
located in Upstate, West, and Central New York. However, there are also three districts in the 
downstate area around New York City with charter schools. The following columns indicate 
whether the district is considered a high need or average need district according to the 
Need/Resource Capacity Index conducted by the New York State Education Department30. The 
index compares the share of students in poverty to a district’s local contribution per student. 
Most districts having charter schools fall into the category high need even though there are two 
districts that are considered average need. No charter school is located in a district considered 
having a low need/resource capacity.   
 
The next columns present summary statistics on charter school enrollment. It is evident that most 
charter school students in New York State (outside NYC) are in grades K to 6. While many 
fewer less students enroll in classes 7 to 12. There are two potential explanations why this is the 
case. In New York State charter school payments are not adjusted for grades. Thus, if high 
school students are more costly to educate, there is an incentive for charter schools to educate 
students in lower and less costly classes. Another potential explanation is that charter schools 
                                                          
30 Exact description of the index can be found here: 
http://sap.questar.org/publications/guidebooks/state_aid_formulas_guidebook.pdf and 
http://www.p12.nysed.gov/irs/accountability/2011-12/NeedResourceCapacityIndex.pdf 
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often start with lower grades and open higher grades later creating a “conveyer belt” system from 
early childhood education to college (Dobbie and Fryer 2011).   
 
The following columns show the share of charter school students residing in the school district 
compared to all students living in the same district. The share ranges from about 1 percent to 
more than 19 percent. There are three districts with shares over 15 percent including Albany, 
Buffalo, and Lackawanna. The last column states the number of students enrolled in a one of the 
district’s charter school but living outside the school district. In some districts like Syracuse and 
Niagara Falls the number is relatively small. However, Rochester, Roosevelt, and Kenmore-
Tonawanda enroll large shares of charter school students from outside the district.    
 
4.3 Theoretical Framework 
 
In this chapter, I use the cost function approach as theoretical framework and empirical 
estimation strategy. Theoretically, I use the approach to identify how charter schools influence 
cost factors and efficiency. Empirically, the approach enables me to include variables controlling 
for district cost and efficiency. Further, I can analyze a large number of school districts. I start 
with using the cost function approach as a theoretical framework.  
 
Following prior work on cost functions (see Downes and Pogue 1994; Duncombe and Yinger 
1998, 2005, 2008, 2011a, 2011b; Rechovsky and Imazeki 2001, 2003), I assume that educational 
cost C in district i during time t depend on a performance objective S; resource prices W; student 
need measures P; and student enrollment N. Thus, more formally: 
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Cit= f(Sit, Wit, Pit, Nit) (1) 
 
 
The above cost equation indicates minimum spending required to reach a given level of student 
performance assuming that the districts use the best available technology to provide education. 
Researchers cannot observe costs but often know actual school district spending. Spending may 
exceed costs as districts do not use the best available technologies. Districts exceeding costs are 
considered as inefficient. Therefore, researchers cannot study determinants of school district’s 
cost without controlling for school district’s efficiency.  
 
To extend Equation 1 and control for efficiency let e stand for district efficiency in delivering S.  
The value of e is to 1.0 in an efficient district. The value of e is between zero and one in 
inefficient districts. A district that does not use best practice (0 < e < 1) must spend more than an 
efficient district (e = 1) to achieve the same level of performance S, holding all else equal. Using 
e to scale Equation 1 the cost and efficiency equation is:  
 
 
𝐸𝑖𝑡 =
𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑖𝑡
=
𝑓(𝑆𝑖𝑡, 𝑊𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝑁𝑖𝑡)
𝑒𝑖𝑡
 
(2) 
 
 
Duncombe and Yinger (2011a) point out an important conceptual misunderstanding regarding 
efficiency in the context of education. The production of public education is strongly 
characterized by multiple outputs and input sharing. The same teachers and classrooms, 
supported by the same administrative services produce many different outputs. Among these 
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outputs are student performance in English and mathematics, graduation rates, as well as student 
performance in art, music, athletics and citizenship.  
 
Given multiple outputs and input sharing in the production of education, inefficiencies in the 
production of test scores may have two different sources. First, inefficiencies can reflect 
spending to promote outputs other than test scores. Second, inefficiencies can reflect the 
overpayment in inputs or the ignorance of least cost technology in the production process. For 
example, a school district that is efficient in delivering student performance in test scores may 
not be efficient in delivering student performance in art or athletics. Indeed, spending for art and 
athletics may have little impact on test scores. Therefore, it is a source of inefficiency in the 
production of test scores. A good art and athletics program may, of course, contribute to 
students’ general conceptual skills with some spillover to mathematics. However, in most cases 
spending on these programs will not have an impact comparable to an increase in spending on 
instruction in classes where students are tested.   
 
4.4 Application of Theoretical Framework 
 
The entry of charter schools can influence expenditures per pupil by affecting cost factors (W, P, 
N), performance objectives (S), or efficiency (e). I start with analyzing the direct effect of charter 
schools on cost factors. To analyze the effects for each cost factor separately, I am assuming 
performance, efficiency, and the respective other cost factor to be constant. In a next step, I 
evaluate the effect of charter schools on performance objectives. Then, I discuss the effects of 
charter schools on district efficiency. In a last step, I look into different conceptualizations of per 
pupil expenditures.   
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It has to be noted that charter school influence cost factors, performance outputs, and efficiency 
through two separate mechanisms. First, charter schools can influence inputs, outputs, and 
efficiency of traditional public schools. Second, cost factors, output, and efficiency may be 
different for charter schools than for traditional schools. Both effects together create the net 
effect in which charter schools influence per pupil expenditures in public schools.  
 
Direct Influence of Charter Schools on Cost Factors 
Important cost factors in the provision of education are resource prices (W), student needs (P), 
and enrollment size (N). Each factor is discussed separately in the following sections. Resource 
prices for traditional public and charter schools (W), and particularly teacher salaries, are 
strongly influenced by school district characteristics such as the cost of living, local amenities, 
labor market conditions, and working conditions for employees (Duncombe and Yinger 2008). 
The cost of living in a school district are defined as the resources required to purchase a standard 
bundle of goods and services. The greater the cost of living is the more a school districts or a 
charter school must pay to attract employees of a given quality. Holding all other factors 
constant, charter schools are unlikely to have a direct effect on the cost of living in the school 
district.  
 
School district amenities are access to or proximity to natural sites, transportation, cultural 
events, and other state or local services (Duncombe and Yinger 2008). Holding all other factors 
constant, including performance objectives, charter schools are unlikely to have a direct effect on 
amenities in the school district.  
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Labor market conditions can also affect the salaries a school district or a charter school is 
required to pay. For instance, if an areas unemployment rate for professionals is high relative to 
the rest of the state, then teachers and school administrator in that area may have relatively 
limited choices of alternative jobs and hence be more apt to accept school district offers with 
lower salaries and benefits (Duncombe and Yinger 2008). Charter schools are unlikely to 
influence overall labor market conditions.       
 
Also, districts and charter schools may trade off spending on factors related to working 
conditions against increased teacher compensation. Working conditions reflect both: school 
district policies and factors outside districts control (Duncombe and Yinger 2008). School 
district policies include school and class size, spending for professional development, school 
leadership and culture. Working conditions outside school districts influence are strongly 
influenced by students’ characteristics and will be discussed together with student need 
measures.  
 
Charter schools are exempt from certain local and state regulations and are likely to have 
different working conditions than traditional public schools (Ni 2012; Malloy and Wohlstetter 
2003). Charter schools can reduce compensation if they offer better working conditions than 
traditional public schools. Charter schools have to increase compensations if their working 
conditions are worse compared to traditional public schools. Further, charter schools could 
influence the working conditions in traditional schools. Districts may start emulating working 
conditions in charter schools, Districts will have to pay greater compensations if working 
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conditions decrease compared to the time prior charter school entry. Districts will have to pay 
less compensation if working conditions improve.  
 
Student needs (P) are another important input factor. School districts with high concentrations of 
students living in poverty or with limited English proficiency face much greater costs than other 
school districts to reach a given performance objective (Duncombe and Yinger 2008). Further, 
student characteristics can affect mobility decisions of teachers (Hanushek, Kain, Rifkin 2004). 
Districts with high concentrations of high cost students need to pay greater compensation than 
other districts to have the same quality of teachers. These districts also have higher costs in 
recruiting and training teachers.  
 
Charter school students can cross attendance zone boundaries and change the student 
composition of schools located in the same district as the charter school (Bifulco and Bulkley 
2014). Holding all other factors constant, including efficiency, I do not expect costs to increase if 
students only switch schools within a district. However, charter schools students can cross 
district boundaries as well and change the student composition of districts receiving and loosing 
students. In the receiving district, the cost of educating students increase if the share of high cost 
students increases. Contrarily, cost decrease if the share of high cost students decreases. In the 
school district loosing students, cost increase if low cost students leave the district and cost 
decrease if high cost students leave the district.  
 
Student enrollment (N) influences the cost of providing education through economies of scale. 
Economies of scale are the result of declining per unit costs as the number of units increases. In 
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education, the focus has been on economies of size, which refer to a decline in per-pupil 
expenditures with an increase in district enrollment, controlling for other cost factors (Andrews, 
Duncombe, and Yinger 2002). There are mainly four explanations for economies of size in 
education. First, some district service such as central administration are relatively fixed. Thus, 
the same administrative staff may be able to serve a significant range of enrollment without 
decline in service. Second, larger districts may be able to employ more specialized labor which 
could improve the quality of instruction at no additional costs. Third, in larger districts teachers 
have more possibilities to draw on the experience of other teachers. Fourth, larger districts may 
be able to negotiate better prices for bulk purchases of supplies and equipment31 (Duncombe and 
Yinger 2008).  
 
Charter schools are likely to influence economies of size at the district and the school level. By 
attracting students from outside the district charter schools change the enrollment in the district 
they are located and the district students are transferring out. 
 
Influence of Charter Schools on Performance Objectives  
Performance objectives (N) are set by a political-administrative process in the school district 
(Meier and Stewart 2001; Meier and O’Toole 2003; Chubb and Moe 1990). According to Meier 
and O’Toole (2003), the process is likely be influenced by organizational structures of the school 
district, organizational stability, and management efforts to exploit the environment and to buffer 
                                                          
31 The existence of economies of scale has been challenged by several authors (see Hanley 2007; Gronberg et al. 
2013; Kuziemko 2006). However, cost functions provide consistently evidence for the existence of economies of 
scale (Andrews, Duncombe, and Yinger 2002).  
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environmental shocks. The cost of providing education change with modifications of the 
performance objectives.  
 
If charter school entry triggers greater performance objectives for traditional public schools, 
costs for traditional public schools are likely to increase. Costs for traditional schools are likely 
to decrease if charter schools lead to lower performance objectives. Charter school set their 
performance objects in a process separate from the school district. Costs for charter schools will 
be greater than for traditional schools if performance objectives are greater than for traditional 
schools. Costs for charter schools will be lower than for traditional public schools if charter 
performance objectives are lower than for traditional schools. Therefore, the net effect of charter 
schools on performance objectives and ultimately costs is driven by both: the effect of charter 
schools on performance objectives for traditional schools and the performance objectives charter 
schools set for themselves.  
 
How Charter Schools Influence Efficiency 
In the cost function context, efficiency is concerned with changes in the technology to produce a 
given performance objective. Efficiency can be improved in two ways. First, technology can 
reduce the inputs necessary to produce a given performance objective. Second, technology can 
increase the performance level reached with a given set of inputs. Conversely, efficiency 
decreases if more inputs are necessary to reach a given level of performance or a lower level of 
performance is realized with a given set of inputs. Charter schools alter the efficiency of 
providing education and can either increase or decrease efficiency. I start with describing two 
mechanisms leading to increasing efficiency before turning to mechanisms decreasing efficiency.     
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The first mechanism leading to an increase in efficiency is created through competition for 
students. It has been argued that the traditional public school system does not provide incentives 
for local school districts to produce education in an efficient way (Hanushek 1986). The reason 
for the lack of incentives is seen in education monopoly of local school districts and the absence 
of competition. Charter schools create competition for traditional schools. According to charter 
school proponents, competition for students will lead to more efficient use of resources (W) 
(Hoxby 2000, 2003a, 2003b; Dee 1998).  
 
Charter schools are exempt from many local and state rules including collective bargaining 
agreements. Hence, charter schools may have an opportunity to choose technologies that are 
more efficient compared to the technologies traditional public schools in the same district use. 
Also, traditional schools may start emulating successful charter schools in their educational 
practices or develop new technologies to compete for students. Both effects, the use of more 
efficient technologies by charter schools and the change in technology by traditional public 
schools may lead to an increase in school district efficiency.  
 
A second mechanism leading to an increase in efficiency operates through student composition 
(P). If students sort differently into schools after charter school entry, concentrations of high and 
low costs students may change. The change is likely to involve charter as well as traditional 
public schools simultaneously. For instance, if charter schools attract large shares of high cost 
students, it is likely that the remaining low costs students enroll into traditional public schools 
and vice versa. Compositional changes impact efficiency through at least two channels (Booker 
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et al. 2008). First, the composition of the student body may affect the instructional technique 
decisions of teachers. The best technique for delivering effective instruction to a classroom of 
students homogeneous in composition may differ from that technology which works best with a 
heterogeneous class. 
 
Second, the composition of the student body may directly affect performance via peer effects. 
For example, adding a disruptive student to a classroom might well reduce the ability of other 
students to learn. Also, performance is affected by the mean ability of the individual’s peers, peer 
group racial, and gender composition (Hoxby 2001). Hence, student responses to the same 
change in peers may be quite different. The net effect of any compositional changes 
accompanying charter school entry is ambiguous ex ante, as the precise dimension of the 
compositional changes and the directional impact of those changes is not clear. However, to the 
extent that compositional effects have a positive impact on student performance, the equilibrium 
sort under the new institutional structure may lead to improved performance among students 
remaining behind at existing public schools. 
 
There are three mechanisms leading to decreasing efficiency (see for these mechanisms Bifulco 
and Reback 2014). The first mechanism operates through the provision of services for charter 
schools. Districts in many states have to provide services for charter schools such as 
transportation, health services, and special education evaluations (Bifulco and Buerger 2014). If 
charter schools increase enrollment the unit costs of these services could decrease. However, the 
cost of providing these service may be higher if districts have to deliver services to students 
spread across a large number of schools. Particularly, for transportation this will be true. 
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Additionally, administering charter school payments and coordinating service to charter school 
increase the workload in district offices. Thus, it is likely that charter schools increase the costs 
for administrative and central services (Bifulco and Reback 2014).   
 
A second mechanism decreasing efficiency takes place at the school level. Charter schools 
introduce a second public schools system. Hence, charter school entry is likely to increase the 
number of school buildings and associated facility and maintenance costs. Closing a public 
school is contentious undertaking as discussions of recent school closure in Chicago and 
Philadelphia show32. Often closure is not possible until enrollment is sufficiently small to and 
decreases in enrollment are likely to persist for future school years. Also, school districts have to 
maintain facilities in case charter schools close or their enrollment drops suddenly. All these 
aspects are likely to increase costs of educating students (Bifulco and Reback 2014).  
 
A third mechanism operates through personnel cost. Charters schools are likely to attract only 
few students out of each classroom in traditional public school. Consequently, the number of 
teachers in traditional public schools cannot be reduced while the district has to pay for 
additional teachers in charter schools. Generally, the uncertainty regarding charter school 
enrollments a school district faces make it more difficult to maintain targeted class sizes and 
student teacher ratios. School districts willing to maintain their targets have to put err on the side 
                                                          
32 For Chicago: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/education/despite-protests-chicago-closing-schools.html?_r=0 
For Philadelphia: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/education/philadelphia-officials-vote-to-close-23-
schools.html 
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of smaller classes increasing costs. Again, all these aspects are likely to increase costs of 
educating students (Bifulco and Reback 2014).   
 
4.5 Data and Measurements 
 
To estimate the effect of charter schools on school district expenditures, I utilize a data set 
including New York State school districts for the years 1998-99 to 2008-09. I exclude New York 
City, as I do not have data necessary to include it in the cost function. Further, I exclude 33 non-
K-12 districts as their cost functions differ from districts providing education for all students. 
Further, I reduce my sample to school districts that are located within a metropolitan statistical 
area (MSA). All charter schools in NYS are located in MSAs, and hence I only compare them to 
other districts located in MSAs. After dropping a few districts because of missing variables, the 
final sample includes 440 school districts. The sample period is ideal for studying the effect of 
charter schools as one year before the opening of the first charter school is included in the data. 
Further, I can consistently measure school district performance for the entire time period.  
 
The following sections explains the variables used in the analysis in more detail. Table 19 
provides the summary statistics for all the variables presented.  
 
Spending Measures 
To measure spending, I used school district expenditure measures from the Annual Financial 
Report (ST3) of the NYSED. The ST3 expenditure measure includes general support services, 
instruction, transportation, community services, employee benefits, debt services (principal and 
interest) and interfund transfers. Using the ST3 measure I construct current and operating 
143 
 
 
 
expenditures (Eom, Nguyen-Hoang, and Yinger 2014). Current expenditures are derived by 
subtracting payments on debt service from total expenditures. Operating expenditures equal 
current expenditures minus transportation spending. Transportation cost are not linked directly to 
student performance and involve a unique set of cost factors such as the districts area and 
population density. Thus, the effect of charter schools on operating expenditures is my primary 
concern in this chapter. However, as transportation has to be provided by districts to charter 
school students, I include models using current expenditures in the analysis as well.  
 
Using these two expenditure measurements, I can conceptualize spending in three different ways.   
The first way uses the above described measures including district payments to charter schools. 
Charter school are not considered to be local education agency in New York State. Hence, 
charter school receive most of the state and federal payments they are eligible for through the 
school districts their students reside. Assuming that charter schools spend the received payments, 
the measure is a good approximation for charter school expenditures.  
 
I divide the expenditures for regular and for charter schools by the enrollment of traditional and 
charter school students residing in the district. Therefore, the enrollment equals regular public 
school students and the students enrolled in charter schools living in the same district. The 
resulting quotient is an approximation of the burden placed on tax payers by the entry of charter 
schools.  
 
A second way of conceptualization expenditures adds private contributions to charter schools to 
the first measurement. The second measurement can be used to analyze how charter school 
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influence the burden placed on society as a whole to educate students in public schools. Baker 
and Ferris (2011) argue that private contributions are particularly high for charter schools in New 
York City. For the FY 2007-08, the authors find private contributions between $0 and $15,000 
per pupil in donations. Thus, in extreme cases, private contributions make up to 60 percent of all 
charter school revenue. The picture for charter schools outside NYC, which are analyzed in this 
study, is somewhat different. In 201133, on average only 4 percent of revenues were coming from 
private contributions (SUNY 2014). Therefore, as the amount of private contributions is small 
and private contributions for years prior 2010 are not available for all charter schools, I do not 
construct the second measurement.    
 
The third measurements is the quotient of school district expenditures, excluding payments to 
charter schools, and district enrollment, excluding the enrollment in charter schools. The 
measurement can be used to evaluate how charter schools effect spending on students in 
traditional public schools. Unfortunately, I am unable to exclude the expenditures imposed on 
school districts for services to charter schools such as special education evaluation, 
transportation, and health services.    
 
Performance Measures  
Student performance is a key variable in cost functions. Performance measures for this study 
have to cover a range of student performance indicators and have to be consistently measured 
across years. I use performance measures based on New York State report cards. The report 
cards are based on standardized tests examining student proficiency and mastery particularly in 
                                                          
33 I analyze the financial audits in FY 2011 as audits for earlier time periods are not available for all charter schools 
(http://www.newyorkcharters.org/progress/school-performance-reports/). 
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mathematics and English. The examinations are central to New York State’s accountability 
system and NYSED publishes the test results as part of each school’s annual report card. Starting 
in 1998-99, this system was used consistently until the 2009-10 school year when NYSED 
changed the cut scores for proficiency levels. To avoid inconsistency, I limit my sample to the 
years 1998-99 to 2008-2009.  
 
I construct a performance index consisting of the equally weighted average percentage of 
students reaching proficiency levels in reading and mathematics exams in 4th and 8th grade. 
Further, I include the percentage of students receiving a Regents Diploma by passing at least five 
Regents exams and the percentage of students not dropping out of high school. I can include or 
exclude the performance of charter school students into the measurement. Including charter 
school performance makes the measurement representative for all school in the district.  
Excluding the performance of charter school students makes the measurement representative for 
all traditional public schools in the district.  
 
Enrollment Measures 
I compute three different enrollment measures in this chapter. First, I count the students residing 
in a school district that are enrolled into a charter school. For these enrollment counts, I include 
students who cross the district border to attend a charter school in another district. Second, I 
count students residing in a school district that are enrolled in traditional public schools. Third, I 
construct a measure including all students residing in a school district enrolled in charter or 
traditional public schools (as the sum of the first and second measurement). As in other work on 
cost functions, I use the log of student enrollment and allow for a nonlinear relationship between 
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per pupil expenditures and enrollment including a squared term [log(enrollment)]2 (Duncomber 
and Yinger 2008, 2011b). Both measures are taken from the Basic Educational Data System 
(BEDS). 
 
Similar to Rockoff (2010), Duncomber and Yinger (2011b), and Eom, Nguyen-Hoang, and 
Yinger (2014), I include change in district enrollment in the cost function as well. I define 
enrollment change as the percentage change in enrollment over a two year period. I estimate the 
impact of enrollment increase and decreases of students in traditional public schools separately. 
Changes in enrollment are outside a district’s control and can be interpreted as cost factors. As I 
am controlling for district enrollment, the enrollment change variables indicate whether two 
districts with the same enrollment and performance have different costs if one of these districts 
experiences a change in enrollment and the other one is not.  
 
Cost-Related Measures 
Researchers have long recognized that cost of education depend on many factors outside a school 
district’s control. These factors include wage environment, student enrollment, and concentration 
of disadvantaged students among the student population (see Duncombe and Yinger 2008 for an 
overview).  Thus, I include the following variables in the cost models: 
 
 Teacher Salary: Teacher salary data comes from the “personnel master file” (PMF) 
administered by the New York State Education Department (NYSED). The salary 
variable is the average salary a district pays to teachers with one to five years of 
experience, controlling for the actual experience and education of teachers in that district.   
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 Percent share students free and reduced price lunch: Information on free and reduced 
price lunch are taken from the BEDS. 
 Percentage share of students with limited English proficiency: Information on students 
with limited English proficiency are taken from the BEDS. 
 Percentage share of students with severe disabilities: Information on students with severe 
disabilities are taken from the BEDS. As severely disabled count students that require 
teacher consultation services or spend at least 60 percent of their time out of the regular 
classroom.  
 
Efficiency-Related Measures  
Costs are defined as the minimum spending of district resources required to provide students an 
opportunity to reach a given level of student performance. However, the dependent variable in 
the cost model is per pupil spending. As discussed earlier, inefficiency in the cost function 
context can include both waste and district’s choice to focus on non-tested subjects areas (e.g. 
arts and athletics). While it is not possible to measure efficiency directly, it is possible to control 
for it indirectly and thereby to minimize the possibility of omitted variable bias.  
 
I follow Duncombe and Yinger (2005, 2011a) and apply two techniques to control for efficiency. 
First, I will run specifications including district fixed effects enabling me to control for all 
district characteristics including efficiency that do not vary over time. A general limitation of the 
approach is that it removes all cross-section variation and undermines the ability to estimate the 
impact of S, W, and P on costs. However, in this study I am mainly interested in the effect of 
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charter school enrollment on district efficiency. Charter school enrollment varies tremendously 
over time and its effects on costs can still be observed.  
 
Second, I include variables in the cost function that have been linked to school district efficiency 
in previous research. Note that none of the following variables has to be linked to the impact of 
charter schools on efficiency. Following Duncombe and Yinger (2005, 2008, 2011a, 2011b), I 
include various income sources, tax price, and other factors affecting voter involvement in 
monitoring district officials in my models. Income may affect efficiency in two ways. First, 
higher income may weaken voter’s incentive to monitor school officials. Second, a higher 
income may encourage voters to push for a broader set of education objects. A tax price 
decrease, similar to an increase in income, weakens voter’s incentive to monitor school officials. 
Contrarily, an increase in tax prices is likely to boost voter’s incentive to monitor school 
officials. Demographic factors such as the share of college educated parents and the share of 
children in the total population have been found to be negatively influencing school district 
efficiency. Thus, I include these demographic factors in the cost models as well. I use the 
following variables to control for district efficiency: 
 
 STAR tax share: The School Tax Relief Program (STAR) provides state funded property 
tax relief for home owners in New York State. Eom, Nguyen-Hoang, and Yinger (2014) 
show that STAR increases school district inefficiencies, and hence I include the star tax 
share in the cost function. I construct this measurement using data from the NYSED 
Fiscal Profile Reporting System (FPRS) and the American Community Survey (ACS). 
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 State aid ratio: To control for the amount of state aid a school district receives, I adjust 
state aid payments to the school district by district income, property value, and received 
STAR payments. Information is comes from FPRS and ACS. 
 Local tax share: The local tax share is calculated by dividing the market price of houses 
in a district by the property value per pupil. Information on the local tax share comes 
from FPRS and ACS.    
 Income per pupil: Information on per pupil income in the district is coming from FPRS. 
 Percentage share of college graduates: This variable measures the share of parents with 
college education in a school district.  
 Percentage share of youth: This variable measures the share of 5 to 7 year olds in a 
school district.  
 
4.6 Empirical Strategy  
 
The empirical strategy focuses on the effects of charter schools on the efficiency of providing 
education. In the empirical models, I control for changes in input factors such as teacher salaries 
and student characteristics as well as performance. Thus, holding cost factors constant the 
coefficient on the charter school enrollment variable is driven by changes in district efficiency 
associated with charter school enrollment. The caveat in the interpretation of the coefficient 
attached to charter school enrollment as efficiency effect relies on effective control for all cost 
factors associated with charter schools. Despite controlling for poverty, limited English ability, 
and disability status in the school district, I fail to control for the ability of the students crossing 
district borders to reach the performance objective of the district they transferred to. The cost of 
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bringing all students up to a given performance objective will change if large shares of either low 
or high ability students transfer into the district. The coefficient on the charter school enrollment 
variable will be downwardly biased if the incoming students have a high ability to reach the 
performance goal set by the district. The coefficient on the charter school enrollment variable 
will be upwardly biased if the incoming students have a low ability to reach the performance 
goal set by the district.  
 
The estimation strategy is similar to a difference-in-differences framework. I compare per pupil 
expenditure in districts with and without charter school enrollment before and after charter 
school entry. The estimation assumptions are that trends in per pupil expenditure in district with 
charter school enrollment were parallel prior charter school opening. To ensure the fulfillment of 
this assumption, I conduct falsification tests examining the similarity in trends prior charter 
entry. Further, charter school entry should not be correlated with other events influencing school 
district per pupil expenditures or efficiency. To ensure the fulfillment of this assumption, I 
conduct falsification tests examining changes in per pupil expenditures for districts without 
charter school enrollment but located in a county with at least one charter school and per pupil 
expenditure for another local service.  
 
For other parts of my empirical strategy, I follow Eom, Nguyen-Hoang, and Yinger (2014) who 
estimate a cost function for a similar time period to evaluate the effects of New York State’s 
property tax relief for home owners on district spending. Similar to their work, I treat the STAR 
tax share and the adjusted aid ratio as endogenous because STAR induced changes in spending 
or performance may be capitalized into housing values. I construct instruments that substitute the 
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predicted market price of houses in a district and the property value per pupil into the STAR tax 
share and adjusted aid ratio. The predications are based on 1999 values inflated by the Case-
Shiller home price indices for New York published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
Using this approach, I can capture growth in the market prize of houses and property value per 
pupil while removing the impact of STAR at the same time.   
 
In their review of literature on cost functions Duncombe and Yinger (2008) point out that teacher 
salary and student performance are treated as endogenous as well. Following Eom, Nguyen-
Hoang, and Yinger (2014), I instrument for teacher salary with the average manufacturing wage 
in the districts county. The instruments for performance are exogenous traits of school districts in 
the rest of the district’s county. A districts own choice are likely to be influenced by choice of 
nearby districts, and the choice of nearby districts are influenced by their exogenous traits. More 
specifically, I use average percentage of high cost students and LEP students in the rest of the 
county as instruments34. 
 
Similar to Eom, Nguyen-Hoang, and Yinger (2014), I examine the appropriateness of the 
instruments using two instrument tests namely overidentification and weak instrument tests. The 
results of these tests will be discussed in the next section. Further, I use Fuller’s estimator (k=4), 
which according to Hahn, Hausman, and Kuersteiner (2004), proves to be less subject to 
potential bias from weak instruments than two-stage-least squares.   
 
                                                          
34 In future drafts, I will instrument for charter school enrollment using the diversity of parent education and race as 
instrument.  
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I estimate all cost functions including district fixed effects, linear district time trends, and year 
fixed effects. District fixed effects control for unobserved, time-invariant districts influencing 
efficiency or cost. The district trends control for a district’s spending trajectory and the year 
fixed effects for specific characteristics of the years included in the sample.    
 
4.7 Results 
 
Table 20 presents results for cost functions using charter school indicators and counts of charter 
school in the district as independent variables of interest. For the sake of brevity, I report only 
the estimated coefficients on the charter school indicators but note that all specifications reported 
in Table 20 and all subsequent tables include the full set of control variables, district fixed 
effects, and district specific trends. The first set of results in Table 20 are based on models using 
per pupil expenditures including payments to charter schools for a student count including 
charter school students as dependent variable. The second set of result uses expenditures 
excluding payments to charter schools and a student count without charter school students as 
dependent variable. All subsequent tables follow the same format.  
 
The first two columns state results for charter school indicators turning on after a charter school 
moves into a school district. The estimated coefficients on the indicator are negative, close to 
zero, and not statistically significant. Columns III and IV use a charter school count as 
independent variable of interest. The coefficients are negative and statistically significant. The 
result suggest that an additional charter school decreases the per pupil expenditures used to 
achieve a given level of achievement in the district by 1.5 percent. Columns V and VI split up 
the charter school count in measurements indicating different numbers of charter schools. The 
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coefficients on the indicators up to two charter schools are close to zero and statistically not 
significant. The coefficient on the indicator for three charter school is negative and statistically 
not significant. The coefficients on the remaining indicators are negative and statistically 
significant. Having four or more charter schools in the district decrease current and operating 
expenditures used to achieve a given level performance level  by about 7 percent35 relative to a 
district with no charter school.  
 
The second set of columns presents results for regressions using expenditures without charter 
school payments as dependent variable. In Column VII and VIII, similar to the previous 
estimations, the coefficients on the charter school indicator are negative and not statistically 
significant. Columns IX and X show negative and statistically significant coefficient on the 
charter school count. The result suggest that an additional charter school in the district decreases 
the per pupil expenditures used to achieve a given level of performance by traditional schools by 
about 2 percent. Columns XI and XII report the coefficients on the measurements indicating 
different numbers of charter schools. The coefficients are all negative. The coefficients attached 
to the first two indicators are not statistically significant. The coefficients on the following 
indicators are statistically significant. They indicate that three charter schools decrease per pupil 
spending used to achieve a given level of performance by about 6 percent and four or more 
charter schools decrease spending by about 10 percent.  
 
Table 21 states results using charter school enrollment as independent variable of interest. The 
models in Table 21 take charter school enrollments from outside the district into consideration, 
                                                          
35 It is important to note that there are only 4 districts with more than one charter school.   
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and hence are preferred to the results presented in Table 20. Again, the first set of results are 
based on models using expenditures including charter payments as dependent variable. The 
second set of results are based on models using expenditures without charter school payments as 
dependent variable. Columns I and II report coefficients on indictors for different charter school 
enrollments. The coefficients on the first two indicators are close to zero and statistically not 
significant. The following indicators have negative and statistically significant coefficients. 
Enrolling between 200 and 300 students in charter schools decreases district expenditures used to 
achieve a given level of student performance by about 3.5 percent. Enrolling between 300 and 
500 students in charter schools decreases expenditures by about 3 percent. Finally, enrolling 
more than 500 students in charter schools reduces spending by about 8 percent.  
 
The next model represents the specification I prefer for estimating the effect of charter schools 
on district expenditures. The first term is the log of charter school enrollment in the school 
district and the second term is the log of enrollment squared. The specification gives full 
functional form flexibility while at the same time even small changes in charter school 
enrollment are taken into account. In Columns III and IV, the coefficients on both terms are 
statistically significant. To illustrate the magnitude of the charter school effect, I calculate the 
effect for different enrollments and graph the result in Figure 12. Charter schools decrease 
district expenditures between 1.1 and 3.4 percent depending on the number of students enrolled 
in charter schools. The effect grows with increasing charter school enrollment. The graph shows 
a step fall of the effect up to the enrollment of 500 students. Afterwards, the effect decreases at a 
slower rate.    
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The next columns in Table 21 use an expenditure measurement without charter school payments 
as dependent variable. In Columns V and VI, similar to the pervious specification, the 
coefficients on the indictors for a charter school enrollment up to 300 have coefficients close to 
zero and they are not statistically significant. The coefficients on the next indicators are negative 
and statistically significant. Enrolling between 200 and 500 charter school students decreases 
spending for students in traditional schools by 4.5 percent. Enrolling more than 500 students in 
charter school decreases spending for students in traditional public schools by about 9.7 percent.   
 
Columns VII and VIII include the log of charter school enrollment and the squared log of charter 
school enrollment as independent variables of interest. The coefficients on both measurements 
are statistically significant. The varying magnitude of the charter school effect is depicted in 
Figure 13. Charter schools decrease spending for students in traditional schools between 1.5 and 
4.3 percent. The effect is more negative with increasing charter school enrollment. Again, the 
effect decreases sharply up to an enrollment of 500 students. Afterwards, decreases at a slower 
rate.  
 
The results stated in Table 20 and 21 are estimated using instruments for teacher salary, the 
STAR and state aid term. I conducted Hansen’s J over-identification tests for the 2SLS models 
and the results were consistent with valid instrumental variables: p-values ranging from .37 to 
.53 for rejecting the null hypothesis of exogenous instrumental variables. Further, the 
instruments are strongly correlated with the endogenous variables. I report the first stages of the 
two stage estimations in Table 22. All coefficients are statistically significant. Further, the F-
statistics in the first stage regressions range between 34.41 and 139.53, and hence are greater 
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than the suggested value of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997). These statistics and the 
use of the Fuller (k=4) estimator suggest that the results are unlikely to be biased due to weak 
instruments.  
 
4.8 Falsification Tests 
 
While the results in Tables 20 and 21 provide evidence that charter schools increase school 
district efficiency, one may be concerned that charter schools move into districts already 
experiencing increasing trends in efficiency. Moreover, one may be concerned that charter 
school enrollment is correlated with other events increasing efficiency in providing education. I 
investigate these two issues by conducting three falsification tests. The idea behind the 
falsification tests is simple, if the effects of charter school enrollment on district spending are 
truly causal than they should only hold for the relevant time period, areas that have charter 
schools, and local expenditures related to education.  
 
Table 23 summarizes the results of the falsification tests. All tests are based on models with 
operating expenditures as dependent variable, a logged charter school enrollment term, and a 
squared term of the logged charter school enrollment. The first column states results for a 
falsification test including enrollment leads for one and two years prior the first charter school 
enrollment in the district. The lead variables are equal to the charter school enrollment one and 
two years after charter school opening in the same district. The coefficients on the lead variables 
are not statistically significant and much smaller than in the previous models. The effect of the 
false charter school enrollment is close to zero. Thus, there is little reason to suspect a large bias 
in the initial estimates due to uncontrolled differences in trends prior charter school opening.  
157 
 
 
 
 
Column II states a falsification test using districts without charter school enrollment. For these 
district, I create a false charter school enrollment. The false enrollment equals the enrollment in 
the district with the most charter school students in the same county. As control group serve 
districts being located in counties having no charter school enrollment prior 2008/09. The 
coefficients on the two charter school enrollment terms are not statistically significant and the 
effect size is very close to zero. The results suggest that charter school enrollment is not 
correlated with other events at the county level influencing spending decisions.  
 
The third column presents a falsification test using the per pupil expenditures for another local 
service as dependent variable. I collected the expenditure for the local fire services from the 
webpage of the New York State comptroller36. Then, I merge this information to the 
corresponding school districts. Using these false per pupil expenditures, I rerun my main 
specification. The coefficients are all close to zero and not statistically significant. The results 
suggest that charter school enrollment is not correlated with other events at the district level 
influencing spending decisions. 
 
The second part of Table 23 uses the same specifications but with per pupil expenditures without 
charter school payments. The results are similar accept for the specification using leads for one 
and two years prior the first charter school enrollment. The coefficients on the logged enrollment 
for both lead years are statistically significant. However, the effect is close to zero meaning that 
                                                          
36 The webpage can be found here: http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/datanstat/findata/index_choice.htm. As the 
areas of the local fire services and school district do not match perfectly in all cases, I was unable to provide 
information for all school districts. .  
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charter school enrollment leads to a 0.00 percent increase or decrease in expenditures. The next 
two columns show coefficients suggesting no effect of charter schools on spending. All 
coefficients are not statistically significant and the magnitude of the effects is close to zero. The 
results confirm that charter school enrollment is not coincidently related to other events at the 
county or district level influencing per pupil expenditures.   
 
4.9 Heterogeneity of the Estimates 
 
Tables 24 and 25 provide several robustness checks using different samples of school districts, 
charter school enrollment in different grades, and differentiates the charter school effect by time. 
The first two columns in Table 24 show results for subsamples of districts located up or 
downstate. The coefficients are not statistically significant and the charter school effect is much 
smaller than in the main specification. Given the results, charter schools do not seem to have a 
different effects in areas close to New York City and areas further away.  
 
Column III to V present models using subsamples of districts with different need/resource 
capacities. The model using a subsample with high need districts shows statistically significant 
coefficients on both enrollment terms. The magnitude of the effect is larger than in the main 
specification ranging from -1.8 to -7.3 percent for enrollments between 50 and 5000 charter 
school students. The larger magnitude is not a surprise as most charter schools locate in districts 
with high need/resource capacity and these districts are likely to drive the overall result.  
 
The model using a subsample with average need districts shows statistically insignificant 
coefficients. The magnitude of the effect is close to zero. The result is somewhat surprising as 
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two districts having charter schools are located in districts with average need/resource capacity. 
According to the theoretical framework, there are two potential explanations for the result. First, 
charter school enrollment does neither create efficiency gains nor access cost. Second, both 
mechanism cancel each other out.   
 
In Column V, I present results using a sample of districts with low need resource capacity. Recall 
from Table 18 that none of the charter schools is located in a low need district, and hence charter 
school enrollments in this sample are solely based on students crossing school district borders. 
The coefficients on the two enrollment terms are statistically significant. The magnitude ranges 
between -0.7 and -7.2 percent for enrollments between 2 and 20 students. The magnitude is 
similar compared to districts with high need/resources capacity. Therefore, the effect of charter 
school enrollments on per pupil expenditures is driven by districts with high and low 
need/resource capacity. 
 
The following columns present the results for models using per pupil expenditures without 
charter school payments as dependent variable. Models using the subsamples of districts located 
up or downstate do not show statistically significant coefficients and the charter school effect is 
close to zero (Columns VI and VII). The result indicates that the effect of charter school 
enrollment does not differ between regions closer or further away from New York City. In 
Columns VII to X I re- run the main specification using samples of school districts with high, 
average, or low need/resource capacity. Similar to the earlier presented results in the same table, 
the coefficients for subsamples using high and low need/resource capacity school districts are 
statistically significant. The magnitude of the effect for district with high need capacity ranges 
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between -1.5 and -6.7 percent for charter enrollments between 50 and 5000 students. The 
magnitude of the effect for districts with low need capacity ranges between -0.8 and -7.3 percent 
for enrollments between 2 and 20 students. Again, the effect of charter school enrollments on per 
pupil expenditures is driven by districts with high and low need/resource capacity. 
 
The first two columns of Table 24 present a robust check based on different grades offered by 
charter schools. The first column presents the results using a subsample with charter school 
enrollment in grades K to 6. The coefficients on the enrollment terms are statistically significant. 
The effect ranges between -1.1 and -3.2 percent for enrollments between 50 and 4000 students. 
The coefficients on the enrollment terms for the subsample of students in grades 7 to 12 are not 
statistically significant. Therefore, the overall result is driven by charter enrollments in grades K 
to 6. This is not a surprises as a greater shares of charter school students is enrolled I the grades 
(see Table 18).     
 
Column III presents the results for a model splitting the post period up in tree intervals of three 
years each. The coefficients on the interactions between enrollment and a post period of 4th to 6th 
year after the first charter school enrollment are statistically significant. The magnitude of the 
effect ranges between -1.0 and -3.3 percent for enrollments of 50 and 5000 students respectively. 
The result suggests that reductions in per pupil expenditures are mainly realized 4 to 6 years after 
charter school entry.  
 
The second section of Table 25 presents the results using per pupil expenditures without charter 
school payments. The results are similar to the results presented in the first part of the table. The 
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coefficients on the charter school enrollment terms are statistically significant for the subsample 
of charter school students in grades K to 6. The effect ranges between -0.8 and -2.7 for 
enrollments or 50 to 4000 students respectively. Again, the result suggest that the overall result 
for models using expenditures without charter school enrollment are driven by enrollments in 
grades K to 6.  
 
Column VI investigates the timing of the charter school effect. Similar to the previous results, 
the coefficients on the interactions between enrollment and a post period of 4th to 6th year after 
the first charter school enrollment are statistically significant. The magnitude of the effect ranges 
between -1.3 and -3.9 percent for enrollments of 50 and 5000 students respectively. Again, the 
result suggests that reductions in per pupil expenditures for traditional public school students are 
mainly realized 4 to 6 years after charter school entry. 
 
4.10 Conclusions   
   
In the theoretical section of the chapter, I work out how charter schools affect school district 
performance and the costs and efficiency of providing education. The empirical strategy aims at 
estimating the effects of charter school enrollments on efficiency while controlling for costs and 
performance. Utilizing data for all New York State school districts (excluding New York City) 
from 1998/99 to 2009/10, I find that charter school increase the efficiency of providing 
education. The results are confirmed by several falsification and robustness checks. 
 
The magnitude of the efficiency effect differs depending on the number of students enrolled in 
charter schools. The effect ranges between -1.1 and -3.4 for enrollments between 50 and 5000 
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charter school students holding performance and cost factors constant. Given average per pupil 
expenditures of $15,395 (including charter payments), charter school reduce district expenditure 
on average between $169 and $523 per pupil. 
 
The caveat in the interpretation of the coefficient attached on charter school enrollment as 
efficiency variable is that I have to control for all potential cost factors associated with charter 
schools that could influence per pupil expenditures. However, in this draft of the chapter, I 
cannot control for the ability of the students crossing district borders. Later drafts will shine more 
light into transferring students and will instrument for charter school enrollment.  
 
Given multiple outputs and input sharing in the production of education, the reduction of 
inefficiencies in the production of test scores may have two different sources. First, the reduction 
could reflect decreases in spending for outputs other than test scores. Second, the reduction could 
reflect the use of more efficient technologies to educate students.  
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Figure 12: Effect of Charter Schools Enrollment on Per Pupil Expenditures Including Charter Payments 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Effect of Charter Schools Enrollment on Per Pupil Expenditures Without Charter Payments 
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Table 18: Summary of Charter School Openings and Enrollments 
 
 
District First Charter 
Established
Number of 
Charter Schools 
in 2008/09
Location: 
Downstate
Location: 
Upstate
High Need 
District
Average Need 
District
Charter 
Enrollment
K to 6
Charter 
Enrollment 
7 to 12
Share of 
District 
Enrollment 
Charter 
Enrollment 
Outside District
Albany 1999/00 9 Yes Yes 1536 313 19.18% 381
Buffalo 2000/01 14 Yes Yes 3845 2400 15.91% 1385
Rochester 2000/01 5 Yes Yes 783 190 2.84% 53
Roosevelt 2000/01 1 Yes Yes 178 50 7.64% 273
Riverhead 2001/02 1 Yes Yes 117 0 2.48% 115
Kenmore-Tonawanda 2001/02 1 Yes Yes 85 37 1.44% 1441
Troy 2001/02 1 Yes Yes 321 16 7.54% 152
Lackawanna 2002/03 1 Yes Yes 299 46 15.09% 178
Syracuse 2002/03 2 Yes Yes 505 364 4.14% 44
Yonkers 2005/06 1 Yes Yes 242 2 1.04% 114
Niagara Falls 2006/07 1 Yes Yes 319 0 4.11% 17
Source: Number of charter schools and year of establishment are taken from the SUNY Charter School Institute web page (http://www.newyorkcharters.org). 
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Table 19: Summary Statistics 
Mean Standard 
Deviation
Min Max
Dependent Variables
Current expenditures per pupil 
(with charter school payments) 16,314 4,470 9,750 49,920
Current expenditures per pupil 
(without charter school payments) 16,319 4,474 9,750 49,920
Operating expenditures per pupil 
(with charter school payments) 15,395 4,266 9,160 48,449
Operating expenditures per pupil 
(without charter school payments) 15,399 4,269 9,160 48,449
Charter School Variables
Number of charter schools 0.03 0.45 0.00 14.00
Charter School enrollment (by residence) 15.06 199.76 0.00 6245.00
Performance Variable
Performance Index (incl. student proficiency, 
diploma rates, non-dropout rates) 75.29 11.14 29.18 97.94
Cost Related Variables
Teacher salary (1 - 5 years experience) 22,505 9,324 1 61,744
Enrollment (by residence) 3,317 3,721 208 45,459
Percent of students with severe disabilities 1.31 0.82 0.00 7.46
Percent LEP students 2.04 3.52 0.00 33.21
Percent free lunch 19.84 15.82 0.00 90.84
Efficiency Variables
Local tax share 0.44 0.14 0.03 1.05
STAR tax share 0.78 0.13 0.32 1.00
State aid term 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.22
Income per pupil 115,776 95,391 25,180 993,261
Percent college graduates 28.33 14.91 6.00 83.40
Percent yout (age 5 - 7) 17.54 2.34 8.81 26.56
Instrumental Variables
Average percent of high cost students in the 
county (excluding focal district) 1.30 0.36 0.00 2.60
Average percent of LEP students in the 
county (excluding focal district) 1.71 1.84 0.00 5.98
Annual county average salary of 
manufactering jobs 48,560 13,875 20,756 99,889
STAR tax share with inflated 1999 property 
values 0.75 0.09 0.44 1.00
Adjusted state aid ratio with 1999 property 
values 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.38
Notes: Summary measurements include fiscal years 1999 to 2009. All monetary variables are adjusted for inflation 
and displayed in 2009 dollars. 
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Table 20: Charter School Effect on District Expenditures Using Charter Indicators 
 
  
Current Operating Current Operating Current Operating Current Operating Current Operating Current Operating
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X) (XI) (XII)
Charter School variables
Charter school indicator -0.00289 -0.00249 -0.0176 -0.0185
(0.0151) (0.0155) (0.0159) (0.0164)
Charter school count -0.0150*** -0.0157*** -0.0215*** -0.0229***
(0.00545) (0.00555) (0.00521) (0.00531)
Indicator for 1 charter school 0.00615 0.00651 -0.00192 -0.00239
(0.0151) (0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0163)
Indicator for 2 charter schools 0.00293 0.00742 -0.00889 -0.00512
(0.0356) (0.0362) (0.0411) (0.0425)
Indicator for 3 charter schools -0.0428 -0.0420 -0.0597** -0.0605**
(0.0275) (0.0276) (0.0275) (0.0278)
Indicator for 4 charter schools -0.0723** -0.0725* -0.103*** -0.107***
(0.0360) (0.0374) (0.0355) (0.0370)
Indicator for 5 or more charter schools -0.0719** -0.0730** -0.0954** -0.0989**
(0.0358) (0.0367) (0.0383) (0.0398)
Observations 4,731 4,731 4,731 4,731 4,731 4,731 4,731 4,731 4,731 4,731 4,731 4,731
R squarred 0.793 0.772 0.795 0.774 0.791 0.770 0.792 0.771 0.796 0.775 0.791 0.769
Note: All regressions are estimated with controls for performance, cost variables, efficiency variables and enrollment variables. Further, district fixed effects, district trends, and year fixed efefcts are included. The sample consist 
of all districts outside NYC that belong to a metroplitan statistical area and serve classes K to 12. Regressions are estimated using the fuller estimator and robust standard errors. Instruments are used for teacher salary, STAR tax 
share, and state aid term. 
Expenditure including
 Charter School Payments
Expenditure without
 Charter School Payments
Robust standard errors in paranthesis: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 
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Table 21: Charter School Effect on District Expenditures Using Charter Enrollment 
  
Current Operating Current Operating Current Operating Current Operating
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
Charter School variables
Charter enrollment < 100 0.000845 0.000738 0.000227 0.000071
(0.00364) (0.00382) (0.00372) (0.00390)
Charter enrollment < 200 students and > 100 0.000734 5.14e-05 -0.00427 -0.00548
(0.0118) (0.0121) (0.0114) (0.0118)
Charter enrollment < 300 students and > 200 -0.0354* -0.0369* -0.0441** -0.0465**
(0.0200) (0.0212) (0.0194) (0.0205)
Charter enrollment < 500 students and > 300 -0.0290** -0.0299** -0.0442*** -0.0465***
(0.0128) (0.0131) (0.0134) (0.0136)
Charter enrollment > 500 -0.0795*** -0.0802*** -0.0960*** -0.0984***
(0.0209) (0.0217) (0.0216) (0.0225)
Log charter enrollment 0.00776** 0.00812** 0.00871** 0.00919**
(0.00379) (0.00400) (0.00388) (0.00409)
Log charter enrollment squarred -0.00238*** -0.00246*** -0.00295*** -0.00311***
(0.000833) (0.000870) (0.000837) (0.000875)
Observations 4,731 4,731 4,731 4,731 4,731 4,731 4,731 4,731
R squarred 0.794 0.773 0.793 0.772 0.794 0.773 0.793 0.771
Expenditure including
 Charter School Payments
Expenditure without
 Charter School Payments
Robust standard errors in paranthesis: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 
Note: All regressions are estimated with controls for performance, cost variables, efficiency variables and enrollment variables. Further, district fixed effects, district trends, and 
year fixed efefcts are included. The sample consist of all districts outside NYC that belong to a metroplitan statistical area and serve classes K to 12. Regressions are estimated 
using the fuller estimator and robust standard errors. Instruments are used for teacher salary, STAR tax share, and state aid term. 
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Table 22: First Stage Coefficients 
  
Performance Index Teacher Salary STAR Tax share Adjusted aid ratio
Average percent of high cost students in the 
county (excluding focal district) 0.0012 0.0219*** -0.0002*** 0.0001
(0.0046) (0.004) (0.0001) (0.0004)
Average percent of LEP students in the 
county (excluding focal district) 0.0063** 0.0293** 0.0138*** 0.0007**
(0.003) (0.0144) (0.0019) (0.0003)
Annual county average salary of 
manufactering jobs 0.0507*** 0.4438*** -0.0054 -0.0005
(0.0109) (0.0638) (0.0061) (0.0011)
STAR tax share with inflated 1999 property 
values -0.0412 0.354** 1.3250*** 0.0799***
(0.0397) (0.1737) (0.0189) (0.0049)
Adjusted state aid ratio with 1999 property 
values 0.0001* -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001***
(0.0000218) (0.000027) (0.000027) (0.000021)
Dependent Variables 
Robust standard errors in paranthesis: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 
Note: Other variables in the first stage results are not displayed. 
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Table 23: Falsification Tests 
 
Leads Area Change Spending 
Fire Dept.
Leads Area Change Spending 
Fire Dept.
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Charter School variables
Log charter enrollment (1 year lead) -0.00056 -0.00086**
(0.00045) (0.00041)
Log charter enrollment squarred (1 year lead) -0.0004 -0.00069
(0.00044) (0.00044)
Log charter enrollment (2 year lead) 0.000275 0.00019**
(0.00105) (0.00097)
Log charter enrollment squarred (2 year lead) -0.000161 0.00015
(0.000981) (0.00011)
Log charter enrollment 0.00512** 0.0272 -0.0129 0.0082* 0.0272 -0.0138
(0.00044) (0.0217) (0.0391) (0.00442) (0.0218) (0.0374)
Log charter enrollment squarred -0.00257** -0.00198 0.000629 -0.00343*** -0.00197 0.00114
(0.001) (0.00208) (0.00742) (0.00092) (0.00208) (0.00652)
Control Variables
Performance Variable Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enrollment Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cost Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Efficiency Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects and Trends
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,731 775 2,946 4,731 775 2,946
R squarred 0.782 0.752 0.357 0.780 0.752 0.356
Operating Expenditure including
 Charter School Payments
Operating Expenditure without
 Charter School Payments
Note: All regressions are estimatd with district and year fixed effects. Sample consist of all districts outside NYC that belong to a metroplitan 
statistical area and serve classes K to 12. Regressions are estimated using the fuller estimator and robust standard errors. Instruments are used for 
teacher salary, STAR tax share, and state aid term. 
Robust standard errors in paranthesis: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 
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Table 24: Heterogeneity Checks Using Area and Need/Resource Capacity Subsamples 
downstate 
urban
upstate
urban
high need avg. need low need downstate 
urban
upstate
urban
high need avg. need low need
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X)
Charter School variables
Log charter enrollment -0.00654 0.00101 0.0289*** -0.00458 0.0318** -0.00710 0.000215 0.0281*** -0.00544 0.033**
(0.00967) (0.00488) (0.00758) (0.00693) (0.0122) (0.00972) (0.00492) (0.00786) (0.00689) (0.0123)
Log charter enrollment squarred 0.000772 -0.00119 -0.00599*** -0.000173  -0.01743** 0.00159 -0.000552 -0.00559*** 0.000719  -0.0178**
(0.00206) (0.00112) (0.00117) (0.00183) (0.0052) (0.00206) (0.00118) (0.00123) (0.00180) (0.0052)
Observations 1,441 2,847 385 2,692 1,045 1,441 2,847 385 2,692 1,045
R squarred 0.779 0.795 0.805 0.677 0.804 0.783 0.793 0.803 0.680 0.804
Operating Expenditure including
 Charter School Payments
Operating Expenditure without
 Charter School Payments
Note: All regressions are estimated with controls for performance, cost variables, efficiency variables and enrollment variables. Further, district fixed effects, district trends, and year fixed efefcts are 
included. The sample consist of all districts outside NYC that belong to a metroplitan statistical area and serve classes K to 12. Regressions are estimated using the fuller estimator and robust standard 
errors. Instruments are used for teacher salary, STAR tax share, and state aid term. 
Robust standard errors in paranthesis: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 
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Table 25: Heterogeneity Checks Using Grade Enrollment Subsamples and Interactions with Time 
 
  
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Charter School variables
Log charter enrollment  (K to 6) 0.00775** 0.00789*
(0.00392) (0.00405)
Log charter enrollment squarred (K to 6) -0.00242*** -0.00212**
(0.000859) (0.000916)
Log charter enrollment  (7 to 12) -0.00742 -0.00783
(0.00675) (0.00673)
Log charter enrollment squarred (7 to 12) -0.000808 -0.000604
(0.00153) (0.00151)
Log charter enrollment  X  1st to 3rd year post 0.00408 0.00475
(0.00394) (0.00393)
Log charter enrollment squarred  X  1st to 3rd year post -0.00155** -0.00203***
(0.000676) (0.000679)
Log charter enrollment  X  4th to 6th year post 0.00828* 0.00875*
(0.00450) (0.00453)
Log charter enrollment squarred  X  4th to 6th year post -0.00243*** -0.00278***
(0.000644) (0.000673)
Log charter enrollment  X  7th to 9th year post 0.00369 0.00335
(0.00608) (0.00625)
Log charter enrollment squarred  X  7th to 9th year post -0.000815 -0.000904
(0.000857) (0.000900)
Observations 4,731 4,731 4,731 4,731 4,731 4,731
R squarred 0.785 0.785 0.782 0.786 0.786 0.782
Operating Expenditure including
 Charter School Payments
Operating Expenditure without
 Charter School Payments
Note: All regressions are estimated with controls for performance, cost variables, efficiency variables and enrollment variables. Further, district fixed 
effects, district trends, and year fixed efefcts are included. The sample consist of all districts outside NYC that belong to a metroplitan statistical area and 
serve classes K to 12. Regressions are estimated using the fuller estimator and robust standard errors. Instruments are used for teacher salary, STAR tax 
share, and state aid term. 
Robust standard errors in paranthesis: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 
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